Brooks v. Sec'y

• Decision Date: 22 February 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:13-cv-221-J-34JBT
• Parties: WILLIE J. BROOKS, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.
• Court: United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Court of Middle District of Florida

WILLIE J. BROOKS, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

Case No. 3:13-cv-221-J-34JBT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

February 22, 2016

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Willie J. Brooks, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action on February 28, 2013, by filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Petition; Doc. 1) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Brooks filed an Amended Petition (Amended Petition; Doc. 9) on October 4, 2013. In the Amended Petition, Brooks challenges a 2008 state court (Columbia County, Florida) judgment of conviction for sale or delivery of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver. Respondents have submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Amended Petition. See Respondents' Answer in Response to Order to Show Cause and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Response; Docs. 16, 17) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.). On November 15, 2013, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause and Notice to Petitioner (Doc. 11), admonishing Brooks regarding his obligations and giving Brooks a time frame in which to submit a reply. Brooks neither submitted a reply nor requested additional time to do so. This case is ripe for review.

II. Procedural History

On February 26, 2008, in Case No. 07-0415-CF, the State of Florida charged Brooks with sale or delivery of cocaine (count one) and possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver (count two). Resp. Ex. A at 53-55, Amended Information. In May 2008, Brooks proceeded to trial, see Resp. Ex. C, Transcript of the Jury Trial (Tr.), at the conclusion of which, on May 8, 2008, a jury found him guilty of sale or delivery of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, as charged. Id. at 132-33; Resp. Ex. A at 133, Verdict. On July 16, 2008, the court sentenced Brooks to a term of imprisonment of fifteen years for count one, and a term of imprisonment of fifteen years for count two, such terms to run concurrently with each other. Resp. Exs. A at 184-89, Judgment; B, Transcript of the Motion for New Trial and Sentencing Proceedings (Sentencing Tr.).

On direct appeal, Brooks, with the benefit of counsel, filed an initial brief, arguing that the circuit court erred when it adjudicated him guilty and sentenced him for both sale of cocaine and possession of the same quantum of cocaine with intent to sell in violation of the double jeopardy clause. Resp. Ex. D. The State filed an answer brief. See Resp. Ex. E. On July 22, 2009, theappellate court affirmed Brooks' convictions per curiam without issuing a written opinion. See Brooks v. State, 12 So.3d 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Resp. Ex. F. The mandate issued on August 7, 2009. See Resp. Ex. G.

On March 4, 2010, Brooks filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (Rule 3.850 motion). Resp. Ex. H at 1-34. In his request for post-conviction relief, Brooks asserted that counsel was ineffective because he failed to: investigate, depose and call three witnesses (Pat Roberts, David Allen and Kenny Tote) at trial (ground one); inform him of "a lenient plea offer" made by the State Attorney's Office that would have resulted in a term of incarceration of six months in the county jail followed by seven years of probation (ground two); file a motion in limine to exclude the testimony and evidence of a twenty-dollar bill (ground four); object to the prosecutor's remarks in closing argument (ground five); impeach and effectively cross examine Michael Murphy, the State's key witness (ground six); and object to the videotape introduced at trial and move for a mistrial to preserve the issue for appellate review (ground seven). Additionally, Brooks asserted that counsel was ineffective because he made "an insufficient boilerplate motion for judgment of acquittal" (ground three), and the trial court erred when it sentenced him as a habitual felony offender (ground eight). See id. Following a May 12, 2011evidentiary hearing, see Resp. Ex. J, Transcript of the Evidentiary Hearing (EH Tr.), the court denied the Rule 3.850 motion on June 21, 2011, see Resp. Ex. I at 108-24.

Brooks filed a notice of appeal on July 22, 2011, pursuant to the mailbox rule. Resp. Ex. K. The appellate court directed Brooks to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as untimely. Resp. Ex. L. When the appellate court did not receive a response from Brooks, the court dismissed the appeal as untimely on September 8, 2011. Resp. Ex. M. Brooks later filed a response to the order to show cause and a motion for rehearing/reconsideration. Resp. Exs. N; O. On November 16, 2011, the appellate court per curiam dismissed Brooks' appeal as untimely without prejudice to file a motion for belated appeal. See Brooks v. State, 77 So.3d 213 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Resp. Ex. P. The mandate issued on February 7, 2012. See Resp. Ex. Q.

On December 2, 2011, Brooks filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking a belated appeal of his post-conviction motion. Resp. Ex. R. The appointed Special Master recommended that Brooks be afforded a belated appeal. Resp. Ex. S. On March 22, 2012, the appellate court per curiam granted Brooks' petition seeking a belated appeal. See Brooks v. State, 82 So.3d 1210 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Resp. Ex. T. The mandate issued on April 17, 2012. See Resp. Ex. U.

On June 11, 2012, Brooks filed a pro se initial appellate brief, addressing grounds one through seven, and conceding groundeight. Resp. Ex. Y. The State filed a notice that it did not intend to file an answer brief. Resp. Ex. Z. On November 20, 2012, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial per curiam without issuing a written opinion, see Brooks v. State, 101 So.3d 841 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Resp. Ex. AA, and the mandate issued on December 18, 2012, see Resp. Ex. BB.

During the pendency of Brooks' appeal of the circuit court's denial of his Rule 3.850 motion, he filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence and Emergency Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Rule 3.800 motion) pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) on September 26, 2011. Resp. Ex. CC at 1-11. In his Rule 3.800 motion, he asserted that his sentence is illegal because Florida Statutes section 893.101 is facially unconstitutional. The trial court denied the motion on December 12, 2011. Id. at 12-14. On appeal, he filed an initial brief, see Resp. Ex. DD, and the State filed a notice that it did not intend to file an answer brief, see Resp. Ex. EE. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's denial per curiam on May 4, 2012, see Brooks v. State, 90 So.3d 835 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Resp. Ex. FF, and later denied Brooks' motion for rehearing on July 5, 2012, see Resp. Ex. GG. The mandate issued on July 23, 2012. See Resp. Ex. HH.

III. One-Year Limitations Period

The Petition appears to be timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

IV. Evidentiary Hearing

"In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Id. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because this Court can "adequately assess [Petitioner's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

V. Standard of Review

The Court will analyze Brooks' claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Section 2254(d) states:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, asdetermined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) "bars relitigation of any claim 'adjudicated on the merits' in state court, subject only to the exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2)." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). As the United States Supreme Court stated, "AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court." Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 16 (2013). This standard of review is described as follows:

Under AEDPA, when the state court has adjudicated the petitioner's claim on the merits, a federal court may not grant habeas relief unless the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," id. § 2254(d)(2). "Under § 2254(d)(1)'s 'contrary to' clause, we grant relief only 'if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.'" Jones v. GDCP Warden, 753 F.3d 1171, 1182 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (

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