Brooks v. United States, 15-843L
| Decision Date | 27 June 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 15-843L,15-843L |
| Parties | ALEX BROOKS, JR. et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. |
| Court | Court of Federal Claims |
ALEX BROOKS, JR. et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.
No. 15-843L
United States Court of Federal Claims
June 27, 2018
Rails-to-Trails; Fifth Amendment Taking; Threshold Title Issues; Centerline Presumption Under North Carolina Law; Intervening Public Road
Mark F. Hearne, II, Clayton, MO, for plaintiffs.
Mayte Santacruz, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
SWEENEY, Judge
In this Rails-to-Trails case, plaintiffs own real property purportedly adjacent to a railroad right-of-way in Cleveland County, North Carolina. They contend that the United States violated the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution by authorizing the conversion of the railroad right-of-way into a recreational trail pursuant to the National Trail Systems Act ("Trails Act"), thus acquiring their property by inverse condemnation. Both plaintiffs and defendant move for summary judgment on threshold title issues. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants in part and denies in part the parties' motions.
During the last century, the United States began to experience a sharp reduction in rail trackage. Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 5 (1990). To remedy this problem, Congress enacted a number of statutes, including the Trails Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1251 (2012). The Trails Act, as amended, provides for the preservation of "established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of rail service" by authorizing the interim use of such rights-of-way as recreational and historical trails. Id. § 1247(d). This process is referred to as "railbanking," and is overseen by the Surface Transportation Board ("Board"), id., the federal agency with the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate "the construction, acquisition, operation,
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abandonment, or discontinuance" of most railroad lines in the United States, 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (2012).
Before railbanking can occur, the railroad company must seek to abandon its line, either by initiating abandonment proceedings with the Board pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 10903, or by requesting that the Board exempt it from such proceedings pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 10502. While considering the railroad company's abandonment application or exemption request, the Board will entertain protests and comments from interested third parties. 49 C.F.R. §§ 1152.25, 1152.29(a) (2014). Of particular relevance in this case, interested third parties may submit requests for the interim use of the railroad line as a trail pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). Id.
If an interested third party submits a trail-use request to the Board that satisfies the requirements of 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d), the Board makes the necessary findings pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 10502(a) or 49 U.S.C. § 10903(d), and the railroad company agrees to negotiate a trail-use agreement, the Board will issue one of two documents: if the railroad company initiated abandonment proceedings, the Board will issue a Certificate of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment, and if the railroad company sought an exemption, the Board will issue a Notice of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment ("NITU"). 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(b)-(d). The effect of both documents is the same: to "permit the railroad to discontinue service, cancel any applicable tariffs, and salvage track and materials, consistent with interim trail use and rail banking . . . ; and permit the railroad to fully abandon the line if no agreement is reached 180 days after it is issued, subject to appropriate conditions . . . ." Id. § 1152.29(d)(1); accord id. § 1152.29(c)(1). The Board will entertain requests to extend the 180-day deadline to enable further negotiations. If the railroad company and the interested third party execute a trail-use agreement, then abandonment of the railroad line is stayed for the duration of the agreement. Id. § 1152.29(c)-(d); 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). If no trail-use agreement is executed, the railroad company is permitted to fully abandon the line. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(c)-(d). To exercise its abandonment authority, the railroad company must "file a notice of consummation with the Board to signify that it has . . . fully abandoned the line" within one year of "the service date of the decision permitting the abandonment . . . ." Id. § 1152.29(e)(2). In the absence of a timely filed notice of consummation, the railroad company's authority to abandon the line automatically expires. Id.
If efforts to execute a trail-use agreement are unsuccessful and the railroad company notifies the Board that it has fully abandoned the line, the Board is divested of jurisdiction over the abandoned railroad line and "state law reversionary property interests, if any, take effect." Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1228-29 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Plaintiffs own real property in Cleveland County, North Carolina, purportedly adjacent to an 11.85-mile portion of a railroad right-of-way situated between (1) milepost SB 144.55 and milepost SB 154.50, and (2) milepost SB 158.10 and milepost SB 160.00.1 The right-of-way was acquired between 1886 and 1889 by a predecessor of the railroad line's current owner,
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Norfolk Southern Railway Company ("Norfolk Southern"). On June 16, 2015, Norfolk Southern submitted to the Board a notice of exemption to abandon the 11.85-mile right-of-way. Two days later, the City of Shelby, North Carolina submitted a trail-use request to the Board. Norfolk Southern agreed to negotiate a trail-use agreement with the City, and on August 4, 2015, the Board issued a NITU. The City and Norfolk Southern have been granted several extensions of time to negotiate a trail-use agreement and negotiations remain ongoing.
Three days after the Board issued the NITU, four individuals filed suit in this court alleging that through the operation of the Trails Act, defendant had taken their property without paying just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Additional plaintiffs joined the action, culminating in the filing of a third amended complaint on July 28, 2017, that set forth the claims of 105 property owners.2 The claims of three of those property owners were subsequently dismissed from the case,3 leaving the claims of 102 property owners for adjudication.
In accordance with a schedule proposed by the parties, plaintiffs provided defendant with a book describing their claims. The parties subsequently filed four sets of stipulations regarding title matters:
• June 9, 2017: The parties stipulated that (1) certain identified plaintiffs owned their properties on August 4, 2015, the date the Board issued the NITU, and (2) certain identified parcels were adjacent to the railroad right-of-way described in the NITU.
• August 11, 2017: The parties stipulated that (1) additional identified plaintiffs owned their properties on August 4, 2015, the date the Board issued the NITU, and (2) certain identified original conveyances corresponded with certain identified parcels and with the relevant segment of the original railroad right-of-way.
• August 18, 2017: The parties stipulated that certain identified original conveyances corresponded with other identified parcels and with the relevant segment of the original railroad right-of-way.
• August 29, 2017: The parties stipulated that under North Carolina law and for certain identified parcels, the identified source deeds conveyed an easement
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for railroad purposes over the corresponding segment of the original railroad right-of-way.
The parties reserved the right to modify or revoke a stipulation if they later determined that the stipulation was legally or factually erroneous.
After filing their fourth set of stipulations, the parties suggested, and the court adopted, a schedule for briefing cross-motions for summary judgment on threshold title issues. Plaintiffs filed their motion for partial summary judgment ("motion") on August 31, 2017, seeking judgment in their favor with respect to the claims of all but six of the property owners identified in their third amended complaint.4 Defendant filed its response and cross-motion for partial summary judgment ("cross-motion") on October 10, 2017, arguing that plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on threshold title issues only for fifty identified claims. According to defendant, it was entitled to summary judgment with respect to (1) twelve claims of ten property owners due to their failure to establish that they owned their properties on August 4, 2015, the date the NITU issued, and (2) at least eighty-nine claims because the owners of the associated parcels had not established a property interest in the land underlying the railroad right-of-way.
Thereafter, plaintiffs sought a stay of the resolution of the claims contested by defendant through January 31, 2018, to enable them to conduct additional title research. Over defendant's objection, the court granted plaintiffs' request.5 Thus, plaintiffs filed their reply in support of their motion and response to defendant's cross-motion ("reply and response") on January 31, 2018. Defendant filed its reply in support of its cross-motion ("reply") on March 7, 2018. In its reply, defendant indicates that it now agrees that plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on threshold title issues for sixty-three identified claims, but contends that it is entitled to summary judgment with respect to (1) four claims of three property owners due to their failure to establish that they owned their properties on August 4, 2015, the date the NITU issued, and (2) at least sixty-eight claims because the owners of the associated parcels have not established a property interest in the land underlying the railroad right-of-way.
Briefing is now complete and the court deems oral argument unnecessary.
Both plaintiffs and defendant move for summary judgment on...
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