Brooks v. Kyler

Decision Date27 September 1999
Parties(3rd Cir. 2000) ALAN T. BROOKS, Appellant, v. KYLER, Superintendent; PORTERFIELD, Sgt.; RUPINSKI, C.O.; ALL DEFENDANTS ARE BEING SUED IN THEIR OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, C.O. NO. 98-7626 Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

On Appeal From the United States District Court For the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civ. No. 95-cv-00448) District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik ALAN T. BROOKS, Appellant Pro Se SCI Graterford P.O. Box 244 Graterford, PA 19426

D. MICHAEL FISHER, ESQUIRE Attorney General HOWARD G. HOPKIRK, ESQUIRE Deputy Attorney General CALVIN R. KOONS, ESQUIRE Senior Deputy Attorney General JOHN G. KNORR, III, ESQUIRE Chief Deputy Attorney General Chief Appellate Litigation Section Office of the Attorney General 15th Floor, Strawberry Square Harrisburg, PA 17120,

Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, MCKEE and COWEN, Circuit Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

BECKER, Chief Judge.

Appellant Alan T. Brooks, a Pennsylvania state prisoner, brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 against four prison officials, claiming, among other things, that they violated his right under the Eighth Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Brooks has appealed the District Court's final order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The appeal presents the question whether a prisoner who testifies that he was violently beaten by three prison guards, but who adduces no objective evidence of anything but de minimis injuries, may survive a summary judgment motion on his Eighth Amendment claim. We conclude that he may, and hence we reverse. In so doing, we look to Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992), in which the Supreme Court concluded that proof of significant injury was not an independent requirement for an Eighth Amendment claim of excessive and wanton force. Following Hudson's focus on the force used, as opposed to the injury inflicted, we conclude that although the degree of injury is relevant for any Eighth Amendment analysis, there is no fixed minimum quantum of injury that a prisoner must prove that he suffered through objective or independent evidence in order to state a claim for wanton and excessive force.

I.

In May, 1994, Brooks was confined at the State Correctional Institution in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania (SCICamp Hill). Defendants, Superintendent Kenneth Kyler, Sergeant Russell Porterfield, Correctional Officer Michael Rupinski, and Correctional Officer Gerald Devlin were assigned to SCI-Camp Hill during the time in question.1 Brooks contends that on the evening of May 5, 1994, Officers Devlin and Rupinski and Sergeant Porterfield physically assaulted him while he was attempting to complete an authorized phone call. The facts adduced by Brooks in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment are as follows.

According to Brooks, before the assault took place, Devlin and Rupinski came to his cell in the isolation confinement unit and told him that he had been approved for a legal phone call. They then handcuffed him to a waist restraint belt and conducted a pat down search. After being escorted to another cell, Brooks placed his call. Approximately ten minutes later, Devlin told Brooks to terminate his conversation. Brooks maintains that he acknowledged the directive but that less than a minute after Devlin issued his order, and while he was in the process of hanging up, Sergeant Porterfield pushed Devlin aside, ran into the cell, and pushed down the telephone receiver.

When Brooks turned and asked Devlin what was happening, Porterfield is said to have struck the right side of Brooks's head with his fist, and then to have continued with more punches. Brooks, still handcuffed to the waist restraint belt, fell face down as Porterfield allegedly continued to punch him in the head while Devlin and Rupinski stomped on his back and neck. As Porterfield continued punching him in the back of the head, Brooks represents that he went "unconscious semi-conscious," and that several minutes later, Rupinski placed him in leg shackles. According to Brooks, he was then raised about four feet from the floor by the leg shackles' chains and waist restraint belt, and slammed into a cell wall. At that point, Porterfield allegedly began choking Brooks with both hands, nearly rendering Brooks unconscious. As he was choking Brooks, Porterfield is said to have threatened to kill Brooks and to have told him that "no one will ever find out." Finally, Brooks alleges that, after the attack, the officers transported him back to his cell where he was subjected to further physical and verbal abuse prior to being unshackled.

As a result of the alleged attack, Brooks suffered injuries including abrasions (or "scratches" as the defendants call them) on his neck and hands. When the assault ended, Brooks requested to see the shift commander and to receive medical treatment. A nurse arrived five minutes later and gave Brooks his daily medication for a previously diagnosed condition of high blood pressure. The officer accompanying the nurse told Brooks to file a grievance. Brooks claims that shortly thereafter he, as well as other inmates, saw Devlin, Rupinski and Porterfield congregating with a lieutenant in what appeared to be an attempt to cover up the assault. When the lieutenant passed Brooks's cell roughly thirty minutes later, Brooks told him what had happened. The lieutenant allegedly told Brooks that he did not believe him and walked away. When the shift changed, Brooks, upon his request, was examined and treated by a physician and, the following day, received various pain medications. Brooks maintains that his blood pressure remained very high for two to three weeks after the alleged assault.2 Brooks also alleges that he was given medication for anxiety, stress, and depression as a result of being attacked.3

Based on the described events, Brooks commenced this pro se action claiming, among other things, that the defendants' actions violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against the use of excessive force. 4 The defendants filed an answer denying the allegations of the complaint and, after discovery, moved for summary judgment. Brooks responded to the motion by submitting an affidavit setting forth his version of the events and arguing that he had been provided with inadequate discovery. The District Court found that Brooks's claims of being violently beaten by three correctional officers were unsupported by the medical evidence:

Although there are material facts in dispute regarding the underlying cause and events at issue, it is apparent that the type of vicious, prolonged attack alleged by Brooks would have resulted in far greater injuries than those which he indisputably sustained.

Accordingly, the Court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Brooks now appeals. The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. SS 1331, 1343. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We set forth the familiar standard of review in the margin.5

II.
A.

After conviction, the Eighth Amendment serves as the primary source of substantive protection in cases where an inmate challenges a prison official's use of force as excessive and unjustified. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986). In an excessive force claim, the central question is "whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). Summary judgment in favor of a defendant is not appropriate if "it appears that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, will support a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322; see also Sampley v. Ruettgers, 704 F.2d 491, 495 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that wantonness exists when a prison guard intends to harm an inmate).

In determining whether a correctional officer has used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, courts look to several factors including: (1) "the need for the application of force"; (2) "the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used"; (3) "the extent of injury inflicted"; (4) "the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them"; and (5) "any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321 (citations omitted).

In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants maintain that they employed only the minimal force necessary to protect their safety and institutional security, as we describe in the margin.6 They also rely on two internal investigations which concluded that Brooks's claims of excessive force were unfounded. See Appellees' Appendix at SA-88-9, PP 4-7. On this evidence, the defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment. While these considerations support the defendants' position, and might well lead to the defendants' verdict at trial, they are controverted by facts adduced by Brooks. If Brooks is believed, while the application of some force may have been needed to reign in Brooks's apparently overtime telephone call, he was shackled at the time so that the extent of his threat to staff would not have been great.

What the appeal turns on then, under the Whitley factors, is the defendants' third argument that the medical evidence in the record does not support Brooks's allegation that he was violently beaten. They contend that Brooks's visible injuries, which include a few scratches to his neck and wrists, were de minimis and create a presumption that the force used against him was inadequate to state an Eighth Amendment claim:

[T]he undisputed medical evidence shows that the only injuries which Brooks had were a few...

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