Brooks v. State

Citation683 N.E.2d 574
Decision Date24 July 1997
Docket NumberNo. 02S00-9511-CR-1306,02S00-9511-CR-1306
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
PartiesKenneth L. BROOKS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

Randall J. Hammond, Fort Wayne, for Appellant-Defendant.

Pamela Carter, Attorney General, Lisa M. Paunicka, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellee-Plaintiff.

BOEHM, Justice.

A jury convicted Kenneth L. Brooks of murder. He was sentenced to sixty years imprisonment. Brooks raises three issues on appeal which we restate as follows:

1. Did the trial court err by denying Brooks' motion to suppress his videotaped statement to the police?

2. Did the trial court err by excluding evidence of the victim's prior bad acts?

3. Was the evidence sufficient to support the murder conviction in light of Brooks' self-defense claim?

We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

The facts most favorable to the verdict reveal that on February 2, 1995, Eddie Jackson, the victim in this case, and Ramona Scott were at a bar in Fort Wayne. Jackson attempted to break up an argument between Tommy Jones and some other men who were playing pool. Jones then called the defendant Brooks to come to the bar, which Brooks and another friend did. As Jackson and Scott left the bar and were walking across the street, Brooks approached the couple. Some words were exchanged and Brooks shot Jackson in the head. As Jackson fell, Brooks shot him again in the chest. A jury convicted Brooks of murder. This appeal ensued.

I. Motion to Suppress

Brooks first argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress a videotaped statement he gave to the police two days after the incident. Brooks claims he was so intoxicated at the time of his statement that the statement could not be considered voluntary and was therefore not admissible. The State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a statement was voluntarily given. Gregory v. State, 540 N.E.2d 585, 592 (Ind.1989). In determining whether a statement is voluntarily given, we look to the totality of the circumstances in order to determine whether there was any inducement in the form of violence, threats, promises or improper influences. Id.

This Court has long held that a confession may be given knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, notwithstanding voluntary intoxication as a result of alcohol, drugs or a combination of both. Wilcoxen v. State, 619 N.E.2d 574, 577 (Ind.1993) (alcohol); Thomas v. State, 443 N.E.2d 1197, 1199 (Ind.1983) (cocaine and marijuana); Bean v. State, 267 Ind. 528, 531-33, 371 N.E.2d 713, 715 (1978) (alcohol and marijuana). A defendant's statement will be deemed incompetent only when he is so intoxicated that it renders him not conscious of what he is doing or produces a state of mania. Lambert v. State, 643 N.E.2d 349, 353 (Ind.1994), sentence aff'd. on reh'g, 675 N.E.2d 1060 (Ind.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 2417, 138 L.Ed.2d 181 (1997). Intoxication to a lesser degree goes only the weight to be given to the statement and not its admissibility. Id.

In this case, Brooks testified that he had consumed alcohol and smoked marijuana beginning at 11 a.m. on the day the police officers questioned him. 1 However, even where the evidence is uncontradicted that a defendant was under the influence of some substance at the time of police interrogation, other evidence may be sufficient to prove that a resulting statement was made voluntarily. Houchin v. State, 581 N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (Ind.1991). Before giving the statement, Detective Frederick Rogers read Brooks his Miranda rights and Brooks signed an "Advice of Rights" form. Brooks, with his mother present, told the detective he did not need an attorney. Although no drug or alcohol tests were given, Detective Rogers did not detect that Brooks had used any kind of drugs or alcohol. 2 At trial, the detective specifically testified that Brooks "did not smell strongly of alcohol, his eyes were not red, his speech was not slurred and he did not stagger on his feet, he appeared to be sober." The trial court found that the video tape "shows that the Defendant appears to be relaxed and alert, that he shows no signs of intoxication and that his answers to questions of Detective Rogers were responsive to the questions asked." The evidence supports the trial court's finding. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in determining that the statement was given voluntarily.

II. Exclusion of Victim's Prior Bad Acts

The trial court did not allow Brooks to introduce testimony that the victim had been charged with two counts of battery in 1992, one of which resulted in a conviction. Brooks argues that this testimony of Jackson's violent propensities would have supported his claim that Jackson was the initial aggressor in the confrontation.

The general rule is that evidence of a person's character is not admissible to prove action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion. Ind. Evidence Rule 404(a). An exception to this rule is that a defendant is permitted to introduce "evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime." Evid.R. 404(a)(2). The victim's reputation for violence is pertinent to a claim of self-defense. Johnson v. State, 671 N.E.2d 1203, 1208 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied; see also United States v. Keiser, 57 F.3d 847, 855 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 676, 133 L.Ed.2d 525 (victim's violent nature is relevant to defendant's theory of self-defense).

Indiana Evidence Rule 405 permits proof of the violent character of the victim by reputation or opinion testimony. 3 In this case, however, Brooks did not seek to introduce reputation or opinion testimony. Instead, he attempted to introduce direct testimony of two specific prior batteries to show Jackson's violent propensities. Evidence of specific incidents is permissible only on cross-examination of a character witness 4 pursuant to Rule 405(a), or when character "is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense" pursuant to Rule 405(b). Neither situation is presented here. In an offer to prove, defense counsel stated that he proposed to call the witness to testify about the incidents, not that he intended to cross-examine a character or opinion witness. Nor was the victim's character an essential element of Brooks' claim of self-defense. Whether or not Jackson had violent propensities, the jury could still determine that Brooks did not act in self-defense. See Keiser, 57 F.3d at 857 (self-defense claim neither rises nor falls on defendant's success in proving victim's penchant for violent outbursts). The trial court did not err in excluding evidence of specific instances of the victim's conduct.

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Brooks argues his conviction for murder is not supported by sufficient evidence because the evidence supports his claim of self-defense. A claim of self-defense in a homicide prosecution requires, among other things, that the defendant did not provoke, instigate or participate willingly in the violence, and that the defendant had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. See Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 817 (Ind.1995), reh'g denied; see also IND.CODE § 35-41-3-2 (1993). When a claim of self-defense is raised, the State must disprove at least one of the elements of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jordan, 656 N.E.2d at 817. Whether a defendant acted in self-defense is generally a question of fact for the jury. Id. at 818.

In this case, substantial evidence demonstrated that Brooks participated willingly in the violence. Just moments before the shooting, Brooks told Jones in reference to Jackson, "I'll get him, I'll smoke him." According to Brooks' own testimony, he approached Jackson, armed with a gun, and "asked him what was the problem between him and Tommy Jones." Additionally,...

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