Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard

Decision Date09 June 1952
Docket NumberNo. 458,458
Citation96 L.Ed. 1283,343 U.S. 768,72 S.Ct. 1022
PartiesBROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN et al. v. HOWARD et al
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Argued by Mr. Charles R. Judge, St. Louis, Mo., for petitioners.

Messrs. Joseph C. Waddy, Washington, D.C., Victor Packman, St. Louis, Mo., for respondent, Howard.

Submitted by Messrs. Eugene G. Nahler, St. Louis, Mo., James L. Homire, New York City, Cornelius H. Skinker, Jr., Alvn J. Baumann, St. Louis, Mo., for respondent, St. Louis-San Fr ancisco Ry. Co.

Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case raises questions concerning the power of courts to protect Negro railroad employees from loss of their jobs under compulsion of a bargaining agreement which, to avoid a strike, the railroad made with an exclusively white man's union. Respondent Simon Howard, a Frisco1 train employee for nearly forty years brought this action on behalf of himself and other colored employees similarly situated.

In summary the complaint alleged: Negro employees such as respondent constituted a group called 'train porters' although they actually performed all the duties of white 'brakemen'; the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, bargaining representative of 'brakemen' under the Railway Labor Act,2 had for years used its influence in an attempt to eliminate Negro trainmen and get their jobs for white men who, unlike colored 'train porters,' were or could be members of the Brotherhood; on March 7, 1946, the Brotherhood finally forced the Frisco to agree to discharge the colored 'train porters' and fill their jobs with white men who, under the agreement, would do less work but get more pay. The complaint charged that the Brotherhood's 'discriminatory action' violated the train porter's rights under the Railway Labor Act and under the Constitution; that the agreement was void because against public policy, prejudicial to the public interest, and designed to deprive Negro trainmen of their right to earn a livelihood because of their race or color. The prayers were that the court adjudge and decree that the contract was void and unenforceable for the reasons stated; that the Railroad be 'enjoined from discontinuing the jobs known as Train Porters' and 'from hiring white Brakemen to replace or displace plaintiff and other Train Porters as planned in accordance with said agreement.'

The facts as found by the District Court, affirmed with emphasis by the Court of Appeals, substantially established the truth of the complaint's material allegations. These facts showed that the Negro train porters had for a great many years served the Railroad with loyalty, integrity and efficiency; that 'train porters' do all the work of brakemen;3 that the Government administrator of railroads during World War I had classified them as brakemen and had required that they be paid just like white brakemen; that when the railroads went back to their owners, they redesignated these colored brakemen as 'train porters,' 'left their duties untouched,' and forced them to accept wages far below those of white 'brakemen' who were Brotherhood members; that for more than a quarter of a century the Brotherhood and other exclusively white rail unions had continually carried on a program of aggressive hostility to employment of Negroes for train, engine and yard service; that the agreement of March 7, 1946, here under attack, provides that train porters shall no longer do any work 'generally recognized as brakeman's duties'; that while this agreement did not in express words compel discharge of 'train porters,' the economic unsoundness of keeping them after transfer of their 'brakemen' functions made complete abolition of the 'train porter' group inevitable; that two days after 'the Carriers, reluctantly, and as a result of the strike threats' signed the agreement, they notified train porters that 'Under this agreement we will, effective April 1, 1946, discontinue all train porter positions.' Accordingly, respondent Howard, and others, were personally notified to turn in their switch keys, lanterns, markers and other brakemen's equipment, and notices of job vacancies were posted to be bid in by white brakemen only.

The District Court held that the complaint raised questions which Congress by the Railway Labor Act had made subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Mediation Board and the National Railroad Adjustment Board. 72 F.Supp. 695. The Court of Appeals reversed this holding.4 It held that the agreement, as construed and acted upon by the Railroad, was an 'attempted predatory appropriation' of the 'train porters" jobs, and was to this extent illegal and unenforceable. It therefore ordered that the Railroad must keep the 'train porters' as employees; it permitted the Railroad and the Brotherhood to treat the contract as valid on condition that the Railroad would recognize the colored 'train porters' as members of the craft of 'brakemen' and that the Brotherhood would fairly represent them as such. 191 F.2d 442. We granted certiorari. 342 U.S. 940, 72 S.Ct. 551.

While different in some respects, the basic pattern of racial discrimination in this case is much the same as that we had to consider in Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173. In this case, as was charged in the Steele case, a Brotherhood acting as a bargaining agent under the Railway Labor Act has been hostile to Negro employees, has discriminated against them, and has forced the Railroad to make a contract which would help Brotherhood members take over the jobs of the colored 'train porters.'

There is a difference in the circumstances of the two cases, however, which it is contended requires us to deny the judicial remedy here that was accorded in the Steele case. That difference is this: Steele was admittedly a locomotive fireman although not a member of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen which under the Railway Labor Act was the exclusive bargaining representative of the entire craft of firemen. We held that the language of the Act imposed a duty on the craft bargaining representative to exercise the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts, without hostile discrimination against any of them. Failure to exercise this duty was held to give rise to a cause of action under the Act. In this case, unlike the Steele case, the locored employees have for many years been treated by the carriers and the Brotherhood as a separate class for representation purposes and have in fact been represented by another union of their own choosing. Since the Brotherhood has discriminated against 'train porters' instead of minority members of its own 'craft,' it is argued that the Brotherhood owed no duty at all to refrain from using its statutory bargaining power so as to abolish the jobs of the colored porters and drive them from the railroads. We think this argument is unsound and that the opinion in the Steele case points to a breach of statutory duty by this Brotherhood.

As previously noted, these train porters are threatened with loss of their jobs because they are not white and for no other reason. The job they did hold under its old name would be abolished by the agreement; their color alone would disqualify them for the old job under its new name. The end result of these transactions is not in doubt; for precisely the same rasons as in the Steele case 'discriminations based on race alone are obviously irrelevant and invidious. Congress plainly did not undertake to authorize the bargaining representative to to make such discriminations.' Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., supra 323 U.S. at 203, 65 S.Ct. at page 232, 89 L.Ed. 173, and cases there cited. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161. The Federal Act thus prohibits bargaining agents it authorizes from using their position and power to destroy colored workers' jobs in order to bestow them on white workers. And courts can protect those threatened by such an unlawful use of power granted by a federal act.

Here, as in the Steele case, colored workers must look to a judicial remedy to prevent the sacrifice or obliteration of their rights under the Act. For no adequate administrative remedy can be afforded by the National Railroad Adjustment or Mediation Board. The claims here cannot be resolved by interpretation of a bargaining agreement so as to give jurisdiction to the Adjustment Board under our holding in Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 70 S.Ct. 577, 94 L.Ed. 795. This dispute involves the validity of the contract, not its meaning. Nor does the dispute hinge on the proper craft classification of the porters so as to call for settlement by the National Mediation Board under our holding in Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297, 64 S.Ct. 95, 88 L.Ed. 61. For the contention here with which we agree is that the racial discrimination practiced is unlawful, whether colored employees are classified as 'train porters,' 'brakemen,' or something else. Our conclusion is that the District Court has jurisdiction and power to issue necessary injunctive orders notwithstanding the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.5 We need add nothing to what was said about inapplicability of that Act in the Steele case and in Graham v. Brotherhood of Firemen, 338 U.S. 232, 239—240, 70 S.Ct. 14, 18, 94 L.Ed. 22.

Bargaining agents who enjoy the advantages of the Railway Labor Act's provisions must execute their trust without lawless invasions of the rights of other workers. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the District Court had jurisdiction to protect these workers from the racial discrimination practiced against them. On remand, the District Court should permanently enjoin the Railroad and the Brotherhood from use of the contract...

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