Brookfield v. Yates
Decision Date | 11 December 2013 |
Docket Number | Case No.: 1:11-cv-00357-AWI-JLT |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Parties | BYRON BROOKFIELD, Petitioner, v. JAMES YATES, Warden, Respondent. |
DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS (Doc. 1)
ORDER DIRECTING THAT OBJECTIONS BE
Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Petitioner is in custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") serving an indeterminate sentence of fifteen-years-to-life pursuant to a June 3, 2005 judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Kern (the "Superior Court") for discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling house (Cal. Pen. Code § 246), and conspiracy to commit the same. (Cal. Pen. Code §§ 665 & 246.) The jury also found true separate firearm and gang enhancements. (Cal. Pen. Code § § 246, 182(a); 186.22(b)(1); 12022.53.) (Doc. 21, Lodged Documents ("LD") 5, p. 2).
The trial court sentenced Petitioner to fifteen-years-to-life for the discharge of a firearm at adwelling and imposed a consecutive ten-year term for the firearm enhancement under § 12022.53. (LD 5, p. 17). However, Petitioner filed a direct appeal in the California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District (the "5th DCA"), which, on October 12, 2006 in an unpublished decision, struck the ten-year enhancement as unauthorized under California law. (LD 5). Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which was granted in case no. S147980, to consider whether the gang enhancement was properly imposed in addition to the firearm enhancement. (LD 7). On August 31, 2009, the state supreme court affirmed the 5th DCA's decision to strike the ten-year consecutive enhancement, but offered a different legal explanation for why that disposition was correct. (LD 11).
On July 22, 2010, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, raising grounds two and five in the instant petition. (LD 12). On February 16, 2011, that petition was summarily denied. (LD 13).
On March 2, 2011, Petitioner filed the instant petition. (Doc. 1). Respondent's answer was filed on June 17, 2011. (Doc. 20). On August 3, 2011, Petitioner filed his Traverse. (Doc. 25). Respondent does not expressly concede that all grounds for relief in the petition have been fully exhausted; however, neither does Respondent contend that any of the claims remain unexhausted. (Doc. 20, p. 11).
The Court adopts the Statement of Facts in the 5th DCA's unpublished decision1:
Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n. 7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. The challenged conviction arises out of the Kern County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C.§ 2241(d).
On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 ( ). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.
A petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) will not be granted unless he can show that the state court's adjudication of his claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412-413.
A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law "if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases, or "if it confronts a set of factsthat is materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court] decision but reaches a different result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005), citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 326, 405-406 (2000). A state court decision involves an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law "if the state court applies [the Supreme Court's precedents] to the facts in an objectively unreasonable manner." Id., quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-410; Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002)(per curiam).
Consequently, a federal court may not grant habeas relief simply because the state court's decision is incorrect or erroneous; the state court's decision must also be objectively unreasonable. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 511 (2003) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 409). In Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. 770 (2011), the U.S. Supreme Court explained that an "unreasonable application" of federal law is an objective test that turns on "whether it is possible that fairminded jurists could disagree" that the state court decision meets the standards set forth in the AEDPA. If fairminded jurists could so disagree, habeas relief is precluded. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786. As the United States Supreme Court has noted, AEDPA's standard of "contrary to, or involv[ing] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law" is "difficult to meet," because the purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a "'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,'" and not as a means of error correction. Richter, 131...
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