Brooks v. Henry
| Decision Date | 20 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:17-cv-00708 |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER SAYNE BROOKS, Plaintiff, v. LT. HENRY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
This matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge to dispose or recommend disposition of any pretrial motions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). (Doc. No. 5.)
Now pending is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Corporal Michael Graulau. (Doc. No. 11.) Plaintiff Christopher Sayne Brooks has not responded in opposition. For the following reasons, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that Graulau's motion (Doc. No. 11) be GRANTED.
Brooks filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on April 11, 2017, while he was in the custody of the Davidson County Sheriff's Office (DCSO). (Doc. No. 1, PageID# 1.) Brooks named as defendants Lieutenant Henry, the "Warden," Corporal Graulau, "4 other[s]," "Lt. Comrade," and "Lt. Dail." (Id. at PageID# 3.) In its June 22, 2017 order, the Court granted Brooks's application to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed all defendants other than Graulau, finding that they were "either not mentioned in [Brooks's] statement of facts, or [were] referenced in a context that is either too incoherent or illegible to enable [] the [C]ourt to discern what [Brooks] alleges they did." (Doc. No. 5, PageID# 27.) The dismissal of those defendants was without prejudice to Brooks's "ability to file an amended complaint in which he clearly states what each defendant did to violate his constitutional rights and when s/he did so." (Id.) Brooks did not file an amended complaint.
Brooks claims that, on July 18, 2016,1 while incarcerated at the Criminal Justice Center in Nashville, Tennessee, he suddenly had a "flashback" and "fear[ed] [for his] life" while Graulau was removing his handcuffs. This caused him to "jerk the cuffs." (Doc. No. 1, PageID# 2.) Brooks alleges that Graulau responded by "beat[ing] [Brooks's] arm" until it started to bleed. (Id.) Brooks claims that this constituted excessive force and states that he has "been going [through] mental health issue[s]," which have "been worse since [the incident]." (Id. at PageID# 3.) He seeks "payments d[ue] to[] mental and p[hysical] pain." (Id. at PageID# 7.)
Graulau filed this motion for summary judgment on September 13, 2017. (Doc. No. 11.) Graulau argues that Brooks's claim of excessive force "should be dismissed because [Brooks] has not properly grieved his claims as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 ('PLRA'), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e." (Doc. No. 12, PageID# 42.) To support that argument, Graulau filed a statement of undisputed material facts, a copy of the grievance procedure in effect at the DCSO, and the declaration of Tom Davis, the DCSO Records Manager. (Doc. Nos. 13, 14, 14-1.) Graulau argues that Brooks "never filed a grievance about a use of force incident on or around July 18, 2016, nor did he file a grievance of any kind against Corporal Michael Graulau. (Doc. No. 12, PageID# 43.) Although Brooks did not respond to Graulau's motion for summary judgment, he does state in his complaint that he "took grievance[s] out [against] both part[ie]s" and "ap[p]ealed one." (Doc. No. 1, PageID# 4.)
On April 19, 2018, the Court noted that Brooks had not responded to Graulau's motion for summary judgment and ordered him to show cause within thirty days why the Magistrate Judge should not recommend that judgment be entered in Graulau's favor for the reasons stated in his motion for summary judgment or for Brooks's failure to prosecute his claims. (Doc. No. 15, PageID# 83.) Brooks was "forewarned that failure to respond to [the] Court's order may result in a recommendation that judgment be entered in favor of Graulau and that his case be dismissed." (Id.) Brooks was released from custody on July 20, 2017. He has not responded to the Court's order. (Doc. No. 10; Doc. No. 14, PageID# 52, ¶ 2.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment shall be granted if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To prevail, the moving party must prove the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to any essential element of the opposing party's claim. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Stiles ex rel. D.S. v. Grainger Cty., 819 F.3d 834, 847 (6th Cir. 2016). In determining whether the moving party has met its burden, a court must view the factual evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Stiles, 819 F.3d at 848. A court must not weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matters asserted but instead must "determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Jackson v. VHS Detroit Receiving Hosp., Inc., 814 F.3d 769, 775 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)).
If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case with respect to which it has the burden, however, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Martinez v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 703 F.3d 911, 914 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). To preclude summary judgment, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and present specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Shreve v. Franklin Cty., 743 F.3d 126, 132 (6th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). "A mere scintilla of evidence by the nonmoving party is insufficient to defeat summary judgment; 'there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmoving party].'" St. Clair Marine Salvage, Inc. v. Bulgarelli, 796 F.3d 569, 574 n.2 (6th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). If the evidence offered by the nonmoving party is "merely colorable," "not significantly probative," or not enough to lead a fair-minded jury to find for the nonmoving party, the motion for summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-52.
This Court's Local Rules 7.01(b) and 56.01(g) govern responses to motions generally and statements of material facts filed with motions for summary judgment, respectively. Local Rule 7.01(b) states, in pertinent part, that "[f]ailure to file a timely response [to a motion] shall indicate that there is no opposition to the motion." M.D. Tenn. Rule 7.01(b) (response). Regarding responses to statements of material facts in the summary judgment context, Local Rule 56.01(g) provides that "[f]ailure to respond to a moving party's statement of material facts . . . shall indicate that the asserted facts are not disputed for the purposes of summary judgment." M.D. Tenn. Rule 56.01(g) (failure to respond). However, "[a] district court cannot grant summary judgment in favor of a movant simply because the adverse party has not responded," Evans v. Plummer, No. 16-3826, 2017 WL 1400495, at *9 (6th Cir. Apr. 19, 2017) (quoting Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 455 (6th Cir. 1991)). The court must instead examine the motion to determine whether the movant has discharged its burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) states that, "[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Rule 41(b) does not abrogate the power of courts, "acting on their own initiative, to clear their calendars of cases that have remained dormant because of the inaction or dilatoriness of the parties seeking relief." Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962); see also Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 109 (6th Cir. 1991); Carter v. City of Memphis, 636 F.2d 159, 161 (6th Cir. 1980) () (citing Link, 370 U.S. at 626).
In determining whether dismissal under Rule 41(b) is appropriate, the Court considers four factors: (1) the willfulness, bad faith, or fault of the plaintiff; (2) whether the defendant has been prejudiced by the plaintiff's conduct; (3) whether the plaintiff was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to dismissal; and (4) the availability and appropriateness of other, less drastic sanctions. Carpenter v. City of Flint, 723 F.3d 700, 703-04 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Mulbah v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 261 F.3d 586, 590 (6th Cir. 2011)). A dismissal for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b) constitutes an adjudication on the merits "[u]nless the dismissal order states otherwise." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). The Sixth Circuit has cautioned that dismissal with prejudice is a "harsh sanction" that should only apply in extreme situations where there is a "clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff." Carter, 636 F.2d at 161. Dismissal without prejudice is "a comparatively lenient sanction" for which the "controlling standards should be greatly relaxed because the dismissed party is ultimately not irrevocably deprived of his day in court." Muncy v. G.C.R. Inc., 110 F. App'x 552, 556 n.4 (6th Cir. 2004).
For the reasons that follow, the Magistrate Judge recommends that Graulau's motion for summary judgment be granted and Brooks's case be dismissed with prejudice. Brooks's failure to comply with the Court's orders provides a second basis for dismissal.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that "[n]o action shall be...
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