Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. Hammett
| Decision Date | 30 August 1962 |
| Docket Number | 6 Div. 868 |
| Citation | 144 So.2d 58,273 Ala. 629 |
| Parties | BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE FIREMEN AND ENGINEMEN et al. v. James E. HAMMETT. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Heiss, Day & Bennett, Cleveland, Ohio, Rives, Peterson, Pettus & Conway, Birmingham, for appellants.
Thos. F. McDowell and Geo. S. Brown, Birmingham, for appellee.
James E. Hammett sued the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, et al., in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, for the wilful and malicious interference with his right to earn a living as an engineer for the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company. The suit was brought on December 4, 1958 and was docketed as Case No. 39106-X. On the trial of the cause, the jury returned a verdict for Hammett in the amount of $10,000 and judgment was rendered thereon. This Court affirmed that judgment on March 29, 1962, Ala.App., 140 So.2d 832, and thereafter overruled the Brotherhood's application for rehearing.
After obtaining this judgment, Hammett commenced suit against the L. & N. Railroad Company for breach of its contract of employment with the railroad. This suit was also filed in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, and is designated as Case No. 45329-X. On March 8, 1962, there was judgment by consent for $2500 in favor of Hammett in Case No. 45329-X, and which judgment was paid by the L. & N. Railroad on March 20, 1962.
On May 23, 1962, following the consent judgment in Case No. 45329-X, the Brotherhood filed a suit in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, in Equity, seeking an injunction against the collection of the judgment against the Brotherhood in Case No. 39106-X. The trial court issued an ex parte temporary injunction as prayed.
On June 6, 1962, on motion of Hammett, the trial court entered a decree dissolving the temporary injunction on the ground that the bill of complaint in the equity suit was without equity, and also entered a final decree dismissing the bill of complaint. This appeal is from that final decree.
The bill of complaint, which the lower court held to be without equity, was based essentially on three major assertions. The first is, that the judgment against the Brotherhood should be enjoined because it was procured by fraud. The second assertion is, basically, that the payment received on the judgment against the L. & N. Railroad created a bar to recovery on the judgment against the Brotherhood, and hence enforcement of the Brotherhood's judgment should be permanently enjoined; and, third, the appellant complains that the bill should not have been dismissed without a declaration of the rights of the parties since a declaratory judgment, as well as an injunction, were prayed for in the bill of complaint.
The first contention based on fraud is without merit.
The appellants contend that in the suit against the Brotherhood, Hammett testified several times that he had no contract of employment with L. & N. Railroad, and therefore his employment relationship was terminable at will.
In the suit against the L. & N. Railroad, Counts A and B of that complaint allege that Hammett had a lifetime employment contract with the railroad. Counts C and B of the complaint further allege that Hammett was covered by the contract between the Brotherhood and the L. & N. Railroad and could only be dismissed for cause.
It is true, as appellants suggest, that Hammett's testimony in the suit against the Brotherhood contradicts his complaint against the L. & N. Railroad. However, even if the court assumes that Hammett's testimony against the Brotherhood was false, nonetheless, generally, false testimony occurring in a trial is no basis for setting aside a judgment obtained in that trial. Ex parte Cade, 220 Ala. 666, 127 So. 154; Bolden v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 215 Ala. 334, 110 So. 574, 49 A.L.R. 1206; Keenum v. Dodson, 212 Ala. 146, 102 So. 230. Moreover, for aught appearing, Hammett did not testify in the suit against the L. & N. Railroad and was not put to the test of offering testimony to support the allegations of his complaint.
It is the second assertion of the appellants that presents the most difficult aspect of the case. Assuming, as we must here, that Hammett was actually under contract for life with the railroad company, then clearly he had a cause of action for breach of that contract by the railroad, as well as an action against the Brotherhood for interfering with that contract. The L. & N. Railroad is a promisor who has breached him promise and the Brotherhood is a tortfeasor. Neither the promisor nor tortfeasor may defend the suit by Hammett on the theory that the law gives an adequate remedy against the other party. Grobman v. Freiman, 3 Misc.2d 656, 152 N.Y.S.2d 898; Frischman v. Metropolitan Tobacco Co., 199 Misc. 844, 104 N.Y.S.2d 446; Pilurs v. Elco Const. Co., 16 Ill.App.2d 543, 146 N.E.2d 104.
The issue squarely presented in this case is: May Hammett actually recover from both the Bortherhood and the L. & N. Railroad, one in a tort action, the other in a contract action?
Neither of the parties has cited us to a case deciding the question, nor has our diligent search revealed one, in this jurisdiction or any other jurisdiction.
Admittedly, the Brotherhood and the L. & N. Railroad are not joint tort-feasors. They could not have been sued together, as there is a total lack of community of interest. The liability of one is in tort and of the other in contract.
There was a general verdict and judgment against the Brotherhood in which the amount of compensatory damages nor punitive damages was specifically designated. The damages assessed in the case against the L. & N. Railroad were compensatory only.
The appellants insist that the principle applicable to joint tort-feasors should be applied, by analogy, under the circumstances of this case. That is to say, generally, a satisfaction of a claim by one joint tort-feasor satisfies the claim as to all other joint tort-feasors. Appellants also insist that there can be but one satisfaction for one injury. We cannot agree.
In the case before us, the liability of the Brotherhood is in tort, and the liability of the L. & N. Railroad is in contract. The causes of action are entirely different and based on different wrongful acts, although both actions had as an element of damage appellee's loss of his job. The suit against the L. & N. Railroad claimed only compensatory damages, and the suit against the Brotherhood claimed both compensatory and punitive damages. The causes of action were different. The damages were different, and the parties defendant were different.
The case of the City of Birmingham v. Walker, 267 Ala. 150, 101 So.2d 250, 70 A.L.R.2d 464,...
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