Brooks v. Berryhill
| Decision Date | 27 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:16-cv-00073-NCC |
| Parties | PAMELA BROOKS, Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This is an action under Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner denying the application of Pamela Brooks ("Plaintiff") for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("the Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq., and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq. Plaintiff filed a brief in support of the Complaint (Doc. 14), Defendant filed a brief in support of the Answer (Doc. 19), and Plaintiff filed a reply brief (Doc. 20). The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (Doc. 7).
Plaintiff filed her applications for DIB and SSI on August 1, 2012 (Tr. 203-15). Plaintiff was initially denied on September 28, 2012, and she filed a Request for Hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") (Tr. 91-100, 101-02). After a hearing and a subsequentsupplemental hearing, by decision dated October 17, 2014, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled (Tr. 8-30). On February 5, 2016, the Appeals Council issued a decision denying Plaintiff's request for review (Tr. 1-6). As such, the ALJ's decision stands as the final decision of the Commissioner.
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 16, 2010, the alleged onset date (Tr. 14). The ALJ found Plaintiff has the severe impairments of disorders of the spine and obesity but that no impairment or combination of impairments met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (Tr. 14-15). After considering the entire record, the ALJ determined Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a sedentary work with the following limitations (Tr. 15). Plaintiff can walk or stand 2 hours out of an 8-hour workday and sit for 6 hours out of an 8-hour workday (Id.). She can occasionally climb stairs, but never climb ropes, scaffolds or ladders (Id.). She can occasionally balance, stoop, crouch, and kneel; however, she may never crawl (Id.). She is limited to occasionally pushing and pulling with the upper extremities, but she is prohibited from pushing and pulling with the lower extremities (Id.). She should avoid prolonged exposure to temperature extremes, chemicals, dust, fumes, humidity, wetness, and vibrating machinery (Id.). She should also avoid unprotected heights and hazardous moving machinery (Id.). Secondary to her reported chronic pain and potential side effects of medications, she is limited to jobs that do not demand attention to details or complicated job tasks or instructions (Id.). The ALJ found Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work, but that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that she can perform, including document preparer, cutter-paster, and pharmaceuticalprocessor (Tr. 21-22). Thus, the ALJ concluded that a finding of "not disabled" was appropriate (Tr. 23). Plaintiff appeals, arguing a lack of substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision.
Under the Social Security Act, the Commissioner has established a five-step process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920, 404.1529. "'If a claimant fails to meet the criteria at any step in the evaluation of disability, the process ends and the claimant is determined to be not disabled.'" Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 590-91 (8th Cir. 2004)). In this sequential analysis, the claimant first cannot be engaged in "substantial gainful activity" to qualify for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(b), 404.1520(b). Second, the claimant must have a severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(c), 404.1520(c). The Social Security Act defines "severe impairment" as "any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. . . ." Id. "'The sequential evaluation process may be terminated at step two only when the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments would have no more than a minimal impact on [his or] her ability to work.'" Page v. Astrue, 484 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Caviness v. Massanari, 250 F.3d 603, 605 (8th Cir. 2001), citing Nguyen v. Chater, 75 F.3d 429, 430-31 (8th Cir. 1996)).
Third, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has an impairment which meets or equals one of the impairments listed in the Regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 404.1520(d). If the claimant has one of, or the medical equivalent of, these impairments, then the claimant is per se disabled without consideration of the claimant's age, education, or work history. Id.
Fourth, the impairment must prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(f), 404.1520(f). The burden rests with the claimant at this fourth step to establish his or her RFC. Steed v. Astrue, 524 F.3d 872, 874 n.3 (8th Cir. 2008) (). The ALJ will review a claimant's RFC and the physical and mental demands of the work the claimant has done in the past. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
Fifth, the severe impairment must prevent the claimant from doing any other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(g), 404.1520(g). At this fifth step of the sequential analysis, the Commissioner has the burden of production to show evidence of other jobs in the national economy that can be performed by a person with the claimant's RFC. Steed, 524 F.3d at 874 n.3. If the claimant meets these standards, the ALJ will find the claimant to be disabled. "The ultimate burden of persuasion to prove disability, however, remains with the claimant." Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1069 n.5 (8th Cir. 2000). See also Harris v. Barnhart, 356 F.3d 926, 931 n.2 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing 68 Fed. Reg. 51153, 51155 (Aug. 26, 2003)); Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2004) (). Even if a court finds that there is a preponderance of the evidence against the ALJ's decision, the decision must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence. Clark v. Heckler, 733 F.2d 65, 68 (8th Cir. 1984). "Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's conclusion." Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2002). See also Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 617 (8th Cir. 2007).
It is not the job of the district court to re-weigh the evidence or review the factual record de novo. Cox, 495 F.3d at 617. Instead, the district court must simply determine whether the quantity and quality of evidence is enough so that a reasonable mind might find it adequate to support the ALJ's conclusion. Davis v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 962, 966 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing McKinney v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000)). Weighing the evidence is a function of the ALJ, who is the fact-finder. Masterson v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 731, 736 (8th Cir. 2004). Thus, an administrative decision which is supported by substantial evidence is not subject to reversal merely because substantial evidence may also support an opposite conclusion or because the reviewing court would have decided differently. Krogmeier, 294 F.3d at 1022.
To determine whether the Commissioner's final decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court is required to review the administrative record as a whole and to consider:
Brand v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 623 F.2d 523, 527 (8th Cir. 1980).
In her appeal of the Commissioner's decision, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in his RFC determination because he failed to include a limitation as to Plaintiff's need to stand andambulate with an assistive device despite evidence in the record as a whole indicating that the assistive device is a medical necessity (Doc. 14 at 12). For the following reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff's argument is without merit, and that the ALJ's decision is based on substantial evidence and is consistent with the Regulations and case law.
The Regulations define RFC as "what [the claimant] can do" despite her "physical or mental limitations." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). "When determining whether a claimant can engage in substantial employment, an ALJ must consider the combination of the claimant's mental and physical impairments." Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 703 (8th Cir. 2001). "The ALJ must assess a claimant's RFC based on all relevant, credible evidence in the record, 'including the medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and an individual's own description of [her] limitations.'" Tucker v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting McKinney, 228 F.3d at 863). See also Myers v. Colvin, 721 F.3d 521, 526...
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