Brookfield v. Yates

• Decision Date: 11 December 2013
• Docket Number: Case No.: 1:11-cv-00357-AWI-JLT
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: BYRON BROOKFIELD, Petitioner, v. JAMES YATES, Warden, Respondent.

BYRON BROOKFIELD, Petitioner, v. JAMES YATES, Warden, Respondent.

Case No.: 1:11-cv-00357-AWI-JLT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Dated: December 11, 2013

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO

DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS (Doc. 1)

ORDER DIRECTING THAT OBJECTIONS BE

FILED WITHIN TWENTY-ONE DAYS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is in custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") serving an indeterminate sentence of fifteen-years-to-life pursuant to a June 3, 2005 judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Kern (the "Superior Court") for discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling house (Cal. Pen. Code § 246), and conspiracy to commit the same. (Cal. Pen. Code §§ 665 & 246.) The jury also found true separate firearm and gang enhancements. (Cal. Pen. Code § § 246, 182(a); 186.22(b)(1); 12022.53.) (Doc. 21, Lodged Documents ("LD") 5, p. 2).

The trial court sentenced Petitioner to fifteen-years-to-life for the discharge of a firearm at adwelling and imposed a consecutive ten-year term for the firearm enhancement under § 12022.53. (LD 5, p. 17). However, Petitioner filed a direct appeal in the California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District (the "5^th DCA"), which, on October 12, 2006 in an unpublished decision, struck the ten-year enhancement as unauthorized under California law. (LD 5). Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which was granted in case no. S147980, to consider whether the gang enhancement was properly imposed in addition to the firearm enhancement. (LD 7). On August 31, 2009, the state supreme court affirmed the 5^th DCA's decision to strike the ten-year consecutive enhancement, but offered a different legal explanation for why that disposition was correct. (LD 11).

On July 22, 2010, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, raising grounds two and five in the instant petition. (LD 12). On February 16, 2011, that petition was summarily denied. (LD 13).

On March 2, 2011, Petitioner filed the instant petition. (Doc. 1). Respondent's answer was filed on June 17, 2011. (Doc. 20). On August 3, 2011, Petitioner filed his Traverse. (Doc. 25). Respondent does not expressly concede that all grounds for relief in the petition have been fully exhausted; however, neither does Respondent contend that any of the claims remain unexhausted. (Doc. 20, p. 11).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court adopts the Statement of Facts in the 5^th DCA's unpublished decision¹:

On the evening of June 14, 2004, Freddie Mae Jackson attended a casual social gathering in front of an apartment complex consisting of two buildings located at 328 Monterey Street in Bakersfield. Around 8:00 p.m., she observed a small gray car pull up and park across the street from the complex, at the corner of Monterey and Inyo Streets. The vehicle was occupied by two men, the driver and a passenger. Jackson described the passenger as a young Black man. The passenger's hair was styled in an afro and he was wearing a red shirt. She did not get a good look at the driver. The occupants sat in the gray car for approximately five minutes. Ebony Johnson approached the gray car and asked its occupants "what you all want." A dark blue Ford LTD slowly drove up Monterey Street and passed the gray car. The driver of the gray car leaned over and began firing a medium sized, black handgun. The driver was pointingthe gun toward Jackson's sons, Casanova and Christopher, who were standing by the mailbox. Jackson heard seven or eight shots. She does not know if the passenger was armed. The gray car immediately drove away. Jackson telephoned for emergency assistance.

Bakersfield City Police Officers Jay Wells and Mike Thompson were dispatched to the scene at approximately 8:15 p.m. Nichols informed them that two people in a gray car that was parked on the north side of Inyo Street had fired a handgun at the apartment complex. Wells found two or three bullet holes in an exterior wall of the complex's west building. Nichols suggested to the officers that they look for the suspects at an apartment complex located at the intersection of Oregon and Kern Streets.

Just as the officers arrived at this location, appellant walked in front of their patrol car. Appellant matched Nichols's description of the passenger. The officers detained appellant and another man, Curtis Epperson. Thompson found a dark blue Ford LTD parked in a nearby alley.

Jackson was transported to appellant's location. She identified appellant as the passenger in the gray car. She did not recognize Epperson.

Bakersfield City Police Officer Herman is assigned to a special enforcement unit primarily involved in criminal street gang suppression. He conducted the follow-up investigation. Herman observed bullet holes in the southwest wall of the apartment building, in a wrought iron fence and in a tree. He believes the bullet holes in the wall were recent because the stucco around the holes was not discolored.

Herman contacted Jackson and Nichols. On July 14, he showed them three photographic lineups each. Jackson identified appellant in one of the photographic lineups as an occupant of the gray car. She identified Epperson in another photographic lineup as the driver of the LTD.

It was stipulated that the Bloods were an ongoing criminal street gang operating in Bakersfield. Herman opined that appellant and Epperson were active Blood members on June 14. He further opined that the shooting was committed for the benefit of the Bloods. (Evidence pertaining to the gang enhancement will be set forth in greater detail at part II, post.)

Appellant presented an alibi defense. Al Saleh, a clerk at the Alfarooq Market located at 800 Kentucky Street, testified that appellant came into the store between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. to purchase cigars and chips. Saleh believes appellant was in the store for a total of four to five minutes. Appellant's sister-in-law, Brandi Callahan, testified appellant was home during the day on June 14. He left the residence around 8:00 p.m. on foot, heading south on Kern Street. She believes appellant walked to the store.

(LD 5, pp. 2-4).

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n. 7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. The challenged conviction arises out of the Kern County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C.§ 2241(d).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (holding the AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.

II. Legal Standard of Review

A petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) will not be granted unless he can show that the state court's adjudication of his claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412-413.

A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law "if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases, or "if it confronts a set of factsthat is materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court] decision but reaches a different result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005), citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 326, 405-406 (2000). A state court decision involves an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law "if the state court applies [the Supreme Court's precedents] to the facts in an objectively unreasonable manner." Id., quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-410; Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002)(per curiam).

Consequently, a federal court may not grant habeas relief simply because the state court's decision is incorrect or erroneous; the state court's decision must also be objectively unreasonable. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 511 (2003) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 409). In Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. 770 (2011), the U.S. Supreme Court explained that an "unreasonable application" of federal law is an objective test that turns on "whether it is possible that fairminded jurists could disagree" that the state court decision meets the standards set forth in the AEDPA. If fairminded jurists could so disagree, habeas relief is precluded. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786. As the United States Supreme Court has noted, AEDPA's standard of "contrary to, or involv[ing] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law" is "difficult to meet," because the purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a "'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,'" and not as a means of error correction. Richter, 131...