Brooks v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 18 February 2016
• Docket Number: Case No.: 3:14cv691/MCR/MD
• Parties: CHRISTOPHER MAURICE BROOKS, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

CHRISTOPHER MAURICE BROOKS, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

Case No.: 3:14cv691/MCR/MD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA PENSACOLA DIVISION

February 18, 2016

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rules 72.1(A), 72.2(D) and 72.3 of this court relating to review of administrative determinations under the Social Security Act ("Act") and related statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. It is now before the court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Act for review of a final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying Plaintiff Brooks' application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-34.

Upon review of the record before this court, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the findings of fact and determinations of the Commissioner are supported by substantial evidence; thus, the decision of the Commissioner should be affirmed.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 2, 2012, Plaintiff, Christopher Maurice Brooks, filed an application for benefits, claiming an onset of disability as of March 2, 2012 (Tr. 23).¹ His application was denied initially and on reconsideration, and thereafter Mr. Brooks requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). A hearing was held on November 7, 2013, and on April 11, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision in which he found Mr. Brooks "not disabled," as defined under the Act, at any timethrough the date of his decision (Tr. 23-35). On June 13, 1012, the Appeals Council denied Mr. Brooks' request for review (Tr. 1-6). Thus, the decision of the ALJ stands as the final decision of the Commissioner, subject to review in this court. Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007). This appeal followed.

II. FINDINGS OF THE ALJ

On April 11, 2014, (date of ALJ decision), the ALJ made several findings relative to the issues raised in this appeal (Tr. 23-35):

1) Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2016;²

2) Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 2, 2012, the alleged onset date;

3) Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: multiple sclerosis, asthma, and sleep apnea;

4) Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1;

5) After careful consideration of the entire record, the ALJ finds that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) except he is precluded from climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He can only occasionally climb stairs. He is limited to the simple routine tasks of unskilled work involving no more than simple, short instructions and simple work-related decisions with few workplace changes. He is to avoid concentrated exposure to dust, fumes, and gases;

6) Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work;

7) Plaintiff was born on February 26, 1972 and was 40 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-44, on the alleged disability onset date;

8) Plaintiff has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English;9) Transferability of jobs kills is not material to the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that Plaintiff is "not disabled," whether or not the Plaintiff as transferable job skills;

10) Considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform; and

11) Plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined in the Act, from March 2, 2012, through the date of this decision.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Review of the Commissioner's final decision is limited to determining whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence from the record and was a result of the application of proper legal standards. Carnes v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991) ("[T]his Court may reverse the decision of the [Commissioner] only when convinced that it is not supported by substantial evidence or that proper legal standards were not applied."); see also Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997); Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). "A determination that is supported by substantial evidence may be meaningless . . . if it is coupled with or derived from faulty legal principles." Boyd v. Heckler, 704 F.2d 1207, 1209 (11th Cir. 1983), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Elam v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 921 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1991). As long as proper legal standards were applied, the Commissioner's decision will not be disturbed if in light of the record as a whole the decision appears to be supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th Cir. 1998); Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1439; Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but not a preponderance; it is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 59 S. Ct. 206, 217, 83 L. Ed. 126 (1938)); Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1439. The court may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Even if the evidencepreponderates against the Commissioner's decision, the decision must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence. Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th Cir. 1986).

The Act defines a disability as an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To qualify as a disability the physical or mental impairment must be so severe that the claimant is not only unable to do her/his previous work, "but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).

Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(g), the Commissioner analyzes a disability claim in five steps:

1. If the claimant is performing substantial gainful activity, he is not disabled.

2. If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity, his impairments must be severe before he can be found disabled.

3. If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity and he has severe impairments that have lasted or are expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months, and if his impairments meet or medically equal the criteria of any impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, the claimant is presumed disabled without further inquiry.

4. If the claimant's impairments do not prevent him from doing his past relevant work, he is not disabled.

5. Even if the claimant's impairments prevent him from performing his past relevant work, if other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that accommodates his residual functional capacity and vocational factors, he is not disabled.

The claimant bears the burden of establishing a severe impairment that keeps him from performing his past work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512. If the claimant establishes such an impairment, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show the existence of other jobs in the national economy which, given the claimant's impairments, the claimant can perform. MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 1986). If the Commissioner carries this burden, the claimant mustthen prove he cannot perform the work suggested by the Commissioner. Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987).

IV. PLAINTIFF'S MEDICAL HISTORY

Dr. Jeffery English, a neurologist with the MS Center of Atlanta (Tr. 275), has treated Mr. Brooks for Multiple Sclerosis ("MS") since the early 2000's. (Tr . 320). Over the course of this extensive treating relationship, Dr. English has made voluminous notes regarding the cognitive decline he has observed in his patient. A December 10, 2004 MRI report showed "Abnormal Brain MRI study showing moderate lesion load demyelinating disease without active enchancement." (Tr. 319.) Mr. Brooks reported cognitive decline in April of 2005, stating that he was experiencing short term memory problems that had caused him to struggle in his classes. At that point, his wife had already taken over all the important household duties and he needed help at work. Dr. English noted "Memory is the biggest disabling factor." (Tr. 308).

Over the ensuing years Dr. English repeatedly noted cognitive decline, inadvisability to drive and subtle evidence of progression. His wife reported some increase in agitation and some decrease in memory." (Tr. 306.)

Dr. English felt that Mr. Brooks suffered from advancing cognitive decline: "He has been clinically and radiographically stable over the last year. He has some subtle changes which are progressing with his memory." (Tr. 291). Mr. Brooks' struggled with the symptoms of MS. He was repeating conversations, merging conversation, and having trouble multitasking. Later in 2007, Dr. English continued to note that "Mr. Brooks appears stable with the exception of noted memory decline by his family. He is repeating himself more." (Tr. 289-290).

On February 13, 2009, Dr. English noted that...