Brooks v. Andolina

Decision Date17 August 1987
Docket Number86-3652,Nos. 86-3621,s. 86-3621
Citation826 F.2d 1266
PartiesGeorge Rahsaan BROOKS v. Lt. ANDOLINA, Wilson Spencer, Paul Burgard, Capt. Tohey, Lawrence Weyandt, James Wigton, Russell Treece, George Petsock, Glen Jeffres, and Richard Thornburgh. Appeal of Lt. ANDOLINA, Wilson Spencer, Paul Burgard, Capt. Tohey, Lawrence Weyandt, James Wigton, Russell Treece, George Petsock and Glen Jeffres. George Rahsaan BROOKS, Appellant, v. Lt. ANDOLINA, Wilson Spencer, Paul Burgard, Capt. Tohey, Lawrence Weyandt, James Wigton, Russell Treece, George Petsock, Glen Jeffres, and Richard Thornburgh.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

LeRoy Zimmerman, Atty. Gen., Jean O. Davin (argued), Deputy Atty. Gen., Donald P. Minahan, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Western Regional Office, Gregory R. Neuhauser, Sr. Deputy Atty. Gen., Andrew S. Gordon, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Litigation Section Office of Atty. Gen., Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellants.

Michael Stephen Antol, Neighborhood Legal Services Ass'n, Pittsburgh, Pa., James D. Crawford (argued), Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellees.

Before SEITZ, STAPLETON, Circuit Judges, and BRODERICK, District Judge. *

OPINION OF THE COURT

SEITZ, Circuit Judge.

The defendants, Pennsylvania prison officials, appeal the order of the district court entering judgment in favor of plaintiff George Rahsaan Brooks, an inmate at the State Correctional Institute at Pittsburgh, S.C.I.P. Brooks appeals the award of damages. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 (1982).

I.

On August 1, 1983, Brooks wrote a letter to Ms. Connie Craig, Coordinator of the Prisoners Branch of the NAACP, complaining that a female prison guard had searched one of his visitors in a very seductive manner. In the letter Brooks asserted that the guards should not be permitted to search visitors without probable cause.

Defendant Andolina filed a misconduct report against Brooks charging him with insolence or disrespect towards a staff member. The report stated that the basis of the charge was the letter to Craig, and that Brooks's claim of an improper search was both false and defamatory.

Prison officials held a hearing on Andolina's charge on August 19, 1983. At the hearing, the female guard testified that the allegations in Brooks's letter were totally false. In addition, she testified that she had received training on search procedures. Brooks was not permitted to present any witnesses on the ground that he failed to comply with the new witness request procedure adopted shortly before charges were filed against him. The hearing committee found that Brooks's statements were false and defamatory, and that he was guilty as charged. The hearing committee sentenced him to thirty days punitive segregation.

After unsuccessfully pursuing an appeal through the prison system, Brooks filed this action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982) in the district court, alleging that the prison officials had violated his federal constitutional rights. The district court referred the action to a magistrate.

After holding an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate concluded that the disciplinary action violated Brooks's first amendment rights. The magistrate rejected the defendants' attempt to justify the action as a security measure, noting that there was no mention of security concerns in the charge or at the prison hearing. The magistrate thus found that the only reason for disciplining Brooks was because he had written the letter. In addition, the magistrate recommended that the district court find that Brooks was deprived of his procedural due process rights as a result of prison officials' refusal to allow him to present witnesses. Finally, the magistrate recommended that Brooks receive only nominal damages because he did not present any proof of actual damages. The district court adopted the findings and recommendations of the magistrate in full. 1

II.

In Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1811, 40 L.Ed.2d 139 (1974), the Supreme Court established that

Prison officials may not censor inmate correspondence simply to eliminate unflattering or unwelcome opinions or factually inaccurate statements. Rather, they must show that a regulation authorizing mail censorship furthers one or more of the substantial governmental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation.

Consistent with this holding, the Fifth Circuit has held that prison officials may not punish inmates for statements made in letters to outsiders, even if the same statements would be grounds for punishment if made orally to prison guards. See McNamara v. Moody, 606 F.2d 621, 624 (5th Cir.1979).

The prison officials contend, however, that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The prison officials argue that the disciplinary action did not violate clearly established constitutional rights because there were security concerns involved and because the officials did not interfere with the transmission of the letter.

The Commonwealth's argument ignores the fact Brooks was charged only with making statements in the letter to Ms. Craig. At no time during the disciplinary proceedings did the prison officials allege that Brooks's letter presented a threat to prison security. We, therefore, agree with the magistrate that the security concerns raised by defendants are merely a belated attempt to justify their actions.

The prison officials rely on Turner v. Safley, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), for support that the disciplinary proceedings against Brooks were justified. In Turner, however, the Supreme Court simply held that because of justifiable security concerns, prison authorities may prohibit inmates from mailing letters to inmates in other prisons within the state prison system. In this case, Brooks was not disciplined for communicating with other inmates, but for the contents of his letter to a person outside the prison system. The Turner opinion, therefore, provides no support for the prison authorities' position.

In addition, it is immaterial that the officials did not interfere directly with the mailing of the letter. If prison officials cannot censor unflattering statements made in letters to outsiders, they also may not punish an inmate for the contents of such letters. We therefore conclude that the disciplinary action taken against Brooks violated his clearly established constitutional rights.

The prison officials also assert that the district court erred in concluding that the refusal to permit Brooks to call any witnesses violated his procedural due process rights. The officials argue that there was no clear violation of Brooks's rights because at the time of the hearing, it was not clearly established third circuit law that the refusal to permit an inmate to call witnesses violated his or her due process rights.

The regulations adopted by the prison officials, however, stated that "The inmate shall be permitted to call witnesses at the hearing." Moreover, under Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2979, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), "the inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses ... in his defense when permitting him to do so will...

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41 cases
  • Castle v. Clymer
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • June 30, 1998
    ...in 1994 and 1995 that prison officials could not transfer an inmate for exercising his First Amendment rights. See Brooks v. Andolina, 826 F.2d 1266, 1268-69 (3d Cir.1987); Garland v. Polley, 594 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir.1979). In this case, the Court has found that plaintiff's letters to Mr. Col......
  • News v. Babeu
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Arizona
    • March 20, 2013
    ...such a theory seems much closer to assigning an inherent value to a constitutional right than to compensable injury. In Brooks v. Andolina, 826 F.2d 1266 (3d Cir.1987), the Third Circuit reversed the lower court's determination that a prisoner's unconstitutional placement in punitive segreg......
  • Aref v. Lynch
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • August 19, 2016
    ...injury.”); Cassidy , 199 F.3d at 375–77 (allowing claims of loss of access to prison programs and services); Brooks v. Andolina , 826 F.2d 1266, 1269–70 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding a prisoner entitled to compensatory damages for his unconstitutional placement in punitive segregation including f......
  • Grenning v. Klemme
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Washington
    • July 22, 2014
    ...and prison officials may not punish an inmate for statements in outgoing mail protected by the First Amendment. Brooks v. Andolina, 826 F.2d 1266, 1268 (3d Cir.1987). “[U]nflattering or unwelcome opinions or factually inaccurate statements” in an inmate's outgoing mail are protected by the ......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Prisoners' Rights
    • United States
    • Georgetown Law Journal No. 110-Annual Review, August 2022
    • August 1, 2022
    ...a reasonable effort to produce desired witnesses and off‌icial’s explanation established insuff‌iciency of efforts); Brooks v. Andolina, 826 F.2d 1266, 1269 (3d Cir. 1987) (due process violation because prisoner not allowed to call witnesses at disciplinary hearing and off‌icials made no sh......

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