Brosseau v. Green Acres Mobile Homes, Inc.

• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BROCK
• Citation: Brosseau v. Green Acres Mobile Homes, Inc., 609 A.2d 738, 135 N.H. 643 (N.H. 1992)
• Decision Date: 17 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-249,91-249
• Parties: Linda (Humphries) BROSSEAU v. GREEN ACRES MOBILE HOMES, INC.

Page 738

609 A.2d 738

135 N.H. 643

Linda (Humphries) BROSSEAU v. GREEN ACRES MOBILE HOMES, INC.

No. 91-249.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

June 17, 1992.

Cook & Molan P.A., Concord (Glenn R. Milner, on the brief, and orally), for plaintiff.

Branch and Greenhalge P.A., Concord (Robert D. Branch, on the brief, and orally), for defendant.

BROCK, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff, Linda Brosseau, filed an action in the Superior Court (Dunn, J.) claiming that the defendant, Green Acres Mobile Homes, violated the New Hampshire Regulation of Manufactured Housing Parks, RSA chapter 205-A, and the New Hampshire Law Against Discrimination, RSA chapter 354-A, and claiming the right to enhanced damages under the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act, RSA 358-A:10. A master was appointed to report on the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The Court (Manias, J.) approved the master's recommendation to grant summary judgment on the issue of liability. After a trial on damages, the Court (Dunn, J.) awarded actual damages of $7,000.00 and trebled the award under RSA 358-A:10. The defendant appeals from the decisions to grant summary judgment on liability and to award both actual and enhanced damages. We affirm the granting of summary judgment and the award of actual damages, but reverse the award of enhanced damages.

In July 1981, the plaintiff purchased a mobile home and leased a lot in the defendant's mobile home park. The lease included a provision prohibiting children under the age of eighteen from residing in the plaintiff's home. The lease incorporated by reference the park rules and regulations prohibiting tenants from selling or leasing their homes to anyone intending to occupy the home with a person under the age of eighteen. In June 1985, the park rules and regulations were amended to establish the park as a retirement community, and to prohibit residents from leasing or selling their homes to persons under forty-five years of age.

In the spring of 1986, the plaintiff listed her mobile home for sale. In October, Cindy Shookus agreed to purchase the home for $33,000. After the park manager, Mary Howard, learned that Shookus intended to reside in the park with her four-year-old daughter, she informed Shookus of the eighteen-year age restriction. Soon thereafter, Shookus withdrew her offer. She alleged that she withdrew her offer after meeting with the park owner, Tom Grappone, who denied her permission to reside in the park because of the age restrictions. Grappone, on the other hand, averred that he never met with her. The plaintiff eventually sold her home to a third party for $26,000. The plaintiff initiated this action to regain the difference between the original amount agreed upon and the final sale price.

To determine liability in this case we must resolve whether the park's age restrictions were unlawful; and, if so, whether the unlawful provisions caused Shookus to withdraw her offer to purchase the plaintiff's mobile home. Concerning the issue of liability, the defendant raises two issues. First, it argues that the trade and commerce provisions of the New Hampshire Law Against Discrimination, RSA chapter 354-A, do not apply to the operation and regulation of mobile home parks. Second, it assigns error on procedural grounds claiming that the issue of liability should not have been resolved by summary judgment.

We address the substantive issue first. The defendant argues that the court erred by applying both RSA chapter 354-A and RSA chapter 205-A in this case, reasoning that the two statutes are contradictory when applied together and concluding that RSA chapter 205-A applies exclusively. We disagree.

RSA chapter 354-A was enacted, in part, to eliminate and prevent age discrimination in broad areas of trade and commerce within the State. RSA 354-A:1. To that end, RSA 354-A:8, V (1965 & Supp.1991), declares that it shall be unlawful to discriminate on the basis of age in housing matters. The act, however, includes an exception that allows housing sales or rentals to be restricted to residents not less than forty-five years of age, if the restriction is pursuant to a plan establishing a retirement community, RSA 354-A:8, V-b(d).

RSA 205-A:2, II(d) prohibits mobile home park owners from restricting on-site sales of mobile homes on the basis of age unless the implementation of the rule providing for an age restriction has been in effect for three years or the restriction was included in the rules or lease when the seller commenced tenancy in the park.

The defendant argues that the statutes are contradictory and, therefore, RSA chapter 205-A, which expressly regulates mobile homes, must apply independently. Relying upon RSA 205-A:2, II(d), the defendant contends that it was entitled to prevent the sale to Shookus because the lease signed by the plaintiff in 1981 expressly prohibited minor occupants. Certainly, if read in isolation, RSA chapter 205-A would support the defendant's contention that any age restriction may apply so long as the restriction is included in the lease or three years has elapsed after the date of implementation. We do not agree, however, that the two statutes are contradictory. Rather, we apply a well-established rule of statutory construction: "When interpreting two statutes which deal with a similar subject matter, we will construe them so that they do not contradict each other, and so that they will lead to reasonable results and effectuate the legislative purpose of the statute." Petition of Public Serv. Co. of N.H., 130 N.H. 265, 282, 539 A.2d 263, 273 (1988) (internal citations omitted).

In considering the language of RSA chapter 354-A and RSA chapter 205-A, we discern a simple rule that is consistent with both statutes. Namely, the age restriction referred to in RSA chapter 205-A must conform to the minimum forty-five-year age restriction allowable under RSA 354-A:8, V-b(d). In other words, RSA 205-A:2, II(d) outlines the conditions under which age restrictions may be imposed, and RSA 354-A:8, V-b(d) specifies the age restriction that may be imposed. Thus, a manufactured housing park, designed as a retirement community, may legally limit occupancy to persons over forty-five years of age if such age restriction is in effect at the time of the commencement of the tenancy or three years has elapsed after the enactment of the retirement community age restriction.

In this case, the requisite three years had not elapsed between the establishment of the park as a retirement community and the plaintiff's agreement with Shookus. Moreover, the minimum eighteen-year age restriction in the lease agreement between the parties restricted ages well below the forty-five-year age minimum established by RSA 354-A:8, V-b(d) and therefore did not meet the requirements of this statute. Thus, the defendant's effort to enforce the age restriction in the lease, resulting in the plaintiff losing her sale to Shookus, was unlawful and discriminatory.

We turn to the defendant's procedural challenge. First, it claims that questions of law should not be addressed on motions for summary judgment and, therefore, the court's conclusion that the park's age restriction was unlawful is procedurally erroneous. It also maintains that summary judgment was premature as a material issue of fact concerning causation remained in dispute.

Having found that the court's substantive conclusion of law was correct, we address the defendant's first argument only because it represents such a fundamental misconception of settled law. It is axiomatic that summary judgment is appropriate when the court "finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Horse Pond Fish & Game Club v. Cormier, 133 N.H. 648, 653, 581 A.2d 478, 481 (1990). The purpose of summary judgment is "to save the time, effort, and expense and to streamline the administration of justice by avoiding the formal trial of cases where there is no genuine issue of material fact." Green Mt. Ins. Co. v. Bonney, 131 N.H. 762, 766, 561 A.2d 1057, 1059 (1989). Without factual disputes, the only task that remains for the court is to apply the law.

The defendant's second claim, that a material issue of fact concerning liability remained unresolved, is more troublesome. Although we find that a material issue of fact was unresolved at the time the motion was granted, we decline to send this matter back for further proceedings as we are able to resolve the issue based upon testimony from the trial on damages.

On the motion for summary judgment, once the court found that the park's age restriction was unlawful, it reasoned that the issue of who informed Shookus of the rules was immaterial because a showing that Shookus had been informed, regardless of the source,...