Brooks v. City of Baltimore

• Decision Date: 26 March 1878
• Parties: CHAUNCEY BROOKS, and others v. THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

48 Md. 265

CHAUNCEY BROOKS, and others v. THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

March 26, 1878

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City.

This case was submitted on bill and answer in the Court below, and by agreement of counsel a decree pro forma was passed, refusing the injunction prayed for by the complainants and dismissing their bill. From this decree the complainants appealed.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.

The cause was argued before BARTOL, C.J., STEWART, BRENT, MILLER ALVEY and ROBINSON, J.

William F. Frick, for the appellants.

John V. L. Findlay and James A. Buchanan for the appellee.

BRENT J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore by Ordinance No. 90, approved May 23rd, 1876, directed the Commissioners for opening streets in that city to extend and widen Eutaw street, and to extend Eutaw Place from Laurens street to North avenue--the latter being the boundary in that direction of the city limits. The property of the appellants lies outside of the city limits, but adjacent to the improvements contemplated by this ordinance. Under the Act of 1838, codified in Art. 4, sec. 837, in relation to the City of Baltimore, Code of Public Local Laws, they have been assessed for benefits accruing to them as owners of this property, and the object of this bill is to prevent by injunction the appellee from proceeding to collect such assessment.

The Act of 1838, provides that, "the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore shall have full power to provide for laying out, opening, extending, widening, straightening or closing up in whole or in part any street, square, lane or alley, within the bounds of said city, which in their opinion the public welfare or convenience may require; to provide for ascertaining whether any, and what amount in value of damage will be caused thereby, and what amount of benefit will thereby accrue to the owner or possessor of any ground or improvements within or adjacent to said city, for which such owner or possessor ought to be compensated, or ought to pay a compensation, and to provide for assessing and levying, either generally on the whole assessable property of said city, or specially on the property of the persons benefited, the whole or any part of the amount of damages and expenses, which they shall ascertain will be incurred in locating, opening, &c." It also authorizes provision to be made by ordinance for an appeal from any such assessment.

The constitutionality of this law in assessing benefits to particular owners of property has been heretofore called in question, but it was fully sustained by this Court in the case of Alexander & Wilson vs. The Mayor and C. C. of Baltimore, 5 Gill, 383, decided in 1847. In that case however, the property upon which the benefits were assessed, laid within the city limits.-- Such has been the growth of the city, that its improvements have now reached in many places the very verge of its boundary line, and for the first time the power of the Legislature to authorize benefits to be assessed and levied upon property adjacent is directly presented.

We have failed to find any constitutional prohibition upon the exercise of this power by the Legislature. Was it a tax, which had been imposed, to be contributed for the support of the municipal government, it would be otherwise. And it is in this respect that there is error in the argument urged on the part of the appellants They have treated this as a tax strictly speaking, and not as a contribution from persons whose property has been increased in value, by the opening and widening of the street in question, at least in an amount equal to the sum they are required to pay. The case in Wells vs. Weston, 22 Missouri, 384, which has been very strongly relied upon, is that of a tax "on all real estate outside of and adjacent to the corporation, to the distance of half a mile," imposed for the support of the city government, and is in no sense an assessment for benefits. So also is the case in 15 Wallace, 300, one of a tax--the question there being the power to tax bonds in the hands of foreign holders.

Taxes and special assessments for benefits stand upon widely different grounds, and the distinction between them has been so generally recognized that it must now be considered as settled. Judge COOLEY in his work on "Taxation," has considered this branch very elaborately. He says on page 416, "The general levy of taxes is understood to exact contributions in return for the general benefits of the government, and it promises nothing to the persons taxed beyond what may be anticipated from an administration of the laws for individual protection, and the general public good. Special assessments on the other hand, are made upon the assumption that a portion of the community is to be specially and peculiarly benefited in the enhancement of the value of property, peculiarly situated as regards a contemplated expenditure of public funds; and in addition to the general levy they demand that special contributions in...