Brooks v. Leon's Quality Adjusters, Inc.
| Decision Date | 29 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 1:15-cv-000965 - JLT |
| Parties | JIMMIE R. BROOKS, Plaintiff, v. LEON'S QUALITY ADJUSTERS, INC. and TONY RODRIGUEZ, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(Doc. 26)
Plaintiff Jimmie Brooks purchased a truck on credit that was financed by Gateway One Lending & Finance. Plaintiff agreed to make monthly payments to Gateway, which took a security interest in the truck. After Plaintiff defaulted on his loan, Gateway hired Leon's Quality Adjusters, which repossessed the truck while Plaintiff was at work. Plaintiff contends that, due to actions taken during the repossession, Defendants are liable for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, California's Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices act, and conversion. (Doc. 1 at 4-7)
Defendants assert Plaintiff is unable to succeed on his claims, and seek summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 26) The Court heard the oral arguments of the parties on August 9, 2016. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
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In May 2014, Plaintiff "financed the purchase of a 2003 model red Ford Super Duty F-250 extended cab truck." (DUF 1) Plaintiff agreed "to make a down payment and monthly payments through a loan" with Gateway One Lending & Finance. (DUF 2, 4) Plaintiff failed to make his loan payments in January, February, March, and April of 2015. (DUF 8-12) In mid-April 2015, Gateway notified "Plaintiff that if he did not get caught up with his payments and the additional fees, it would repossess the Truck." (DUF 13) On April 16, 2015, Gateway hired Leon's Quality Adjusters and submitted an "Order to Repossess." (DUF 14; Doc. 26-3 at 5)
On April 18, 2015, "Rodriguez went by Plaintiff's home address and Bolthouse Farms," where Plaintiff was employed. (DUF 18, 29) Rodriguez did not enter the Bolthouse property, but "observed the employee parking lot." (DUF 18, 22) Rodriguez again went to Plaintiff's neighborhood the next day, and talked to one of Plaintiff's neighbors. (Doc. 26-2 at 80, Brooks Depo. 81:6-11)
On April 22, 2015, Rodriguez returned to Bolthouse Farms property to repossess Plaintiff's truck. (See DUF 48) A black iron gate at the entryway of Bolthouse was open. (DUF 34, 35) There is not a physical gate "or any other barrier at the first entryway to the employee parking lot." (DUF 40) While there are security shacks at Bolthouse, "[t]he employee parking lot entry ways are situated before the security guard shack[s]." (DUF 37) Rodriguez parked on the street outside the property, and "walked into Bolthouse's employee parking lot," where he confirmed the "make, model, and license plate information" on the truck. (DUF 48) He then returned to his tow truck and drove onto the Bolthouse property. (See DUF 52)
Rodriguez entered the driveway of Bolthouse Farms, and backed into the employee parking lot. (DUF 52) Bolthouse security guard Lucia Jimenez, who "was stationed at the front guard shack," testified that she observed the tow truck on the driveway and estimated he was driving 7-10 mph.2 (DUF 51-53) When Jimenez saw the tow truck backing into the parking lot, she called Sabrina McEntire, a security guard in the shack "directly behind . . . the guard shack that Jimenez maintained."(DUF 55, 57) Jimenez lost sight of the tow truck while it was in the parking lot, because the vehicles of employees "blocked her view." (DUF 59)
McEntire3 testified that when Jimenez called, she "looked up at the camera" and saw that the tow truck was already leaving the parking lot with Plaintiff's vehicle. (Doc. 28 at 94, McEntire Depo. 39:13-18) When she exited the shack and spotted the tow truck, it was "leaving the south entrance" of the parking lot. (Id. at 93, Depo. 34:4-8) She asserted that she then went around the side of the building, and (Id., 34:15-21) In addition, McEntire reported she waved her hands in the air and yelled loudly. (Id., 34:22-35:4) At that time, McEntire said she "was looking at the rear of Mr. Brooks' vehicle, and the tow truck "was driving down towards the end of the driveway." (Id., 35:3-6, 22-23) She never made eye contact with the driver and testified she did not know if she was yelling loudly enough for the driver to hear her. (Id., 36:7-9, 37:3-10) McEntire reported the tow truck went out of the south lane, into the wrong direction. (Id., 35:13-15) "[A]fter he made the turn, he started accelerating." (Id. at 95, Depo. 42:14-15) McEntire estimated that "[i]t was less than a minute everything happened." (Id. at 96, Depo. 49:22-23)
The entire process of entering the parking lot, attaching the vehicle to the tow truck, and exiting the lot took less than a minute. (Doc. 28 at 96; McEntire Depo. 49:22-23; Doc. 28 at 109, Bajwa Depo. 23:11-13 []) After exiting the Bolthouse Property, Rodriguez pulled over on the road. He testified that he did not go straight to the tow yard because he had not put on chains, straps, orrunning lights when he connected Plaintiff's truck. (Doc. 28 at 60, Rodriguez Depo. 102:23-103:1) In addition, Rodriguez called the Kern County Sheriff's office "no more than 15 minutes" later to report that he had repossessed the truck. (DUF 74)
At approximately 9:30 p.m., Plaintiff was informed "that someone had taken off with the Truck." (DUF 75) Plaintiff went to the security shack, where he was told "the Truck had been towed by an unidentified person." (DUF 81) Plaintiff told the security guard that he was going to call 911," but McEntire dissuaded him from doing so at that time. (DUF 81; Doc. 27-2 at 32)
Plaintiff and a coworker, Robert Gilstrap, drove around Bolthouse property in a golf cart "trying to locate the truck." (DUF 85) When those efforts failed, "they got in Gilstrap's car and searched for the Truck off Bolthouse's property." (DUF 87) While searching his vehicle, Plaintiff called 911. (DUF 88) "About the same time that he called 911, they saw the Truck, and Plaintiff told the dispatcher that they found the Truck, and he hung up." (DUF 89)
Rodriguez saw two men in the truck, and heard someone yell, "Hey, that's my truck!" (DUF 95; Doc. 27-2 at 35) Rodriguez "noticed that the passenger in Gilstrap's car was on the phone, and then he got out of the car and approached Rodriguez and told him, 'I'm Jimmie Brooks.'" (DUF 98) Plaintiff "asked permission to take some of his personal property out of the Truck." (DUF 101) Prior to allowing Plaintiff retrieving his property, Rodriguez asked Plaintiff for the keys to his vehicle. (DUF 102) Once Plaintiff did so, "Rodriguez allowed Plaintiff to take his personal items out of the Truck." (DUF 103) "At no time did Rodriguez use or threaten force or violence against Plaintiff." (DUF 110)
Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of the Civil Procedure, "an affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated." See also Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 410, 419 (9th Cir. 2001) ().
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Plaintiff objects that "Exhibit A"—the "Order to Repossess" sent from Gateway to Leon's Quality Adjusters—is hearsay. (Doc. 27-4 at 2) However, commercial documents with independent legal significance, such as contracts, do not constitute hearsay. See United States v. Pang, 362 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, the document memorializes the agreement between Gateway and Leon's Quality Adjusters for the repossession of Plaintiff's truck. Indeed, that Gateway hired Leon's Quality Adjusters is undisputed by the parties. (See Doc. 27-2 at 4) Further, Leon Scroggins, the president and owner of Leon's Quality Adjusters, properly authenticated the document. Accordingly, Plaintiff's objection to the exhibit is OVERRULED.
Mr. Scoggins asserted, "Leon's maintained progress reports relating to the repossession jobs it was hired to do," and sought to authenticate the report related to the repossession of Plaintiff's truck as "Exhibit B." (Doc. 26-3 at 2, Scoggins Decl. ¶ 4) In addition, Mr. Scoggins reported that "Leon's completed a Notice of Taking Possession of Motor Vehicle," and sought to authenticate the Notice as "Exhibit C." (Id., ¶ 6)
Plaintiff argues Mr. Scoggins failed to properly authenticate the documents "since Exh. B is not a 'Progress Report,' but a Notice of Taking Motor Vehicle," and "Exh. C is not a 'Notice of Taking Motor Vehicle,' but a Progress Report." (Doc. 27-4 at 2) Plaintiff also objects to the documents as hearsay, and contends Mr. Scoggins fails to demonstrate personal knowledge as to the Notice because it "was prepared and signed by someone other than Scroggins." (Id.)
As an initial matter, Mr. Scroggins explained he "inadvertently" submitted Exhibit B and C in the incorrect order. (Doc. 29-1 at 2, Supp. Scroggins Decl. ¶ 2) Plaintiff's objections on the grounds that the exhibits were erroneously mislabelled are OVERRULED. On the other hand, as Plaintiff asserts, Mr. Scroggins does not demonstrate personal knowledge regarding the Notice, which appears to have been signed by Tony Rodriguez. Therefore, Plaintiff's objection on the grounds of lack of personal knowledge is SUSTAINED.
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