Brooks v. State, 1--173A6
| Decision Date | 18 June 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 1--173A6,1--173A6 |
| Citation | 296 N.E.2d 894,156 Ind.App. 414 |
| Parties | Sam BROOKS, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Joseph B. Barker, Kagan & Barker, Martinsville, for defendant-appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Zaban, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff-appellee.
The defendant-appellant (Brooks) is appealing his conviction after a trial by jury of Third Degree Burglary and Theft of property valued at more than $100. He was accordingly fined in the sum of $200 and sentenced to the State Farm for a year on the former count and sentenced to the Department of Corrections for not less than one nor more than ten years on the latter charge.
We agree with Brooks' assertion that reversible error existed in the admission of portions of testimony by two witnesses concerning other criminal acts, purportedly committed by Brooks. This testimony consisted of statements regarding other thefts committed and the articles taken.
The trial judge specifically admitted this evidence under the rule espoused by Watts v. State (1950), 229 Ind. 80, 95 N.E.2d 570, which held, in substance, that evidence of separate and distinct crimes is admissible to show intent, motive, purpose, identification or a common scheme or plan. In the instant case the jury heard this evidence to show a 'behavioral pattern' on the part of Brooks. We note in passing that the jury was not instructed, as they were in Watts, supra, as to the purpose of such testimony in a criminal trial.
The so-called Watts rule is an exception to the general rule that one crime cannot be proved in order to establish another distinct crime. Hergenrother v. State (1939), 215 Ind. 89, 18 N.E.2d 784; Loveless v. State (1960), 240 Ind. 534, 166 N.E.2d 864; Layton v. State (1966), 248 Ind. 52, 221 N.E.2d 881.
We are of the opinion that the questioned testimony was more important for what was not said than what the jury heard. Brooks was not convicted of any of these alleged criminal acts. None of the acts were identified as to time in relation to the instant act, except to say they occurred prior to the instant case. The record does not make it appear the acts were geographically located in relation to each other, as in Loveless, supra, to show a conspiracy. Nor was there a foundation from a time standpoint to show the availability of the res gestae exception. See Roddy v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 50, 257 N.E.2d 816. Furthermore it appears that...
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Stacks v. State
...Layton v. State (1966), 248 Ind. 52, 221 N.E.2d 881; Loveless v. State (1960), 240 Ind. 534, 166 N.E.2d 864; Brooks v. State (1973), 156 Ind.App. 414, 296 N.E.2d 894. One of the numerous exceptions to this general rule holds that if insanity is an issue in a criminal prosecution, all releva......
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Gubitz v. State
...of the alleged co-conspirator's testimony, this contention need not be further treated. Both Gubitz and McCraney rely on Brooks v. State (1973), Ind.App., 296 N.E.2d 894, for the proposition that it is reversible error to admit evidence of other thefts allegedly committed by a defendant. Ho......
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Hinkle v. State, 2-177A10
...taken in the three burglaries was indicative of any common scheme, plan, method of operation or identity. 4 See Brooks v. State (1st Dist. 1973) 156 Ind.App. 414, 296 N.E.2d 894. See Loveless v. State (1960) 240 Ind. 534, 166 N.E.2d 864; O'Conner v. State (4th Dist. 1978) Ind.App., 382 N.E.......
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Carr v. State, 3-1177A287
...case against Carr, the admission of the improper evidence could well have influenced the jury's verdict. See also Brooks v. State (1973), 156 Ind.App. 414, 296 N.E.2d 894. Carr is entitled to a fair trial at which such evidence is not The cause is reversed and remanded for a new trial. GARR......