Brooks v. Delta Fire & Cas. Co.

• Decision Date: 30 June 1955
• Docket Number: No. 4056,4056
• Citation: 82 So.2d 55
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
• Parties: Enman BROOKS, Plaintiff, v. DELTA FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant.

Page 55

82 So.2d 55

Enman BROOKS, Plaintiff, v. DELTA FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant.

No. 4056.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

June 30, 1955.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 15, 1955.

Writ of Certiorari Denied Nov. 7, 1955.

Weber & Weber, Baton Rouge, for appellant.

Watson, Blanche, Fridge, Wilson, Posner & Thibaut, Baton Rouge, for appellee.

TATE, Judge.

This is a suit for damages sustained in an automobile accident. Before trial, plaintiff Enman Brooks dismissed his suit as against codefendant, Dr. Jerry A. Pierce, owner of the car involved in the accident, and service was never made on codefendant Bruce Deitz (deceased), father of Miss Hilda Deitz, driver of the car, a minor at the time of the accident.

The sole remaining defendant is the Delta Fire & Casualty Company in its capacity as liability insurer of Dr. Jerry A. Pierce, owner of the car driven by Miss Deitz involved in the accident, and allegedly also as liability insurer of Mrs. Jerry Ellen Moreau, daughter of Dr. Pierce, and of Miss Deitz under the 'omnibus' clause of the policy issued by it covering operation of this motor vehicle. The District Court in an able opinion denied plaintiff recovery on the ground that at the time of the accident Miss Deitz was not authorized to drive the car in question by its named insured, Dr. Pierce, and that therefore there was no coverage by the insurer of the operation of the vehicle at the time of the accident. From this judgment, plaintiff has perfected this appeal.

The chief question involved is whether or not the policy issued by defendant to Dr. Pierce covers the driver of the automobile at the time of the accident. The 'omnibus clause' of the policy in question reads as follows:

'III Definition of Insured: With respect to the insurance for bodily injury liability and for property damage liability the unqualified word 'insured' includes the named insured and also includes any person while using the automobile and any person or organization legally responsible for the use thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile is by the named insured or with his permission.' (Italics ours.)

The undisputed facts concerning use of Dr. Pierce's automobile on the day of the accident are these: Dr. Pierce's daughter, Mrs. Moreau, intended to go to New Orleans for medical examination on the day of the accident. Since she wished to take her six-week old baby, she asked her friend, Hilda Deitz, to go with her to take care of the baby. Miss Deitz also wished to go to New Orleans to pick up some papers to prepare for examination as a beautician both for herself and for some of her friends. Both missions were accomplished in New Orleans, and the friends returned to Baton Rouge, where they attempted to call their parents to let them know of their return. They reached the Pierces, but the Deitz telephone was busy, so they drove to the Dietz residence. While there, they decided to deliver the application forms to one of Miss Deitz' friends. Up until this time, these young ladies testified, Mrs. Moreau had been doing all the driving. But at this point since Mrs. Moreau's baby was crying, Mrs. Moreau asked Miss Deitz to drive while she held her baby. It was while Miss Deitz was driving to the home of the friend that the accident occurred.

The testimony indicates that Miss Deitz had stayed overnight at the home of Dr. Pierce, where Mrs. Moreau although married was living at the time. Both Dr. and Mrs. Pierce knew that Miss Deitz was to accompany their daughter to New Orleans. It is admitted that there was no discussion whatsoever before the girls left as to whether or not Miss Deitz or anyone else was authorized to drive the family car. Before the accident, Miss Deitz had no inkling that she was not supposed to drive this car.

However, on the trial of this matter, Dr. Pierce testified, corroborated by his wife and by his daughter, that on several prior occasions he had informed his daughter not to let anyone else drive his car. ¹ Based on this testimony that Dr. Pierce had not authorized Miss Deitz' use of the automobile, and also on its finding that at the time of the accident Miss Deitz was engaged in a personal errand of no benefit to the Pierces or their daughter, the District Court found that her operation of the motor vehicle was not covered under the omnibus clause of the policy in question under the holding of this Court in Longwell v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 63 So.2d 440, writ of certiorari denied.

We respectfully must disagree with these legal conclusions.

Omitting surplus language, the clause in question reads that the 'word 'insured' * * * includes any person while using the automobile * * *, provided the actual use of the automobile is by the named insured or with his permission.' (Italics ours.) It is unquestioned that Dr. Pierce authorized the 'use' of this automobile for the mission(s) to New Orleans. He had given legal control of its use to his daughter, Mrs. Moreau, at least. Pursuant to that legal control vested in her, Mrs. Moreau had requested or permitted Miss Deitz to drive.

Since Parks v. Hall, 189 La. 849, 181 So. 191, our Supreme Court has liberally construed the 'permission' in the omnibus clause so as to afford coverage when initial permission is given even when the original permittee deviates from or even violates the instructions given him by the owner as to the use of the automobile. ² In the recent cases of Waits v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 215 La. 349, 40 So.2d 746, and Dominguez v. American Casualty Co., 217 La. 487, 64 So.2d 744, 747, our Supreme Court unequivocably held that there was coverage under the omnibus clause even when the employees authorized to drive the vehicles for specific purposes violated specific general instructions not to remove the vehicles from their night-time parking places by removing same for personal purposes later in the evening, during which the accidents resulted. ³ See also Stanley v. Cryer Drilling Co., 213 La. 980, 36 So.2d 9.

In his concurring opinion in the Dominguez case, Chief Justice Fournet stated at 46 So.2d 751:

'The language in the policy is to be construed so as to effectuate the insurance and not for the purpose of defeating it; and that where the language used in the policy is ambiguous, admitting of two constructions, it must be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer so that the interest of the insured, who has paid a consideration for the indemnity, may be protected';

and again:

'This construction clearly gives effect to the evident intent of the parties, for the omnibus clause was included in their contract for the very purpose of covering the liability of the operator of the car as the unnamed assured, and so that any injured person would be given a cause of action against the insurer for injuries deemed by law to have been caused by the operation of the car.' (Italics ours.)

It would appear from the language and holdings of these cases that the operation of a car by anyone who has been given legal control thereof shall be covered under the omnibus clause of any liability insurance policy covering operation of the said automobile. Deviation from instructions given prior to control of the automobile being entrusted to the original permittee were held 'immaterial and of no moment', Waits v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 215 La. 349, 40 So.2d 746, 748. Increasingly the concept of a liability insurance policy has been as a protection not only to the named insured, but also to the public. It is regarded not only as insurance carried by the owner, but also as insurance carried on operation itself of the vehicle. See the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law, LSA-R.S. 32:851 et seq., especially LSA-R.S. 32:872, subd. C(2) accepting an 'automobile liability policy' as security after an accident if the owner had in effect such policy 'with respect to the motor vehicle involved in the accident.' ⁴

We further believe the present instance can be distinguished from that of Longwell v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., La.App. 1 Cir., 63 So.2d 440, relied upon by defendant-appellee. In Longwell, the driver went out of the route prescribed by his employer and picked up a girl friend, to whom he entrusted operation of the vehicle. It might be said that under the facts and circumstances therein it was so far outside the contemplation of the owner in entrusting the original permittee (the truckdriver) with the truck that you could not imply any delegation of permission to his girl friend to drive on this mission of pleasure far removed from the business purposes for which the truck had been entrusted to the original permittee.

But in the present instance, the owner of the car knew that his daughter and her infant child was to be accompanied on the trip to New Orleans by her friend, Miss Deitz. Here the transfer of drivership took place when the infant's crying required the attentions of its mother. Had this infant required the attention of the matron rather than the maiden en route to New Orleans, surely it was not contemplated that they would park on the highway until the daughter had performed her maternal functions. Surely it was contemplated that for this reason, or even were the daughter tired or beset by headache or for any other reason was unable or unwilling to continue driving, that Miss Deitz would take the wheel so that the journey could continue, rather than that the vehicle would be immobilized until such time as the named insured's daughter was able or willing to return to the wheel. Under these circumstances, despite the alleged general instructions given at some...