Brooks v. United States, 286
Decision Date | 09 March 1925 |
Docket Number | No. 286,286 |
Citation | 267 U.S. 432,69 L.Ed. 699,37 A.L.R. 1407,45 S.Ct. 345 |
Parties | BROOKS v. UNITED STATES |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Mr. Joe Kirby, of Sioux Falls, S. D., for plaintiff in error.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 433-434 intentionally omitted] Mr. Assistant Attorney General Donovan, for the United States.
This is a writ of error to the District Court for the District of South Dakota brought by Rae Brooks to reverse a judgment against him of conviction under two indictments for violation of the Act of Congress of October, 1919, and known as the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act. The writ of error issued under section 238 of the Judicial Code (Comp. St. § 1215) because the case involves the constrction or application of the Constitution, in that the chief assignment of error is the invalidity of the act. The act became effective October 29, 1919 (41 Stat. 324 [Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, §§ 10418b-10418f]), and is as follows:
'Chapter 89.—An act to punish the transportation of stolen motor vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce.
'Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that this act may be cited as the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act.
'Sec. 2. That when used in this act:
'(a) The term 'motor vehicle' shall include an automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, motorcycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails;
'(b) The term 'interstate or foreign commerce' as used in this act shall include transportation from one state, territory, or the District of Columbia, to another state, territory, or the District of Columbia, or to a foreign country, or from a foreign country to any state, territory, or the District of Columbia.
The objection to the act cannot be sustained. Congress can certainly regulate interstate commerce to the extent of forbidding and punishing the use of such commerce as an agency to promote immorality, dishonesty or the spread of any evil or harm to the people of other states from the state of origin. In doing this it is merely exercising the police power, for the benefit of the public within the field of interstate commerce. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 215, 5 S. Ct. 826, 29 L. Ed. 158. In Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 23 S. Ct. 92, 47 L. Ed. 108, it was held that Congress could pass a law excluding diseased stock from interstate commerce in order to prevent its use in such a way as thereby to injure the stock of other states. In the Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321, 23 S. Ct. 321, 47 L. Ed. 492, it was held that Congress might pass a law punishing the transmission of lottery tickets from one state to another, in order to prevent the carriage of those tickets to be sold in other states and thus demoralize, through a spread of the gambling habit, individuals who were likely to purchase. In the Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 45, 31 S. Ct. 364, 55 L. Ed. 364, it was held that it was within the regulatory power of Congress to punish the transportation in interstate commerce of adulterated articles which if sold in other states from the one from which they were transported would deceive or injure persons who purchased such articles. In Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 33 S. Ct. 281, 57 L. Ed. 523, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 906, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 905, and Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 37 S. Ct. 192, 61 L. Ed. 442, L. R. A. 1917F, 502, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 1168, the so-called White Slave Traffic Act, which was construed to punish any person engaged in enticing a woman from one state to another for immoral ends, whether for commercial purposes or otherwise, was valid because it was intended to prevent the use of interstate commerce to facilitate prostitution or concubinage and other forms of immorality. In Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway Co., 242 U. S. 311, 37 S. Ct. 180, 61 L. Ed. 326, L. R. A. 1917B, 1218, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 845, it was held that Congress had power to forbid the introduction of intoxicating liquors into any state in which their use was prohibited in order to prevent the use of interstate commerce to promote that which was illegal in the state. In Weber v. Freed, 239 U. S. 325, 36 S. Ct. 131, 60 L. Ed. 308, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 317, it was held that Congress had power to prohibit the importation of pictorial representations of prize fights designed for public exhibition because of the demoralizing effect of such exhibitions in the state of destination.
In Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529, 62 L. Ed. 1101, 3 A. L. R. 649, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 724, it was held that a federal law forbidding the transportation of articles manufactured by child labor in one state to another was invalid because it was really not a regulation of interstate commerce but a congressional attempt to regulate labor in the state of origin by an embargo on its external trade. Articles made by child labor and transported into other states were harmless and could be properly transported without injuring any person who either bought or used them. In referring to the cases already cited, upon which the argument for the validity of the Child Labor Act (Comp. St. §§ 8819a-8819f) was based, this court pointed out that in each of them the use of interstate commerce had contributed to the accomplishment of harmful results to people of other states, and that the congressional power over interstate transportation in such cases could only be effectively exercised by prohibiting it. The clear distinction between authorities first cited and the Child Labor Case leaves no doubt where the right lies in this case. It is known of all men that the radical change in transportation of persons and goods effected by the introduction of the automobile, the speed with which it moves, and the ease with which evil-minded persons can avoid capture have greatly encouraged and...
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