Brooks v. Firestone Polymers, LLC

• Decision Date: 08 October 2014
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:12–CV–325
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas
• Parties: Paul D. Brooks, Ellis E. Byrd, Jonathan E. Greenaway, Erick Guillory, Samuel W. Johnson, Wayne E. Johnson, Michael Spencer, and Ricky Ruffin, Plaintiffs, v. Firestone Polymers, LLC a/k/a Firestone, Defendant.

70 F.Supp.3d 816

Paul D. Brooks, Ellis E. Byrd, Jonathan E. Greenaway, Erick Guillory, Samuel W. Johnson, Wayne E. Johnson, Michael Spencer, and Ricky Ruffin, Plaintiffs

v.Firestone Polymers, LLC a/k/a Firestone, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:12–CV–325

United States District Court, E.D. Texas.

Signed October 08, 2014

Craig J. Schexnaider, Bruce W. Cobb, Attorney at Law, Beaumont, TX, Plaintiffs.

Michael David Mitchell, Robert L. Ivey, Stephen Eric Hart, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, Houston, TX, Daniel Anthony Verrett, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, Austin, TX, for Defendant.

SECOND AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MARCIA A. CRONE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the court are Defendant Firestone Polymers, LLC's (“Firestone”) Motions for Summary Judgment (# s 59–66). Having considered the motions, the submissions of the parties, the pleadings, and the applicable law, the court finds that Firestone's motions should be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

Plaintiffs, all African–American males, allege that they were discriminated against on account of their race while employed at Firestone's chemical manufacturing facility in Orange, Texas. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim they were denied training, promotions, and overtime opportunities, and were demoted in a racially-discriminatory manner. Moreover, Plaintiffs assert that their abusive working conditions rendered the workplace a “hostile work environment.” Plaintiffs filed their Original Complaint on June 29, 2012, and filed their First Amended Complaint on February 4, 2013, asserting violations of the following: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e –2000h–6 ; the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ; the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) ; the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 (“LLFPA”); and Executive Order 11246.¹

Plaintiffs are represented by the United Steel, Paper, and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union (“USW” or “the Union”), and the terms of their employment with Firestone are governed by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (the “CBA”) between the Union and Firestone.² According to the CBA, employees at Firestone's facility are assigned to either A, B, or C-level positions. A-level positions provide the greatest pay, while C-level positions provide the lowest pay. Numerous positions exist within those three levels, and under the CBA, all jobs within the same classification level are paid at the same rate. The CBA also states that all promotions and demotions from one level to another are determined solely by seniority. While training within the A-level is determined by seniority, training within the B and C-levels is not.

All eight Plaintiffs allege slightly different facts.

A. Paul Brooks

Paul Brooks (“Brooks”) was hired by Firestone in June 2000 and began working in a Clevel position in the warehouse. Brooks asserts Title VII and § 1981 claims for failure to train, failure to promote, discriminatory demotion, denial of overtime, and hostile work environment. Additionally, Brooks alleges causes of action under the LLFPA and Executive Order 11246.

B. Ellis Byrd

Ellis Byrd (“Byrd”) was hired by Firestone in 1996 and began working in a C-level position in the box-building department. Byrd asserts Title VII and § 1981 claims for failure to train, failure to promote, denial of overtime, and hostile work environment. Additionally, Byrd alleges causes of action under the LLFPA and Executive Order 11246.

C. Jonathan Greenaway

Jonathan Greenaway (“Greenaway”) was hired by Firestone in June 2000 and began working in a C-level position in the box-building department. Greenaway asserts Title VII and § 1981 claims for failure to train, failure to promote, discriminatory demotion, denial of overtime, and hostile work environment. Additionally, Greenaway alleges causes of action under the LLFPA and Executive Order 11246. Finally, unlike the other Plaintiffs, Greenaway also seeks relief under the ADA.

D. Samuel Johnson

Samuel Johnson (“S. Johnson”) was hired by Firestone in June 1977 and began working in a C-level position in the warehouse. S. Johnson asserts Title VII and § 1981 claims for failure to train, failure to promote, discriminatory demotion, denial of overtime, and hostile work environment. Additionally, S. Johnson alleges causes of action under the LLFPA and Executive Order 11246.

E. Wayne Johnson

Wayne Johnson (“W. Johnson”) worked at Firestone from November 2000 until September 2010. W. Johnson asserts Title VII and § 1981 claims for failure to train, failure to promote, discriminatory demotion, denial of overtime, and hostile work environment. Additionally, W. Johnson alleges causes of action under the LLFPA and Executive Order 11246.

F. Ricky Ruffin

Ricky Ruffin (“Ruffin”) was hired by Firestone in March 2000 and began working in a Clevel position in the warehouse. Ruffin asserts Title VII and § 1981 claims for failure to train, failure to promote, discriminatory demotion, denial of overtime, and hostile work environment. Additionally, Ruffin alleges causes of action under the LLFPA and Executive Order 11246.

G. Michael Spencer

Michael Spencer (“Spencer”) was hired by Firestone in 1993 and began working in a Clevel position in the box-building department. Spencer asserts Title VII and § 1981 claims for failure to train, failure to promote, denial of overtime, and hostile work environment. Additionally, Spencer alleges causes of action under the LLFPA and Executive Order 11246.

H. Erick Guillory

Erick Guillory (“Guillory”) was hired by Firestone in 1998 and began working in a C-level position in the box-building department. Guillory asserts Title VII and § 1981 claims for failure to train, failure to promote, denial of overtime, and hostile work environment. Additionally, Guillory alleges causes of action under the LLFPA and Executive Order 11246.

Each Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on varying dates between August 2009 and March 2010. On December 19, 2012, following a two-year investigation, the EEOC sent Plaintiffs' counsel a determination letter stating it did “not see how [Plaintiffs] can meet their statutory obligation on the underlying or amended charges.”³ The EEOC letter further noted that the amended charges filed on or about March 10, 2010, as well as charges concerning events that occurred in 2008 and before, “are time barred.” Moreover, the EEOC ran statistical tests to determine whether black employees at Firestone were paid less than white employees. The EEOC concluded that any differences in pay were “statistically insignificant.” Nonetheless, the EEOC provided Plaintiffs a right to sue letter, and Plaintiffs filed suit within 90 days after receiving said letter.

II. Analysis

Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; QBE Ins. Corp. v. Brown & Mitchell, Inc., 591 F.3d 439, 442 (5th Cir.2009) ; Warfield v. Byron, 436 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir.2006) ; Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 401 F.3d 347, 349 (5th Cir.2005). Where a defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis of an affirmative defense and, thus, bears the ultimate burden of persuasion, “evidence must be adduced supporting each element of the defense and demonstrating the lack of any genuine issue of material fact with regard thereto.” Terrebon n e Parish Sch. Bd. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 310 F.3d 870, 877 (5th Cir.2002) ; see Exxon Corp. v. Oxxford Clothes, Inc., 109 F.3d 1070, 1074 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied , 522 U.S. 915, 118 S.Ct. 299, 139 L.Ed.2d 231 (1997) ; Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir.1986). To warrant judgment in its favor, the movant “ ‘ “must establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the defense.” ’ ” Martin v. Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist., 353 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir.2003) (emphasis in original) (quoting Chaplin v. NationsCredit Corp., 307 F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir.2002) (quoting Fontenot, 780 F.2d at 1194 )); accord Addicks Servs., Inc. v. GGP–Bridgeland, LP, 596 F.3d 286, 293 (5th Cir.2010).

“A fact is material only if its resolution would affect the outcome of the action....” Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 585 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir.2009) ; accord Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir.2012) ; Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Farese, 423 F.3d 446, 454 (5th Cir.2005). “Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “An issue is ‘genuine ’ if it is real and substantial, as opposed to merely formal, pretended, or a sham.” Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo Cnty., 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir.2001) (emphasis in original). Thus, a genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; accord Poole, 691 F.3d at 627 ; Bayle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir.2010) ; Wiley, 585 F.3d at 210 ; EMCASCO Ins. Co. v. Am. Int'l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 438 F.3d 519, 523 (5th Cir.2006). The moving party, however, need not negate the elements of the nonmovants' case. See Bayle, 615 F.3d at 355 ; Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir.2...