Brooks v. Brooks

• Decision Date: 14 February 1927
• Docket Number: 26225
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: BROOKS v. BROOKS. [*]

111 So. 376

145 Miss. 845

BROOKS v. BROOKS. ^[*]

No. 26225

Supreme Court of Mississippi

February 14, 1927

Division B

. (Division B.)

CONTRACTS. Deeds. There must be meeting of minds of parties to render contract valid; equity will set aside deed fraudulently procured by son from father, who was unable to read and write and who reposed confidence in son; evidence of lack of meeting of minds of parties and fraudulent concealment held to support decree setting deed aside.

In order for a contract to be valid, there must be a meeting of the minds of the parties to it. And where a father signs a deed, believing that it contains agreements material to the contract, which, in fact, it does not contain, and where he is unable to read and write and reposes trust and confidence in his son in whose favor the deed is made, who procures a different deed from that intended to be made, equity will set it aside.

HON. T P. DALE, Chancellor.

APPEAL from chancery court of Simpson county, HON. T. P. DALE, Chancellor.

Suit by E. B. Brooks against H. L. Brooks. From a decree for complainant, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

May, Sanders & McLaurin, for appellant.

What title did the complainant have to convey when the second deed was executed without a re-conveyance from defendant to complainant? The rule which our court has established is that where a deed has been once duly executed and delivered, a subsequent surrender and destruction of it cannot divest the estate of the grantee which passed by the deed. Whitton v. Smith, Freeman's Chancery 231; Burton v. Wells, 30 Miss. 688. In Pierce v. Garrett, 107 So. 885, Mr. Justice ANDERSON reviews the Mississippi cases.

It being obvious that the second deed could not be cancelled for breach of the obligations set out in the first deed, the only other ground of cancellation would be fraud, and as above stated, neither the original nor the supplemental bill contains sufficient allegations of fraud.

W. M. Lofton and Bee King, for appellee.

The contention of appellee is that when he signed this deed he did not understand its provisions, and that he was induced to sign it by appellant for the purpose of defrauding him and placing the land beyond his reach. The court below rendered the only decree that could have been rendered according to the principles of equity and the dictates of humanity. Hester v. Hooker, 7 S. & M. 768.

Fraud vitiates all contracts. The facts leading up to this transaction show in unmistakable terms that there was a fiduciary and confidential relationship existing between the father and the son in this case. See Bunch v. Shannon, 46 Miss. 525; Mortimer et al. v. Hanna, 82 Miss. 645, 35 So. 159.

OPINION

ETHRIDGE, J.

The appellee filed a bill in the chancery court to set aside and cancel the conveyance of certain lands executed by himself and wife to the appellant on the 29th day of October, 1924. There was a decree by the chancery court sustaining the relief prayed for in the bill, from which decree this appeal is prosecuted.

The appellee, it appears, was the father of the appellant and other children. He and his wife lived alone, and being afflicted with heart trouble and unable to do anything, he needed the care and protection of some of his children. Therefore an agreement was entered into by the appellant and the appellee that the appellant would move on the place and live with the appellee (his father) and his with, provide for them, and give them the necessary care and attention; that the lands owned by the appellee and occupied by him, described in the bill, would be deeded to the appellant, to take effect after the death of the grantors (the appellee and his wife), provided that, after the death of the grantors (appellee and his wife), appellant would pay to the daughter of appellee the sum of two thousand dollars out of the proceeds of the place or money raised by him for that purpose. An attorney was sent for, who prepared a deed embodying this agreement of the parties and expressly providing:

"That this deed is not to take effect until after the death of both of the grantors, but it is understood and so provided that the said grantee shall after the 1st day of January, 1925, have the right to occupy, use, cultivate, lease, or rent such lands, provided such grantee shall, to the satisfaction of the grantors, support and maintain them (the said grantors). And it is further provided that in case the grantors shall survive the grantees, then the heirs of the grantees shall have the right to carry out all the provisions of this deed, but it is understood that the right of the grantee or his heirs to use and occupy the said lands will in no way interfere with or deprive the grantors of the right to occupy said lands and premises at their pleasure."

Subsequent to the execution of this deed, the appellant represented to the appellee that appellee's daughter and her husband were dissatisfied with the arrangement and insisted that the appellant pay them the two thousand dollars then; that he would like for appellee to change the deed so as to give appellee's daughter seventy acres of the land in lieu of the two thousand dollars, and thereby relieve appellant of the obligation to pay appellee's daughter two thousand dollars out of the proceeds of the place, which the appellee agreed to do. The appellant thereupon sent for a person, not a lawyer, to fix the papers so as to effect this purpose. This person drew a straight deed in fee simple, without any conditions attached thereto and without embodying the agreement therein, which deed was signed by the appellee and his wife and witnessed by two persons, one of whom afterwards made affidavit as a subscribing witness, and the deed was recorded on the 1st day of November, 1924, in the Records of Deeds in the county.

The appellee testified that he could neither read nor write, that he did not understand land numbers and was incapable of...