Brooks v. State Bd. of Elections
| Citation | 848 F. Supp. 1548 |
| Decision Date | 07 March 1994 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. CV288-146. |
| Parties | Tyrone BROOKS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, et al., Defendants, and Donald Cheeks, et al., Intervenors. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
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Laughlin McDonald, Kathleen L. Wilde, Neil Bradley, ACLU, Atlanta, GA, J. Gerald Hebert, Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Washington, DC, for plaintiffs and counter-defendants.
Stanley Curtis House, Charles Leslie Wilkinson, III, Augusta, GA, for intervenors-plaintiffs and cross-claimants.
William Jacob Cobb, David Frank Walbert, Walbert & Herman, Carol Atha Cosgrove, Atlanta, GA, for defendants.
Edmund Booth, pro se.
Donna M. Murphy, Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Voting Section, Washington, DC, for U.S.
Thomas R. Burnside, Jr., pro se.
J. Taylor Phillips, pro se.
Harold A. Johnson, pro se.
A.C. Guhl, pro se.
Walter C. McMillan, Jr., pro se.
Harold D. McLendon, pro se.
Verna L. Smith, pro se.
Warren McLendon, pro se.
I.G. Dawson, Sr., pro se.
Harold Alexander, Atlanta, GA, for Emma L. Adams.
Diane Marie Morrell, Allen & Perry, Savannah, GA, Randal A. Mangham, Atlanta, GA, for Georgia Alliance of African-American Attys.
Harold Alexander, pro se.
Randal Mangham, pro se.
David Frank Walbert, Walbert & Herman, Atlanta, GA, for cross-defendants.
Currently before the Court are the joint motion of the Defendants and the Plaintiffs for approval of their proposed settlement agreement and a motion by the Intervenors for summary judgment. For the reasons stated herein, both motions are DENIED.
Plaintiffs filed this action in 1988 challenging several aspects of the Georgia judicial system under the United States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("VRA"). Specifically, the Plaintiffs challenge the manner in which judges of the state court, superior court and court of appeals and justices of the supreme court are elected in Georgia under Section 2 of the VRA and the legality of certain changes made to the Georgia judicial system since the enactment of Section 5 of the VRA. Pursuant to Section 5 of the VRA, Pub.L. 89-110, Title I, § 5, 79 Stat. 437 (), a three-judge panel1 was convened. In December 1989, the Panel held that Section 5 applied to judicial elections, that the Georgia electoral scheme has the potential for discriminating against minority voters, and that the State of Georgia failed to obtain preclearance for numerous changes to their electoral scheme as required by the VRA. Brooks v. State Bd. of Elections, 775 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.Ga.1989), modified on other grounds, 775 F.Supp. 1490 (S.D.Ga.1991), and aff'd, 498 U.S. 916, 111 S.Ct. 288, 112 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990) (Brooks I). Consequently, the Court enjoined the State from filling judicial positions that had not been precleared. Id. at 1484. Incumbents, however, were allowed to remain in office. Id.; injunction extended by Brooks v. State Bd. of Elections, 775 F.Supp. 1490, 1491 (S.D.Ga. 1991); Brooks v. State Bd. of Elections, 790 F.Supp. 1156, 1159 (S.D.Ga.1992). By Order dated February 28, 1994, this injunction was extended until March 1, 1995.
In June of 1992, after extensive negotiations spanning the course of two years and under the leadership of Senior Federal District Court Judge Anthony A. Alaimo, the Plaintiffs and the Defendants reached a proposed settlement agreement. This agreement, presented to the Court in the form of a consent decree, provides, inter alia, that: (1) the Governor will hereafter appoint all judges in Georgia; (2) appointed judges will thereafter be subject only to retention elections; (3) by the end of 1994 there will be at least twenty-five black superior court judges and five additional blacks will be appointed to either the state court or the superior court; (4) in order to realize these numerical requirements, a new category of judgeships, "State Assignment Superior Court Judgeships" may be created and filled by black candidates to serve by assignment in any of the State's judicial circuits; and (5) any disputes that arise under this system in the future will be overseen by Senior District Judge Anthony A. Alaimo. (Consent Decree at 10-14.) The Plaintiffs and the Defendants (collectively referred to herein as the Proponents) signed this consent decree with the understanding that it would not become effective until it was approved by the Department of Justice and the Court.
On September 25, 1992, the Panel granted a motion for the Intervenors to enter this litigation. The Intervenors, along with amicus curiae Thomas Burnside, argue that the terms of the proposed settlement violate their state and federal constitutional rights. On August 30, 1993, the U.S. Attorney General approved the settlement (pre-cleared the changes to the Georgia judicial electoral system contained in the consent decree), conditioned upon approval by this Court, and based on assurances by the Georgia Attorney General that the terms of the plan do not violate the Georgia Constitution.2
In November of 1993, the Panel denied a motion to allow interim gubernatorial appointments to certain judicial posts pending a final decision by the Court on the proposed settlement agreement. In that Order, the Panel also severed the Section 5 and Section 2 portions of this case, retaining control over the Section 5 claim and directed that the Section 2 claim be addressed by this Court alone. By the authority of that order, this Court must now decide whether or not to approve the proposed settlement agreement.
On November 22, 1993, this Court certified the Plaintiff Class as all present and future black registered voters in Georgia and ordered that notice be given to absent class members pursuant to Rule 23(e). A fairness hearing was held January 12, 1994, at which the Court heard evidence and argument from the Plaintiff Class Representatives, the Defendants, the Intervenors, amicus curiae Thomas Burnside, and several objectors, acting in both their individual and representational capacities.3 It is important to note that this hearing was not a trial of the merits of this case. Nevertheless, the hearing provided an opportunity for interested parties to make their positions on the proposed settlement agreement known to the Court. After hearing this evidence and testimony, the Court is convinced that all points of view regarding the proposed settlement agreement have been represented and expressed to the Court.
Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "a class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court." FED. R.CIV.P. 23(e). This rule is designed to ensure that class actions are not settled or compromised to the undue detriment of others, normally absent members of the plaintiff class, who will be affected by the terms of the compromise. In this case, the proposed settlement would affect not only members of the Plaintiff Class, but all persons in the State of Georgia. Thus, in addition to imposing an obligation on the Court to protect the interests of absent class members, Rule 23(e) requires the Court to protect the interests of all persons who would be affected by this settlement agreement and who are not adequately represented by the Parties to this litigation.
In evaluating a proposed settlement agreement in a class action, a court must examine the totality of the circumstances and must determine, under that broad inquiry, whether the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, reasonable, and legal.4 E.g., Bennett v. Behring Corp., 737 F.2d 982 (11th Cir.1984); United States v. Marengo County Comm'n., 731 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir.1984) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 976, 105 S.Ct. 375, 83 L.Ed.2d 311; In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 659 F.2d 1337 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir.1980); Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9 (N.D.Ga.1973). The Proponents bear the burden of persuading the Court of the fairness, adequateness, reasonableness and legality of the agreement's terms.
The courts have formulated a host of factors to be considered in evaluating a proposed settlement in a class action, but several of the factors are geared toward cases in which monetary damages are sought from private enterprise and are thus inapplicable to this case. Those most relevant to a case like this are: (1) the circumstances surrounding the settlement; (2) the complexity, expense, possible duration, and present stage of the litigation; (3) the reaction to the settlement proposal; (4) the strength of the plaintiffs' case; and (5) the reasonableness of the settlement proposal relative to the law and to the strength of the plaintiffs' case. See, In re Armored Car Antitrust Litigation, 472 F.Supp. 1357, 1367 (N.D.Ga.1979) rev'd in part on other grounds, 645 F.2d 488 (5th Cir.1981) (citing Miller v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 426 (5th Cir.1977); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2nd Cir.1974); see also, Bennett, 737 F.2d at 896 (citations omitted).
In considering these factors, the Court must strike a balance between its need for sufficient information upon which to evaluate the proposed settlement and the limitations on its fact-finding abilities. The "trial court must not reach any dispositive conclusions on unsettled legal or factual issues, but at the same time must `attempt to arrive at some evaluation of points of law and undisputed points of fact on which settlement is based.'" Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9 (N.D.Ga.1973) (quoting West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1086 (2nd Cir.1971) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871, 92 S.Ct. 81, 30 L.Ed.2d 115).
The standard under which the Court is to evaluate the proposed settlement is deceptive in its simplicity and clarity. In...
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