Brooks v. State, 5 Div. 621
| Decision Date | 22 September 1955 |
| Docket Number | 5 Div. 621 |
| Citation | 82 So.2d 553,263 Ala. 386 |
| Parties | Andrew BROOKS v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Russell & Russell, Tuskegee, for appellant.
John Patterson, Atty. Gen., Robt. Straub, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Edmon L. Rinehart, Montgomery, of counsel, for the State.
The appellant, Andrew Brooks, was indicted and convicted of murder in the second degree and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of thirty years. From this judgment, he prosecutes this appeal.
There were no eye witnesses to the encounter which led to the death of the deceased. The testimony in this cause was meager and presents very little conflict. The only testimony as to what happened immediately prior to and during the conflict was the evidence which the appellant gave in his own behalf on the witness stand and the evidence of Sheriff Preston Hornsby as to a voluntary statement which the appellant made to him upon his surrender after Gye's death. There is no substantial conflict in these two statements from appellant.
The facts established by the record show that the appellant, the deceased, and two other negroes were engaged in a dice game behind the house of appellant's father in the early hours of the morning. The deceased was rolling the dice and 'failed to make his point', but, nevertheless, picked up the wager. The appellant was afraid of the deceased who bore a bad reputation, and retired to his father's house through the kitchen. The deceased followed the appellant to the kitchen, and appellant, without pausing, went out the front door and around the north side of the house. The usual mode of exit from the house was around the south side as there was a garden fence which ran parallel to and very close to the north side of the house. Appellant testified that he thought the deceased would go around the south side of the house but he met him face to face on the north side between the garden fence and his father's house. The deceased drew back his hand as if to stab the appellant, whereupon Brooks struck the deceased in the neck with an ordinary pocket knife. The deceased then came to the front of the house where he collapsed and died. The record of the evidence does not make it entirely clear whether the appellant could have retreated from the actual scene of the encounter without increasing his peril.
The evidence is clear that the deceased died from the wound inflicted by the appellant and the only issue is whether or not appellant killed the deceased in the defense of his own life. The case was tried on this issue and the distinguished trial judge correctly instructed the jury, at great length, on the law of self defense.
There was considerable character evidence, and all of the witnesses established a good reputation for the appellant. The testimony is without dispute that the deceased's general reputation was bad for 'peace and quiet.' The witness, Melissa Johnson, when asked if she knew the deceased's general reputation for violence, blood-thirstiness, and dangerousness, replied: 'I know he is dangerous for whipping up people.' This answer, to which no objection was taken, can, we think, only be construed as an affirmative answer to the question propounded.
The evidence shows that in a voluntary statement which the appellant made to the Sheriff that the appellant told him that the deceased 'had a name for being bad', and that he was 'scared' of him.
The assignments of error relate primarily to refused requested charges and to one portion of the court's oral charge to which counsel for the appellant duly excepted.
The Judge charged the jury as follows:
[Emphasis supplied.]
We think that the clear import of this portion of the court's oral charge was that the bad character of the deceased could only be considered by the jury on the sole issue of determining who was the aggressor in the combat which led to the deceased's death.
Evidence of bad character of the deceased for peace and quietude, coupled with evidence of a general reputation for violence, blood-thirstiness or dangerousness, is admissible as having probative value on elements of the doctrine of self defense, other than the single issue concerning who was the aggressor.
In Brown v. State, 33 Ala.App. 97, 107, 31 So.2d 670, 679, it was...
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Henderson v. State
...is sufficient to go to the jury, evidence of the deceased's bad character for turbulence and violence must be accepted. Brooks v. State, 263 Ala. 386, 82 So.2d 553 (1955); McGuff v. State, 248 Ala. 259, 27 So.2d 241 (1946); Rutledge v. State, 358 So.2d at 1041-42. These same principles appl......
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Lester v. State, 1 Div. 878
...that Charge No. 12 should have been given. The cause is, therefore, reversed and remanded.' (Emphasis Supplied.) Brooks v. State, 263 Ala. 386, 389, 390, 82 So.2d 553, 555. The following statements appear in the 'The latter part of this charge, which for convenient reference we have placed ......
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Smith v. State, 6 Div. 229
...is sufficient to go to the jury, evidence of the deceased's bad character for turbulence and violence must be accepted. Brooks v. State, 263 Ala. 386, 82 So.2d 553 (1955); McGuff v. State, 248 Ala. 259, 27 So.2d 241 (1946); Rutledge v. State, supra." Bankston, supra at While there was suffi......
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Page v. State
...under the evidence if aptly drawn, Harris v. State, 96 Ala. 24, 11 So. 255; Chaney v. State, 178 Ala. 44, 59 So. 604; Brooks v. State, 263 Ala. 386, 82 So.2d 553, it possessed misleading tendencies because of the use of the work 'Struck,' and the trial court will not be put in error for ref......