Brooks v. School District of City of Moberly, Missouri, 16131.
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
Citation | 267 F.2d 733 |
Docket Number | No. 16131.,16131. |
Parties | Naomi BROOKS et al., Appellants, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF CITY OF MOBERLY, MISSOURI, etc., et al., Appellees. |
Decision Date | 17 June 1959 |
Robert L. Carter, New York City (Herbert O. Reid, Washington, D. C., R. L. Witherspoon, Sidney R. Redmond, St. Louis, Mo., and Lee V. Swinton, Kansas City, Mo., on the brief), for appellants.
Arthur M. O'Keefe, Moberly, Mo. (Austin Walden, Moberly, Mo., on the brief), for appellees.
Before SANBORN, VAN OOSTERHOUT and MATTHES, Circuit Judges.
VAN OOSTERHOUT, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs, seven Negro school teachers, who were employed by the defendant School District to teach in its segregated school maintained for Negroes during the 1954-1955 school year, and were not reemployed when the school system was integrated commencing in the fall of 1955, appeal from final order entered October 2, 1958, dismissing their complaint praying for declaratory judgment, an injunction, and damages.
Plaintiffs' cause of action is based upon their claim that the defendants denied them reemployment after integration solely because of their race or color, pursuant to a rule, practice, or custom of the Board of Education not to employ Negro teachers. Plaintiffs allege that such practice, policy, custom, or usage is in violation of their rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States, particularly the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1983.
There is no dispute between the parties as to the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants admit that any rule, practice, or custom denying plaintiffs reemployment because of race or color would be discriminatory and in violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
The trial court properly determined it had jurisdiction to consider the alleged violation of plaintiffs' rights protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Prior to integration the Board operated six white elementary schools, a white junior high school, a white junior college, and a combined elementary and high school for Negro students known as the Lincoln School. During the school year 1954-1955, the Board employed 109 teachers. Ninety-eight white teachers served in the white schools. Eleven Negro teachers taught in the Lincoln School. Plaintiffs are seven of the eleven teachers employed in the Lincoln School.
The defendant Board, immediately after the decision of the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873, commenced the necessary study looking toward the integration of its schools. After seeking the views of all races, an acceptable plan of integration was worked out and was placed in effect at the opening of the fall term of 1955. It is stipulated that, "the Board of Education of Moberly, Missouri, fairly and honestly and expeditiously went about and conducted the integration of the colored pupils and the white pupils in the Moberly School System prior to the filing of this suit." Because of this stipulation it is unnecessary to set out the detailed evidence pertaining to the development of the integration plans. It should be said, however, that the original proposal contemplated the use of the Lincoln School as a unit of the integrated system, but this plan was abandoned when substantial objections thereto were made by both races. The Negroes opposed the retention of Lincoln as a voluntary segregated school, and no effort was made to retain the segregated school. The integration plan finally adopted called for the closing of the Lincoln School, and provided that pupils of all races would attend the integrated school in the district in which they lived.
As predicted by the Integration Committee, the plan adopted required fewer teachers than were needed under the former system. The Board's determination that the teaching staff could be reduced by eleven teachers is unchallenged. At a Board meeting held on April 13, 1955, the Board decided not to renew the contracts of the eleven Negro teachers, and took similar action as to four white teachers. The teachers not employed were given statutory notice to that effect.
The Negro teachers, prior to integration, were employed by the School District which operated all of the Moberly schools. The Board, in its consideration of employment of teachers for the school year 1955-1956, attached no significance to the fact that Lincoln School was closed, and did not decline reemployment to the Negro teachers upon the basis that the teaching positions which they had previously filled no longer existed. Instead, the Board endeavored to compare the qualifications of all teachers of both races in reaching its determination as to which teachers should be reemployed.
All witnesses offered on behalf of the Board denied that the Board had any rule, practice, or custom to refuse employment to Negro teachers because of their race, and also denied that plaintiffs were in any way discriminated against because of their race. The Board's position is that, at the April meeting and at all subsequent meetings at which vacancies were filled, the plaintiffs were given full and fair consideration for all teaching positions which they were certificated to fill; and the Board maintains that in each instance the teachers employed were better qualified than any of the plaintiffs to fill the teaching positions available.
Among the stipulations of the parties are the following:
The emphasized portion of the rule just quoted covers the intangible elements to be considered in connection with the employment of the teachers. It is the application of this part of the rule that caused the difficulty in this case.
It is conceded that some of the Negro teachers had a greater number of college credits than some of the white teachers, and it is likewise true that some of the plaintiffs had more years of experience in teaching than some of the white teachers who were employed.
There is ample expert testimony to the effect that the intangibles included in the Board's rule are important elements to be considered in determining teacher qualifications. This court recognized the importance of intangibles in Morris v. Williams, 8 Cir., 149 F.2d 703, where we held that intangibles may properly be considered in fixing teachers' salaries, and that differentials in salaries based upon valid intangibles are not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. We stated (p. 708):
* * *"
As heretofore stated, the plaintiffs stipulated as to the validity of the rule. Their real complaint is that it was not honestly and fairly applied.
We shall briefly state the facts relative to the method used by the Board in employing teachers for the school year commencing in the fall of 1955.
On April 11, 1955, Superintendent Henderson wrote each Board member a letter advising that the teaching staff should be reduced by eleven members. He set out in detail the training and experience of all the teachers, Negro and white, who were serving in the system. At a Board meeting on April 13, 1955, the qualifications of all the teachers of both races were discussed in the light of all of the elements of the Board's rule, including the intangibles. The Superintendent, upon the basis of the qualifications, recommended the teachers to be reemployed. The eleven Negro teachers were not included in the group thus recommended. The Board at the same meeting also decided not to renew the contracts of four white teachers.
Superintendent Henderson testified at length at the trial, comparing the qualifications of the teachers reemployed with the Negro teachers on the basis of the whole rule of the Board. His testimony was corroborated as to elementary teachers by Mr. Brown who was supervisor of elementary teachers. Board members Wallace and Chamier testified that all teachers in the system were fairly considered for the positions available which they were qualified to teach; that the Board's whole rule, including intangibles, was considered in determining the qualifications; and that the Board, after a fair consideration of all...
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