Brookins v. The Round Table, Inc.

• Decision Date: 13 October 1981
• Citation: 624 S.W.2d 547
• Parties: William Ray BROOKINS, Jr., et al., Appellants, v. THE ROUND TABLE, INC., et al., Appellees.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 547

624 S.W.2d 547

William Ray BROOKINS, Jr., et al., Appellants, v. THE ROUND TABLE, INC., et al., Appellees.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Oct. 13, 1981.

Brenda Gale Willett, Dallas, Tex., J. D. Lee, Madisonville, for appellants, William Ray Brookins, Jr., et al.

Gayle Malone, Jr., Trabue, Sturdivant & DeWitt, Nashville, amicus curiae.

N. R. Coleman, Jr., Milligan, Coleman, Fletcher, Gaby & Kilday, Greeneville, for appellees, The Round Table, Inc.

Charles R. Terry & Associates, Morristown, for appellees, Charles Ford and Ford's Package Store.

OPINION

COOPER, Justice.

The application for permission to appeal was granted in this case to review the action of the Court of Appeals in affirming a summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' suit for damages for personal injuries predicated upon the illegal sale of intoxicating beverages to William Ray Brookins, Jr., a minor.

The minor plaintiff was seriously injured at about 12:30 a.m. on May 8, 1977, when the automobile in which he was riding as a passenger left the highway and struck a tree. There is no question but that the driver of the automobile was intoxicated at the time of the accident and that his intoxication was a cause of his loss of control of the automobile.

Plaintiffs brought suit against Charles Ford, doing business as Ford's Package Store, and The Round Table, Inc., a restaurant in Greeneville, Tennessee, charging the defendants with unlawfully selling intoxicating beverages to Brookins, who was under the age of eighteen. Plaintiffs contend that the drinking of the intoxicating beverages by Brookins diminished his capacity to exercise care for his own safety, and kept him from realizing the seriousness of the danger in riding with his intoxicated friend.

The trial judge sustained defendants' motions for summary judgment, holding that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed, pointing out that the minor plaintiff had actively contributed to the intoxication of the adult driver by illegally procuring the intoxicating beverages and by sharing them with the driver to the point of mutual intoxication.

Taking issue with the action of the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs insist a commercial vendor of alcohol is liable for any and all injuries resulting from the unlawful sale of alcoholic beverages to minors; that the defense of contributory negligence is not available to a vendor in the action brought by a minor, who sustained injury while under the influence of the intoxicant sold him; and, that, if contributory negligence is a defense, it is an issue for the jury under the circumstances of this case.

This cause having been dismissed on summary judgment, we are left to glean the material facts from the pleadings and the limited discovery depositions taken by the parties. From these, we find that on May 7, 1977, William Brookins, Jr. was 17 years and 3 months of age. That day he was picked up at his home by Jim Williamson, then 18 years of age, and the two went to Ford's Package Store where the minor plaintiff purchased a quantity of beer and two bottles of champagne. Thereafter, and without consuming any of the beverages, the two picked up their dates for the night and went to their high school prom. They stayed at the prom a short time and then went to the Round Table Restaurant at about 6:00 p.m. to dine. While at the restaurant, they ordered, for the four in the party, two steaks and two salads. Jim Williamson and William Brookins, Jr. each drank one beer. This was the first alcoholic beverage that any of the party drank that night.

Upon leaving the restaurant, the minor plaintiff and his male companion, who was driving the automobile, began to drink the beverages purchased at Ford's. They returned to the prom and left it again to go "riding around" and parking. The accident occurred at about 12:30 a.m. At sometime just prior to the accident, Brookins complained to Williamson about his driving and tried to take the keys from him, without success. Brookins testified that if he had not been drinking, he would not have ridden with Williamson. He also testified that he would not have ridden with Williamson if he had had any other way to get home.

At common law, an individual who sold or furnished alcohol to another generally was held not to be liable for damages resulting from the other's intoxication, even if those damages were foreseeable, in part because the other's acceptance and use of the intoxicants was considered an independent intervening cause, cutting off any liability. See Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 821; 45 AM.JUR.2d Intoxicating Liquors § 554. Today, even in the absence of statutes prohibiting the sale of intoxicating beverages to a minor or to an intoxicated person, courts generally recognize that the furnishing of intoxicants may be the proximate cause of an injury resulting from intoxication, the negligence consisting of the creation of a situation or condition which involves unreasonable risk because of the foreseeable action of another. Trail v. Christian, 298 Minn. 101, 213 N.W.2d 618 (1973); Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal.3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal.Rptr. 623 (1971); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); Anno., 97 A.L.R.3d 528. See also Mitchell v. Ketner, 54 Tenn.App. 656, 393 S.W.2d 755, wherein the court emphasizes that:

We are unwilling to hold that, no matter what the circumstances, the act of the purchaser and not the sale constitutes the proximate cause of injury to third persons or that consumption of the intoxicant is always an independent, intervening act which breaks the chain of causation. 393 S.W.2d 759.

The court further points out that whether the sale of intoxicants is the proximate cause of subsequent injuries is essentially a question of foreseeability, stating:

The ultimate test is one of foreseeability which in turn must rest on such factors as the apparent condition of the buyer of the intoxicant and whether he is likely to become the driver of an automobile or inflict injury upon third persons by some other means reasonably to be anticipated or foreseen. Id., at 759.

The public policy of this state is to prevent minors from purchasing, possessing, or imbibing alcoholic beverages. To carry out this policy, the legislature has expressly forbidden a vendor of alcoholic beverages to sell to a minor, ¹ under penalty of law. See T.C.A. §§ 57-3-406, 57-4-203, 57-5-301(a) and (c), and 57-5-303. The legislature also expressly has forbidden a minor,...