Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore Co

Citation67 S.Ct. 1387,331 U.S. 519,91 L.Ed. 1646
Decision Date09 June 1947
Docket NumberNo. 970,970
PartiesBROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN v. BALTIMORE & O.R. CO. et al
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

On

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

Mr. Burke Williamson, of Chicago, Ill., for appellant.

Mr. Ernest S. Ballard, of Chicago, Ill., for appellees.

Mr. Justice MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Our concern here is with the intervention rights of representatives of railroad employees in a suit brought against the railroad under § 16(12) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 16(12), 49 U.S.C.A. § 16(12).

The origin of this suit is to be found in an order issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission on May 16, 1922. Chicago Junction Case, 71 I.C.C. 631. See also Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 44 S.Ct. 317, 68 L.Ed. 667. The Commission there approved the purchase by the New York Central Railroad Co. (Central) of all the capital stock of the Chicago River & Indiana Railroad Co. (River Road); it also authorized the leasing to River Road of all the properties of the Chicago Junction Railway Co. (Junction) for 99 years and thereafter, at the lessee's option, in perpetuity. Among the properties in question were trackage and switching facilities at the Union Stock Yards, Chicago, Illinois, connecting with various trunk lines. Prior to the Commission order, the practice had been for the trunk line railroads to use their own power and crews to move their empty and loaded livestock cars over these tracks to and from the loading places in the Union Stock Yards. For the privilege of so moving their cars, the railroads were charged $1.00 per car, loaded or empty.

The Commission made various conditions to its approval of the proposed transactions. The third condition provided: 'The present traffic and operating relationships existing between the Junction and River Road and all carriers operating in Chicago shall be continued, in so far as such matters are within the control of the Central.' 71 I.C.C. at 639. This condition is still in effect, the Commission's decision and order having been found to be valid and binding on all parties in a proceeding in the District Court in 1929.1

The trunk line railroads have continued to use their own power and crews in moving their livestock cars over the trackage operated by River Road and have paid River Road the amount of $1.00 per car. But on January 25, 1946, Central and River Road notified the railroads that on and after February 1, 1946, the cars would be moved over this trackage by means of the power and crews of River Road and that the handling charge would be $12.96 per outbound loaded car. Soon after this new practice went into effect, the trunk line railroads (appellees herein) brought this suit for preliminary and permanent injunctions under § 16(12) of the Interstate Commerce Act against Central, River Road and Junction. They claimed that the new practice was in violation of the third condition of the 922 Commis sion order. They accordingly sought to enjoin the defendants and 'their respective officers, agents, representatives, servants, employees and successors,' from disobeying the order, especially the third condition thereof, and to force the defendants to permit them to move their cars with their own power and crews. The Commission was allowed to intervene as a party plaintiff; its intervening complaint also prayed for an injunction against the alleged violation of the third condition by the defendants and their employees.2

A stipulation of facts was then filed. After describing the change in handling the cars, it pointed out that this change resulted from a settlement between the River Road and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen of a labor dispute over the work involved in these livestock car movements. The Brotherhood was the bargaining agent under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., for the River Road trainmen. It made a demand, based upon its contract with River Road, that these trainmen be given the work of moving and switching the livestock cars over the River Road trackage. The Brotherhood threatened to call a strike unless this demand was met before 10:30 p.m., January 23, 1946, a threat that was backed by an almost unanimous strike vote of the trainmen. Under this threat, River Road made an agreement with the Brotherhood shortly before the scheduled strike hour, as a result of which the River Road trainmen were to be permitted to move and switch the cars. The notice to the trunk line railroads of this change in practice subsequently followed.

The District Court thereupon issued a preliminary injunction as requested. Central, River Road and Junction, and 'their respective officers, agents, representatives, employees and successors,' were restrained from disobeying the 1922 Commission order and from violating the third condition of that order and were commanded to permit the trunk line railroads to move their cars over the River Road line with their own power and crews. The court concluded, as a matter of law, that the facts relative to the labor dispute between the Brotherhood and River Road were 'irrelevant and immaterial.'3

Three days after the preliminary injunction became effective, the Brotherhood asked leave to file its special appearance for the purpose of moving to vacate the injunction and to dismiss the proceedings for failure to join the Brotherhood and its members as indispensable parties. This motion was denied. River Road then filed its answer to the original complaint, pointing out that the changed arrangement resulted from the labor dispute with the Brotherhood and contending that this new practice did not violate the 1922 Commission order. The Brotherhood thereafter filed its motion to intervene generally as a party defendant, alleging that the primary purpose of the suit was to nullify its agreement with River Road and to deprive the Brotherhood members of the work they were performing under that agreement and that the Brotherhood members were therefore indispensable parties. The contention was made that the Brotherhood had an unconditional right to intervene by virtue of § 17(11) of the Interstate Commerce Act4 and Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c; and 28 U.S.C. § 45a, 28 U.S.C.A. § 45a, was later added in support of this contention But the m otion to intervene was denied by order, without opinion.

The District Court then allowed an appeal to this Court from its order denying intervention. The appellee railroads moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that such an order was not final and hence was not appealable, the Brotherhood not being entitled to intervene as a matter of right. We postponed further consideration of the question of our jurisdiction to review the order to the hearing of the appeal upon the merits. 67 S.Ct. 870.

Ordinarily, in the absence of an abuse of discretion, no appeal lies from an order denying leave to intervene where intervention is a permissive matter within the discretion of the court. United States v. California Co-op. Canneries, 279 U.S. 553, 556, 49 S.Ct. 423, 424, 73 L.Ed. 838.5 The permissive nature of such intervention necessarily implies that, if intervention is denied, the applicant is not legally bound or prejudiced by any judgment that might be entered in the case. He is at liberty to assert and protect his interests in some more appropriate proceeding. Having no adverse effect upon the applicant, the order denying intervention accordingly falls below the level of appealability. But where a statute or the practical necessities grant the applicant an absolute right to intervene, the order denying intervention becomes appealable. Then it may fairly be said that the applicant is adversely affected by the denial, there being no other way in which he can better assert the particular interest which warrants intervention in this instance. And since he cannot appeal from any subsequent order or judgment in the proceeding unless he does intervene, the order denying intervention has the degree of definitiveness which supports an appeal therefrom. See Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502, 508, 61 S.Ct. 666, 668, 85 L.Ed. 975.

Our jurisdiction to consider an appeal from an order denying intervention thus depends upon the nature of the applicant's right to intervene. If the right is absolute, the order is appealable and we may judge it on its merits. But if the matter is one within the discretion of the trial court and if there is no abuse of discretion, the order is not appealable and we lack power to review it. In other words, our jurisdiction is identified by the necessary incidents of the right to intervene in each particular instance. We must therefore determine the question of our jurisdiction in this case by examining the character of the Brotherhood's right to intervene in the proceeding brought under § 16(12) of the Interstate Commerce Act.

We start with Rule 24(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, applicable to a civil proceeding of this type. Rule 24(a) deals with intervention of right and provides in pertinent part: 'Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action; * * *.' In contrast, Rule 24(b) is concerned with permissive intervention and reads as follows: 'Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a condititional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question o law or fa ct in common. In exercising its discretion ...

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