Brooks v. Clarke

Decision Date16 April 2015
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 3:15-CV-13
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
PartiesDONALD LEE BROOKS, Petitioner, v. HAROLD W. CLARKE, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

THIS MATTER is before the Court on a Writ of Habeas Corpus for Prisoner in State Custody ("Petition") (ECF No. 1) filed by Petitioner Donald Lee Brooks ("Brooks" or "Petitioner") and a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 5) filed by Respondent Harold W. Clarke ("Clarke" or "Respondent"), Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections. In the Petition, Brooks challenges his convictions for second degree murder and the use of a firearm in the commission of that murder. After being convicted, Brooks was sentenced to 25 years on the murder conviction and 3 consecutive years on the firearm offense. For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES the Petition and GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND
a. Factual History

On April 12, 2010, Brooks, Gerald Hall ("Hall) and Tony Robinson ("Robinson") were at a bar named "B&N Grill," drinking beer and playing pool. Hall and Brooks were regular customers who came in about two or three times a week. Robinson did not previously know either of the two other men. After some time, the men got loud fussing at each other, and the bar owner, Betty Newton ("Newton"), asked the men to go outside. At trial, Newton claimed that Brooks shoved Hall to the ground as the men walked outside. Testifying for the prosecution, Robinson stated that he went outside a few moments after Hall and Brooks left the bar, and sawthe two men just standing there. According to Robinson, Brooks then walked to his truck, pulled out a gun, and walked toward Hall while firing his gun. The prosecution alleged that Hall was shot in the back.

However, Brooks testified to the contrary that upon exiting the bar, Hall and Robinson took him to the ground, and his hat and glasses were knocked off. When knocked down, Brooks allegedly landed on his back and suffered a large gash in his head, which required stitches. Brooks further testified that Hall was straddling him, basically sitting on Brooks' stomach and holding down one arm, while Robinson held down Brooks' other arm. Brooks then alleged that Hall started beating him in the face. When Brooks asked Hall why he was doing this, Hall responded, "I'm going to kill your old MF ass." Brooks testified that at that moment, he "snapped," managed to get his arm free, pulled his gun "from the back of [his] britches," and started shooting.

After the shooting, Brooks went to his truck, called 911 and advised the dispatcher that he thought he shot two people. According to Deputy White's testimony, when he arrived on scene he first noticed that Brooks had a lot of blood on his face. The first thing Brooks told the Deputy was that "they beat me up," and "I'm an old man, and that's why I shot them."

According to the state's medical examiner, Dr. Gormley, Hall died about three weeks after the shooting from infection, essentially caused by two gunshot wounds.

b. Procedural History

i. Conviction and Direct Appeal

Brooks was charged with murder and the use of a firearm in the commission of that murder. He pled not guilty to each charge. A jury trial was held before the Honorable Thomas V. Warren on September 1-2, 2010. Keith N. Hurley ("Hurley") represented Brooks at trial. The jury was instructed on first degree murder, second degree murder, manslaughter based on the heat of passion, and self-defense. The jury found Brooks guilty of second degree murder and use of a firearm in the commission of murder and recommended 25 years for second degree murderand 3 years for use of a firearm. The Court accepted the jury's recommended sentences. The trial court entered final judgment on September 9, 2010, and Brooks subsequently appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals of Virginia. A single judge refused the petition on March 22, 2011, and a three-judge panel likewise refused the petition on May 17, 2011. The Virginia Supreme Court thereafter refused Brooks' petition for appeal by order dated October 24, 2011.

ii. State and Federal Habeas Petitions

After the Virginia Supreme Court's refusal to hear Brooks' petition, he filed a habeas corpus petition in the Amelia County Circuit Court. In that petition, Brooks raised all of the allegations that he raises in the present Petition, which are outlined below. The circuit court issued a letter opinion on September 21, 2013, in which it rejected Brooks' various ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The circuit court dismissed the petition on February 21, 2014. The Supreme Court of Virginia then denied the petition for appeal from the habeas dismissal order on October 10, 2014.

On January 7, 2015, Brooks filed the instant Petition in this Court raising the same four primary claims:

• Claim A: Petitioner was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel when (1) counsel failed to present and argue any evidence of the trajectory of the bullets that allegedly supported the defense theory of the case and in particular Petitioner's testimony; (2) counsel failed to properly cross-examine the state's chief medical examiner regarding the entry and exit wounds, trajectory of the bullets, and inaccuracies of his diagrams, and failed to object to the admission of the autopsy report; and (3) counsel failed to present evidence and argue during closing argument that the bullet wounds and trajectory of the bullets support Petitioner's theory of self-defense, or at worst, manslaughter. (See Pet. at 13-14.)
• Claim B: Petitioner was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to present evidence of certain bruising on Petitioner as well as the bent rings on Petitioner's left hand allegedly caused by Robinson putting his knee on Petitioner's hand. (See id. at 27.)
• Claim C: Petitioner was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to fully cross-examine Robinson. (See id. at 30.)
• Claim D: Petitioner was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel as a result of counsel's errors in Claims A through C. (See id. at 35.)

On February 18, 2015, Clarke filed a response to the Petition and the Motion to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 5, 6). Brooks subsequently filed a reply to the Motion to Dismiss on March 23, 2015 (ECF No. 8). This matter is now ripe for review.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS
a. The AEDPA

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), a federal court may review a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a person serving a sentence imposed by a state court only on grounds that the person is being held in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The federal court may grant the petition on a claim decided on its merits by the state court only if that decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

A decision is "contrary to" federal law if it resolves a question of law in a way that contradicts the relevant Supreme Court precedent, or if it yields a result that differs from the outcome of a Supreme Court case involving "materially indistinguishable" facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A decision applies federal law unreasonably if it is based on the correct legal principle but applies that principle unreasonably to the facts of a case. Id. at 413. Whether a decision is reasonable is determined by an objective, not subjective, test. Id. at 409-10. The question is not "whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 410). Finally, a federal court is to presume the correctness of the state court's finding of facts and not find an "unreasonable determination" of the facts, unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 473-74. Thus, under section 2254(d), if a state courtapplies the correct legal rule to the facts of a case in a reasonable way, or makes factual findings reasonably based on the evidence presented, a federal court does not have the power to grant a writ of habeas corpus, even if the federal court would have applied the rule differently. Williams, 529 U.S. at 406-08.

b. Motion to Dismiss

The familiar standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) apply to a government's motion to dismiss a section 2254 petition. Walker v. Kelly, 589 F.3d 127, 138 (4th Cir. 2009). A motion to dismiss therefore "tests the legal sufficiency of the petition, requiring the federal habeas court to assume all facts pleaded by the § 2254 petitioner to be true." Id. at 139 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wolfe v. Johnson, 565 F.3d 140, 169 (4th Cir. 2009)). The court must consider "the face of the petition and any attached exhibits" in determining whether a section 2254 petition states a claim for relief. Id. (quoting Wolfe, 565 F.3d at 169).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual information "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663-64 (2009). A complaint achieves facial plausibility when it contains sufficient factual allegations supporting the reasonable inference that the alleged violations occurred. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556; see also Iqbal, 556...

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