Brooks v. GAF Materials Corp.
| Decision Date | 31 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No.: 8:11-cv-00983-JMC |
| Parties | Jack Brooks, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated; and Ellen Brooks, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. GAF Materials Corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Plaintiffs Jack Brooks and Ellen Brooks ("Plaintiffs") bring this putative class action against Defendant GAF Materials Corporation ("GAF") asserting claims for negligence, negligent representation, breach of warranty, breach of implied warranties, fraud, violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act ("SCUTPA"), and unjust enrichment arising from GAF's sale of allegedly defective roofing shingles. Currently before the court is GAF's Motion for Summary Judgment and to Decertify the Class [Doc. 38]. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part.
GAF manufactures roofing materials, including roofing shingles marketed under the Timberline® brand name. Plaintiffs are residents of Newberry, South Carolina. In August 2000, contractor Thadd Mays ("Mays") replaced Plaintiffs' roof using Timberline shingles. Plaintiff asserts that, at the time of installation, Mays indicated that the shingles installed on Plaintiffs' roof were "thirty-year" shingles. GAF asserts that the shingles installed on Plaintiffs' roof were covered by a thirty-year limited warranty which provided that, in the event of a manufacturingdefect, GAF would furnish new shingles and pay the "full reasonable cost of labor to repair or recover the defective shingles" for the first five years after original installation. Thereafter, GAF would contribute to the purchase of new shingles (but not the cost of labor to install them), with the amount contributed by GAF prorated to reflect the amount of use a homeowner received in proportion to the warranty term. The terms of this limited warranty, including a disclaimer of implied warranties, appeared on the packaging of each bundle of Timberline shingles.
In March 2003, after receiving complaints from other property owners, Mays inspected Plaintiffs' roof and observed cracking in some of the shingles. Several GAF employees accompanied Mays during the inspection. No one from GAF ever advised Plaintiffs of the cracking in the shingles on their roof. It is disputed as to whether Mays informed Plaintiffs of the cracking at the time of his inspection and observation in 2003 or sometime later.
In March 2006, Mays submitted warranty claims to GAF on behalf of Plaintiffs and several other property owners. Mays also submitted proposals to GAF which included his estimates for completing the removal and replacement of the roofs. GAF resolved the majority of the warranty claims submitted by Mays by offering a payment in the amount estimated by Mays for the labor costs associated with the claims and a materials voucher for the GAF roofing shingles necessary to complete the work.
On April 17, 2006, Plaintiffs filed suit against GAF. Two days after the suit was filed, GAF informed Mays that it would resolve Plaintiffs' claim by making payment for the labor costs to Mays Contracting as well as providing a materials voucher for GAF roofing shingles. Plaintiffs declined GAF's offer and proceeded with the lawsuit. At the time of the initiation of this suit, Plaintiffs did not report to GAF any damages other than the allegedly defective shingles. However, in 2010, Plaintiffs' expert witness opined that there were two leaks in the interior of Plaintiffs' home which he attributed to the cracking shingles.
Plaintiffs originally filed this suit as an individual action against GAF in the Court of Common Pleas of Newberry County, South Carolina ("Circuit Court") on April 17, 2006. GAF removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The matter was remanded back to the Circuit Court upon Plaintiffs' representation that they would restrict their claim to an amount under $75,000 and, therefore, the matter did not meet the monetary threshold for diversity jurisdiction. In November 2007, Plaintiffs amended their complaint to assert a class action, and GAF again removed the matter to federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). After removal, Plaintiffs sought remand on the ground that they tailored their complaint to avoid federal jurisdiction by limiting their damages to five million dollars. Relying on that representation, this court remanded the case to the Circuit Court again.
The case then proceeded in the Circuit Court. In March 2010, the Circuit Court granted Plaintiffs' request for class certification ("Circuit Court Certification Order"). The Circuit Court defined the class as: "all South Carolina property owners whose roofs include Timberline® shingles manufactured at GAF's Mobile, Alabama manufacturing facility between 1999 and 2007."
The Circuit Court also heard the parties' motions for summary judgment. GAF moved for summary judgment as to all claims brought by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs requested judgment be entered in favor of the class on the cause of action for breach of implied warranties. In September 2010, the Circuit Court denied GAF's motion and granted Plaintiffs' motion as to the cause of action for breach of implied warranties ("Circuit Court Summary Judgment Order").
GAF appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals. While that appeal was pending, Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint in the Circuit Court seeking more than $5million in class action damages. The Circuit Court granted Plaintiffs' motion, and GAF promptly removed the matter back to this court.
After the removal of the matter to this court, GAF filed the instant motion requesting the court enter an order granting summary judgment in favor of GAF as to all claims asserted by Plaintiffs in their individual capacity or, alternatively, for an order reconsidering and reversing the Circuit Court Summary Judgment Order granting partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on their claims for breach of implied warranties. GAF further seeks an order from this court decertifying the class which was certified by the Circuit Court on March 18, 2010.
Where a matter is removed to federal court after a state court has entered a judgment, "the district court should immediately adopt the judgment as its own." Resolution Trust Corp. v. Allen, 16 F.3d 568, 575 (4th Cir. 1994). "After this adoption, the judgment [sh]ould be treated the same as other judgments entered by the district court and the parties would follow the ordinary rules regarding post-judgment remedies." Id. at 573.
GAF filed the instant motion prior to the court's adoption of the Circuit Court orders as its own. However, in the interest of judicial economy, the court now adopts the Circuit Court orders as orders of this court in accordance with the guidance from Resolution Trust Corp., and proceeds with review of this motion as allowed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party "may file a motion to alter or amend a [state court judgment made prior to removal] under Rule 59(e) which must be served no later than [twenty-eight] days after the district court's entry of the state court judgmentas its own." Id. at 573 n.5; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).1 A court may alter or amend a judgment only where the movant shows either (1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) new evidence that was not available at the time of the ruling; or (3) that there has been a clear error of law or a manifest injustice. See Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp., 599 F.3d 403, 407 (4th Cir. 2010).
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate that: (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and (2) that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. See id. at 324. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. See Ross v. Commc'ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985). Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
GAF argues that it is entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' individual claims...
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