Brooks v. Roberts
| Decision Date | 19 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | 1:16-CV-1025 |
| Parties | Derrick BROOKS, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Clifton DeMeco, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, and Brian Blowers, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Samuel D. ROBERTS, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
OF COUNSEL: DENNIS PARKER, ESQ., PETRA T. TASHEFF, ESQ., SAIMA A. AKHTAR, ESQ., GREGORY LEE BASS, ESQ., KATHARINE M. DEABLER-MEADOWS, ESQ., NATIONAL CENTER FOR LAW & ECONOMIC JUSTICE, INC., Attorneys for Plaintiffs, 275 Seventh Avenue, Suite 1506, New York, NY 10001.
OF COUNSEL: SUSAN C. ANTOS, ESQ., EMPIRE JUSTICE CENTER - ALBANY, Attorneys for Plaintiffs, 119 Washington Avenue, Second Floor, Albany, NY 12210.
OF COUNSEL: OMAR J. SIDDIQI, ESQ., NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT, Attorneys for Defendant, 100 Church Street, New York, NY 10007.
HON. LETITIA JAMES, New York State Attorney General, OF COUNSEL: C. HARRIS DAGUE, ESQ., Ass't Attorney General, Attorneys for Defendant, The Capitol, Albany, NY 12224.
On August 19, 2016, plaintiffs Derrick Brooks, Clifton DeMeco, and Brian Blowers (collectively "plaintiffs") filed a class action complaint against defendant New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance ("OTDA") Commissioner Samuel D. Roberts (the "Commissioner" or "defendant"). As relevant here, OTDA is the agency designated by the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") as responsible for administering federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program ("SNAP") benefits, sometimes known as food stamps, to qualifying low-income residents in New York State.
Plaintiffs’ class complaint alleged that the Commissioner's implementation of a new federal rule that imposed a three-month time limit on the receipt of SNAP benefits by able-bodied adults without dependents ("ABAWDs") who did not meet certain work requirements violated Constitutional Due Process and the federal statutory law governing the SNAP benefits program.
Among other things, plaintiffs alleged that the Commissioner failed to provide adequate notice to SNAP recipients about (1) the ABAWD time limit, (2) the work rule requirements, (3) the conditions that would exempt an individual from the ABAWD rules, or (4) the conditions under which "good cause" would exist for non-compliance with those new rules. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the federal statutory law governing the SNAP program.
On August 23, 2016, plaintiffs moved for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 23 and for a preliminary injunction under Rule 65. Dkt. Nos. 9-10. The Commissioner opposed plaintiffs’ requests and cross-moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state plausible claims for relief and under Rule 12(b)(7) for failure to join the USDA as a necessary party. Dkt. No. 21.
After full briefing on these motions, the Commissioner advised the Court that OTDA had revised the language in the written notices provided to SNAP applicants and recipients and requested permission to submit supplemental briefing in light of the revisions. Dkt. No. 33. That request was granted. Dkt. No. 36. With the benefit of the parties’ supplemental briefing on the adequacy of the revised notices, the Court heard argument on the cross-motions on November 30, 2016 in Utica, New York. Decision was reserved.
On May 5, 2017, the Court granted in part and denied in part the Commissioner's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, denied the Commissioner's 12(b)(7) motion after concluding the USDA was not a necessary party, and denied plaintiffs’ motions for class certification and for a preliminary injunction. Brooks v. Roberts , 251 F. Supp. 3d 401, 437 (N.D.N.Y. 2017).
As relevant here, Brooks held that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on several of their statutory and process-related claims regarding lack of adequate notice but found that they had failed to show irreparable harm because they could "immediately reestablish eligibility by reapplying for benefits." Id. at 428, 432-33. Brooks also held that plaintiffs met all four of the Rule 23(a) requirements class certification but concluded it was unnecessary to formally certify any class because the Commissioner had represented "that he will apply any relief obtained by plaintiffs in this action across the board to all members of the proposed class." Id. at 417-421.
Thereafter, the parties initially engaged in written discovery in the form of document productions and interrogatory demands. Dague Decl., Dkt. No. 102-1 ¶ 12. Beginning in January of 2018, the parties began negotiating with an eye toward settlement. Id. ; see also Antos Decl., Dkt. No. 99-1 ¶ 5. The parties continued negotiating the terms of a settlement throughout 2018 and well into 2019. See, e.g. , Dkt. Nos. 73, 75, 77, 79, 81, 83, 85. As the Commissioner's periodic written status updates make clear, the "nuance and complexity of the matters involved" necessitated multiple meetings, conference calls, and the exchange of position statement letters. Dkt. Nos. 73, 81.
On June 14, 2019, the parties notified the Court that they had reached a settlement agreement on all of the remaining claims and submitted the matter for Court approval. Dkt. Nos. 87-88. Among other things, this agreement (1) certified a statewide class of SNAP recipients who had their benefits reduced or terminated for failure to meet an ABAWD work requirement during a discrete time period; (2) directed certain changes to the language found in written notices to SNAP recipients; (3) directed defendant to issue policy guidance and other information to local social services districts; and (4) provided specific relief to each of the three named plaintiffs.
On September 17, 2019, after holding a fairness hearing in open court, the parties’ settlement was approved. Dkt. Nos. 90-93. Thereafter, the parties tried to reach an agreement on attorneys’ fees and costs. Dkt. Nos. 94-95. When that failed, the Court set a briefing schedule on plaintiffs’ fee request. Dkt. No. 97.
On June 26, 2020, plaintiffs moved under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees. Dkt. Nos. 99. Plaintiffs have also moved for an award of costs under Rule 54. Dkt. No. 98. The Commissioner has opposed plaintiffs’ fee request, but not their request for costs. Dkt. No. 102. Plaintiffs have replied. Dkt. No. 103. Both motions will be considered on the basis of the submissions without oral argument.
In their opening brief, plaintiffs seek an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $367,163.82. Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 99-23 at 8.2 This figure is broken down into more detail in plaintiffs’ supporting submissions: $161,303.67 is attributable to 722.285 hours of work done by the Empire Justice Center and $205,860.15 is attributable to 867.29 hours of work done by the National Center on Law and Economic Justice. Antos Decl., Dkt. No. 99-1 ¶¶ 15-16.
As plaintiffs explain, these totals already include (1) a write-off of any time worked by "five of the seven law students who worked on the case"; (2) a 50% write-down on time spent for travel; and (3) a 10% across-the-board reduction that accounts for "any duplication among multiple counsel." Pls.’ Mem. at 12. Notably, however, the $367,163.82 does not account for costs.
Plaintiffs have included in their submissions a chart that better illustrates the details of the fee request and also includes a partial breakdown of their request for costs:
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