Brookshire v. Buncombe Cnty.
| Decision Date | 18 January 2012 |
| Docket Number | 1:10cv278 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
| Parties | MICHAEL A. BROOKSHIRE, Plaintiff, v. BUNCOMBE COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA, et al., Defendants. |
Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [# 25]. Plaintiff brought this action asserting federal claims pursuant to Section 1983 and the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), as well as several state law claims. Defendants move for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' motion [# 25].
Plaintiff, who is a resident of North Carolina, began working as an employee for Buncombe County in 1989. (Pl.'s Dep. 14:2-11; 22:5-11, Sept. 8, 2011.)During the relevant time period, Plaintiff worked as an Erosion Control Officer. (Pl.'s Dep. 25:3-7.) Defendant Creighton is the Planning Director for Buncombe County and Plaintiff's immediate supervisor. (Pl.'s Dep. 28:24-25; Creighton Dep. 10:24-25; 14:16-17, Oct. 4, 2011; Defs.' Ex. A at p. 1.) As an Erosion Control Officer, Plaintiff was responsible for enforcing the Sedimentation Pollution Control Act of 1973, as well as Buncombe County's Erosion Control Ordinance. (Pl.'s Dep. 25:8-24; Defs.' Ex. A at p. 1.)
Plaintiff was a salaried employee and worked 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m five days a week. (Pl.'s Dep. 28:17-21; 36:10-19.) Plaintiff, however, only worked on average three hours a day in the office. (Pl.'s Dep. 36:24-37:5.) The rest of the time Plaintiff was out of the office visiting and inspecting sites in Buncombe County, taking classes, or educating the public. (Pl.'s Dep. 40:8-25; Creighton Dep. 14:10-15.) In order to record the time he worked, Plaintiff filled out a time sheet that he submitted via a computerized system. (Pl.'s Dep. 43: 16-25; Mathis Aff. ¶¶ 7-8.) Plaintiff was supposed to record his hours worked and any vacation, sick leave, personal time off, annual leave, or other time off from work he took through this system. (Mathis Aff. ¶ 7.)
Buncombe County also provided Plaintiff with a truck to drive. (Pl.'s Dep. 149:3-150:19; Creighton Dep. 38:11-20.) Buncombe County, however, owned thetruck, and it was registered to Buncombe County. (Pl.'s Dep. 149:14-17; 150:13-14; Creighton Dep. 38:11-12.) Pursuant to the County of Buncombe Vehicle Policy, the truck was only to be used for official county business. (Defs.' Ex. B. at p. 2.) Plaintiff signed a Memorandum of Understanding stating that he has no expectation of privacy to the items stored in his vehicle, and that Buncombe County has the right to search the vehicle without first notifying Plaintiff. (Defs.' Ex. M.)
Although Plaintiff was a good employee during the majority of his tenure with Buncombe County, during the last two years of his employment, Defendant Creighton began having concerns that Plaintiff was falsifying his time sheets and not working during the work day. (Creighton Dep. 21:1-10; 22:19-25:25.) For example, one of the County Managers informed Defendant Creighton that an employee with the National Forest Service reported seeing Plaintiff's truck in a park operated by the United States Forest Service during the work day. (Creighton Dep. 22:22-23:11.) Defendant Creighton confronted Plaintiff about this report and told him that he needed to stop going to such parks during the work day. (Creighton Dep. 23:1-9.) In addition, contractors and other Buncombe County employees complained that they could not reach Plaintiff during the work day. (Creighton Dep. 23:17-25:22.) Defendant Creighton counseled Plaintiff that heneeded to spend more time in the office. (Creighton Dep. 26:23-25.)
As a result of Defendant Creighton's suspicion that Plaintiff was not at work and was not doing his work related duties during the day, Defendant Creighton had a GPS device installed on the county truck Plaintiff drove. (Creighton Dep. 36:23-37:14.) This device tracked and recorded the location of the truck. (Creighton Dep. 39:20-21.) Defendant Creighton tracked the location of the truck for approximately three weeks before removing the device. (Creighton Dep. 57:9-27.) Plaintiff was unaware of the GPS device. (Pl.'s Dep. 148:25-149:2.)
After removing the device, County employees downloaded the GPS data and created a chart that compared the location of the vehicle as recorded by the GPS device with Plaintiff's time sheets and computer log on times. (Creighton Dep. 59:13-15.) The GPS data indicated that Plaintiff was traveling to various parks, among other places, during the day and was not working a full day. (Creighton Dep. 40:12-57:8.) Based on a review of this chart and the GPS data, Defendant Creighton concluded that Plaintiff was falsifying his time sheet. (Creighton Dep. 20:3-16; 30:23-31:23.) Defendant Creighton then spoke with Defendant Thornberry, the Director of Human Resources for Buncombe County, and informed him that he was going to recommend terminating Plaintiff for falsifying his time sheets and improper use of a County vehicle. (Thornberry Dep. 9:18-24;14:2-16:20, Oct. 4, 2011.)
On September 1, 2009, Defendant Creighton and Plaintiff had a meeting where Defendant Creighton shared the GPS data with Plaintiff. (Creighton Dep. 60:11-61:25; Pl.'s Dep. 148:7-19; 166:17-167-3.) Plaintiff admitted to visiting Blantyre Park during the work day but stated that he was there working. (Creighton Dep. 63:6-17; Pl.'s Dep. 148:12-19.) Defendant Creighton then informed Plaintiff that he would be recommending that Buncombe County terminate his employment. (Creighton Dep. 62:7-16.) Later that same day, Defendant Creighton informed Defendant Thornberry that he had suspended Plaintiff with pay and was recommending that the County Manager terminate his employment. (Thornberry Dep. 17:19-17.)
Several days later, Defendant Thornberry spoke to Plaintiff over the phone about his options. (Thornberry Dep. 19:16-17.) Defendant Thornberry informed Plaintiff that Defendant Creighton recommended that Plaintiff be fired for falsifying time sheets and improper use of a county vehicle. (Thornberry Dep. 19:17-21; Pl.'s Dep. 30:1-6.) In addition, he told Plaintiff that he was on paid suspension pending a pre-dismissal hearing where the County Manager would determine whether to terminate Plaintiff. (Thornberry Dep. 19:17-20:4.) During this conversation, Defendant Thornberry informed Plaintiff that he could either goforward with the hearing or he could resign and retire. (Thornberry Dep. 20:1-4.) If Plaintiff was terminated he would not receive some of this post-retirement health benefits because he was short of the twenty year service mark. (Thornberry Dep. 20:5-9.) However, if Plaintiff opted to resign and retire, he could use his annual leave to reach the twenty year mark and, thus, retain his health benefits. (Thornberry Dep. 20:10-15.) Plaintiff contends that Defendants Thornberry and Creighton told him that he would lose all his retirement benefits if he was terminated. (See e.g., Pl.'s Dep. 93:8-10, 192:15-24, 193: 6-10, 197:15-25, 219:6-16.) Plaintiff stated that he would get back with Defendant Thornberry later. (Thornberry Dep. 20:15.)
Although Defendant Thornberry called Plaintiff several times after the September 3rd conversation and left him messages, Plaintiff did not return any of the calls. (Thornberry Dep. 25:4-7.) Defendant Thornberry informed Defendant Creighton that Plaintiff was not returning his calls, and Defendant Creighton then had an employee go to Plaintiff's house and personally ask him to call Defendant Thornberry. (Thornberry Dep. 25:8-22.) On September 9, 2009, Plaintiff called Defendant Thornberry and said he was still weighing his options. (Thornberry Dep. 25:12-13; Pl.'s Dep. 192:16-25.) Plaintiff requested a termination letter setting forth the reasons for his dismissal and the appeal process. (Pl.'s Dep. 180:4-8, 192:15-193:24.) Plaintiff did not receive such a letter. (Pl.'s Dep. 180:11-12.) Subsequently, Plaintiff submitted his letter of resignation, dated September 10, 2009. Plaintiff resigned effective September 21, 2009. (Defs.' Ex. G.) In his letter, Plaintiff claims that he wrote the letter under extreme duress because he was informed by the Human Resources Department that if he did not resign he would be terminated on a date short of his retirement date and he would not be able to receive retirement benefits. (Defs.' Ex. G.) This action ensued.
Pursuant to Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party is entitled to summary judgment if the movant "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat a motion for summary. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986); Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 519 (4th Cir. 2003). Rather, there must be a genuine issue of material fact. Id. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. 2510. Finally, in deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court need only consider the materials cited by the parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). The Court, however, may consider the other materials in the record. Id.
Plaintiff asserts a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants based on their alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches by placing the GPS device on his vehicle and tracking the location of the vehicle....
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