Brooks v. Stanley
| Decision Date | 12 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO. 7:19-CV-195-FL,7:19-CV-195-FL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
| Parties | SANDRA HEWETT BROOKS, Plaintiff, v. DAVID STANLEY, individually and in his capacity as the Director of Brunswick County Health and Human services; CATHY LYTCH, individually and in her capacity as the Director of Brunswick County Department of Social Services; and PATRICIA MYERS, individually and in her capacity as the Adult Services Supervisor for the Brunswick County Department of Social Services, Defendants. |
This matter comes before the court on defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (DE 8). The issues raised have been fully briefed, and in this posture are ripe for ruling. For the reasons that follow, defendant's motion is granted as to plaintiff's claims arising under federal law and denied as moot in remaining part where the court declines to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff's pendent state law claims.
Plaintiff commenced the instant action on October 2, 2019, alleging claims under federal law for violation of her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1986, and claims under state law for unfair and deceptive trade practices, N.C. Gen. Stat. 75-1.1 et. seq., and negligent supervision. Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss on January 6, 2020, arguing that each of plaintiff's claims are time-barred by applicable statutes of limitations, that plaintiff fails to state a claim with respect to each of her causes of action.
In 2013, plaintiff, a black female, served on the Brunswick County Senior Alliance ("BCSA") with defendant Patricia Myers ("Myers"), Brunswick County's supervisor of Adult Day Care Services, and Lori Alderfer ("Alderfer"), BCSA's Adult Day Care Consultant. (Compl. ¶¶ 11, 13, 15). While plaintiff was serving with defendant Myers and Alderfer on the BCSA, members of the BCSA agreed that Brunswick County needed a community-based service that provided social and health services for adults needing supervised care during the day, also known as an Adult Day Healthcare Center ("ADHC"). (Id. ¶ 17). In 2014, plaintiff informed BCSA members of her interest in opening an ADHC facility in Brunswick County. (Id.). Almost immediately, defendants Myers and Cathy Lytch ("Lytch"), director of Brunswick County Department of Social Services, opposed plaintiff's ownership of an ADHC. (Id.).
Prior to plaintiff opening Oceanic Infinite Care ("Oceanic"), her ADHC, Brunswick County routinely provided an experienced consultant to assist individuals in opening an ADHC. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 18). The consultant was reFsponsible for assisting ADHC administrators with a range of tasks, such as training, technical assistance, consultation services, program compliance with state and federal regulations, contract development, administration and monitoring, other duties. (Id. ¶¶ 18-20). These functions were critical to the successful development, implementation, and long-term sustainability of Oceanic. (Id. ¶ 20). However, shortly after plaintiff expressed her desire to open an ADHC, defendants Myers and Lytch replaced Alderfer, an experienced ADHC consultant, with Mary Windham ("Windham"), a novice ADHC consultant. (Id. ¶ 21).
At the point when defendants Lytch and Myers assigned Windham to act as plaintiff's ADHC consultant, Windham lacked both the requisite work experience and training to competently perform her duties. (Id.). During plaintiff's first consultation with Windham, plaintiff discovered that defendant Myers issued to Windham an outdated Adult Day Care policies and procedures manual. (Id. ¶ 22). Defendant Myers never provided Windham with an updated manual; in fact, plaintiff gave Windham the name of the website where Windham eventually downloaded an updated version of the manual. (Id.). Realizing that Windham was ill-equipped as an ADHC program consultant, plaintiff request program consultations with defendants on several occasions, but those requests were ignored. (Id. ¶ 23).
Plaintiff alleges that defendants Lytch and Myers intentionally participated in unlawful race discrimination by failing to provide plaintiff with the same level of consultative services as enjoyed by similarly situated white providers during the development phase of their respective programs. (Id.). Some Brunswick County Department of Social Services caseworkers informed plaintiff that they overheard defendant Myers making racially disparaging comments denouncing the opening of an ADHC by a black owner, like plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 24). Defendants also allegedly engaged in various other misconduct. (Id. ¶ 25).
Finally, plaintiff alleges that defendants purposefully withheld federal Title VI and Title XX funds from Oceanic by deliberately and repeatedly using the wrong federal eligibility requirements to reduce client eligibility for Oceanic's services. (Id. ¶ 35). Defendants knowingly chose to use the stricter program eligibility requirements found in the Home and Community Grant Program, despite Title XX program consultants directing defendants to use the specific eligibility requirements articulated under Title XX. (Id.). Due to defendant's use of the wrong eligibility requirements, plaintiff and Oceanic lost contracts and revenue from numerous program eligiblesenior adults, which led to the closing and dissolution of Oceanic. (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges that her claims arose on or about July 16, 2015. (Id. ¶ 1). Three years later, plaintiff filed her first action against defendants, alleging the same claims. Brooks v. Stanley et al, No. 7:18-CV-128-BO, DE 1 (E.D.N.C. July 16, 2018). A few months later, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her claims without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(a)(i). Brooks v. Stanley et al, No. 7:18-CV-128-BO, DE 6 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 3, 2018).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In evaluating whether a claim is stated, "[the] court accepts all well-pled facts as true and construes these facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff," but does not consider "legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, . . . bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement[,] . . . unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record." Sec'y of State For Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). Additionally, the court "may consider documents attached to the complaint, as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic." Id. (internal citations omitted).
"Ordinarily, a defense based on the statute of limitations must be raised by the defendantthrough an affirmative defense, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), and the burden of establishing the affirmative defense rests on the defendant." Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007). "[A] motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) invites an inquiry into the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not an analysis of potential defenses to the claims set forth therein." Brockington v. Boykins, 637 F.3d 503, 506 (4th Cir. 2011). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) based on affirmative defenses "is appropriate when the face of the complaint clearly reveals the existence of a meritorious affirmative defense." Id.; Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, N.C., 85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1996).
"To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated her right to equal protection and her right to due process.
The Fourteenth Amendment prevents any state from "deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend XIV. "The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination." Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). "To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result ofintentional or purposeful discrimination." King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 220 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001)); Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cty., Md., 48 F.3d 810, 825 (4th Cir. 1995). "[I]f a plaintiff has met this burden, then 'the court proceeds to determine whether the disparity in treatment can be justified under the requisite level of scrutiny.'" Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533, 542 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Morrison, 239 F.3d at 654).
Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts from which the court can reasonably infer she was subjected to unlawful race discrimination. She fails to plausibly allege she is similarly situated to white service...
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