Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles

• Decision Date: 09 November 2000
• Docket Number: No. 990518-CA.,990518-CA.
• Parties: BROOKSIDE MOBILE HOME PARK, LTD., a Utah limited partnership dba Brookside Mobile Home Park, Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-appellee, v. Sam PEEBLES aka Samuel B. Pebbles, an individual; and Harold Boyd Pebbles, an individual, Defendants, Appellees, and Cross-appellants.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

14 P.3d 105

2000 UT App 314

BROOKSIDE MOBILE HOME PARK, LTD., a Utah limited partnership dba Brookside Mobile Home Park, Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-appellee, v. Sam PEEBLES aka Samuel B. Pebbles, an individual; and Harold Boyd Pebbles, an individual, Defendants, Appellees, and Cross-appellants.

No. 990518-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

November 9, 2000.

Russell A. Cline, Crippen & Cline LC, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.

Dennis K. Poole and John L. Adams, Dennis K. Poole & Associates PC, Salt Lake City, for Appellees.

Before JACKSON, Associate P.J., and BILLINGS and DAVIS, JJ.

OPINION

JACKSON, Associate Presiding Judge:

¶ 1 Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. (Brookside) challenges the trial court's denial on reconsideration of Brookside's summary judgment motion, the directed verdict for Sam Peebles on Brookside's unlawful detainer claim, and the denial of Brookside's request for attorney fees and costs. Sam Peebles cross appeals from the jury verdict and the trial court's denial of Peebles's request for attorney fees and costs.¹ We affirm on all issues, except that we reverse the trial court's denial of Peebles's request for attorney fees and costs.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 In 1983, Peebles bought a mobile home occupying Space 100 in Brookside Mobile Home Park (Park) located in West Jordan, Utah. He entered a space lease with a former owner of the Park, Brookside Associates (Associates). Peebles later sold the mobile home to a couple who entered into their own lease with Associates. When the couple defaulted on their purchase contract with Peebles, Peebles retook possession of the mobile home and signed a second lease. Peebles then rented the mobile home to a series of renters. He finally contracted to either rent or sell the mobile home to Richard Rowley, who entered into a lease agreement with Associates for Space 100.

¶ 3 Associates sold the Park to a trust and entered into an agreement with the trust titled "Assignment of Leases and Deposits," dated December 9, 1994. In the agreement, Associates assigned to the trust

its right, title and interest in and to those certain leases, rental agreements, security or other deposits from tenants, and rentals with respect to such leases and agreements appurtenant to the [Park] . . . (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Leases"), which Leases, rents, and security deposits are more particularly described on Exhibit "B" attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference.

Exhibit B was the Park's rent roll, showing Rowley as the resident of Space 100, with no mention of Peebles. Less than one month later, the trust sold the Park to Brookside and assigned the very same set of leases to Brookside, again with no mention of Peebles. On April 1, 1995, Rowley entered into a new space lease agreement with Brookside.

¶ 4 In the fall of 1995, Rowley abandoned the mobile home without paying some rent due Brookside. On November 29, 1995, Brookside sent a notice to Peebles, stating the following:

Be advised that the above referenced mobile home has been abandoned. In accordance with Utah Code § 57-16-9, you, as lien holder of record and now deemed a tenant at will are primarily liable to the Brookside Mobile Home Park for all rent and service charges accruing after ten (10) days following your reciept [sic] of this notice if the mobile home is not moved.

¶ 5 On December 11, 1995, Brookside sent Peebles a "Notice to Pay Rent or Quit," stating:

Please take notice that the rent on the premises located at Brookside Mobile Home Park, No ____, which you now possess as a tenant, is past due.

You must, within three days after service of this Notice upon you, pay the rent now due and owing on the premises, or, in the alternative, you must, within such period of three days, vacate the premises and deliver possession to your landlord, Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd., or its duly authorized agent. . . .

In the event that you should cure the above default within the time period allowed, but in the future at any time should default in the payment of rent when due, violate any of the Rules and Regulations of Brookside Mobile Home Park, or breach any provision of the Lease Agreement, such repeated default and/or violation will result in immediate termination of your lease without any further period to cure such default or violations and eviction proceedings will be initiated immediately.

Peebles then began paying monthly rent.

¶ 6 On December 27, 1995, Brookside prepared a form listing several repairs that needed to be done to keep the mobile home "in compliance with current park standards."

¶ 7 On April 11, 1996, Brookside posted upon the mobile home a "Notice to Quit," addressed to Peebles at his Riverton, Utah address. The notice stated:

[Y]ou must, within five (5) days after service of this Notice upon you, remove the mobile home purportedly owned by you from the premises . . . and deliver possession of said premises to its owner, Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd., or its duly authorized agent. . . .

In the event of your failure to comply with the above notice to vacate the premises within the specified period, you will be unlawfully detaining the premises, and in accordance with the provisions of Section 78-36-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953), you will be liable for treble damages for such unlawful detainer, and an action will be commenced against you to evict you from the premises and to take judgment against you for three times the damages assessed by the Court for unlawful detainer, together with costs of legal action.

This notice is given and served in accordance with the provisions of Sections 78-36-3 and 78-36-6, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).

¶ 8 Around that time, Brookside filed an unlawful detainer action against Peebles because Peebles allegedly had not complied with Park rules in maintaining his mobile home. Peebles defended the unlawful detainer action, asserting five days was insufficient notice. He contended the action should have been filed under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act (the Act), which requires fifteen days notice. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-6(2)(a) (1994) ("In the event of failure to abide by a mobile home park rule, the notice shall provide for a 15-day cure period. . . .").

¶ 9 On September 25, 1996, Peebles agreed to sell the mobile home to Jackie Southworth. However, when Brookside denied her application to become a tenant of the Park, the sales agreement fell through. Peebles then filed a counterclaim against Brookside, claiming, among other things, that Brookside had violated the Act by unreasonably withholding approval of Southworth's tenancy application. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-4(4) (Supp.2000).

¶ 10 Brookside moved for summary judgment, arguing that the undisputed facts showed that Peebles did not have a lease with Brookside, and Peebles thus was not a "resident"² of the Park under the Act. Therefore, Brookside contended that its claim fell under the unlawful detainer statute, not the Act, rendering sufficient the notice it had given Peebles and invalidating Peebles's counterclaims under the Act. Peebles responded that the Act applies to this case because he was a resident/lessee of the Park when Brookside brought its action. He maintained that the leases he had entered into with Associates were still in effect, having been assigned to Brookside.

¶ 11 The trial court ruled for Brookside, agreeing that this case had been properly brought as an unlawful detainer action and did not fall under the Act. It stated that the fact that Peebles knew that other buyers or renters of his mobile home had entered into lease agreements with Brookside and/or its predecessors constituted as a matter of law a surrender by Peebles of his earlier space lease. The trial court determined that it was immaterial that Peebles had presented evidence showing that it had been the Park's custom to keep leases for a single space with both the mobile home owner and the owner's renter.

¶ 12 Peebles then filed a motion asking the trial court to reconsider its decision. Peebles urged that an issue of material fact was in dispute regarding whether he knew of and/or consented to the leases Rowley entered into with Associates and Brookside, and he attached supplemental affidavits in which he asserted that he did not know about the Rowley leases when they were made. Consequently, he argued, a factual question remained as to whether he had surrendered his lease.

¶ 13 The trial court found Peebles's arguments persuasive, stating:

There is no dispute about the legal proposition concerning surrender. However, defendant [Peebles] does dispute that there was a surrender alleging he had no knowledge that there were lease agreements with occupants of the mobile home with whom he dealt with as subtenants. Defendant further asserts facts that could be interpreted to demonstrate that he was dealt with by plaintiff in a manner reflective of his perceived position as tenant. Most notably, the notice to vacate refers to defendant as tenant.

The effect of these assertions is that there is a dispute of material fact and my previous conclusion to the contrary is erroneous.

The matter was then set for trial.

¶ 14 After Brookside presented its evidence at trial, Peebles moved for a directed verdict. Peebles argued that, even if no written lease existed between Peebles and Brookside, Peebles was an "owner resident" of the Park and thus could be in unlawful detainer of the space only under the Act. Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3(2) (1996) ("Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a mobile home is determined under Title 57, Chapter 16, Mobile Home Park Residency Act."). The Act defines "resident" as "an individual who leases or rents space in a mobile home park." Id. § 57-16-3(3) (1994). Peebles therefore contended that, given his alleged status as a resident of the Park, anything less than fifteen days was insufficient notice.

¶ 15 The trial court agreed with Peebles's argument and...