Broughel v. S. New England Tel. Co.

• Decision Date: 02 April 1901
• Citation: 73 Conn. 614,48 A. 751
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: BROUGHEL v. SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND TEL. CO.

48 A. 751

73 Conn. 614

BROUGHEL

v. SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND TEL. CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 2, 1901.

Appeal from superior court, Hartford county; Samuel O. Prentice, Judge.

Action by Andrew J. Broughel, Jr., administrator, against the Southern New England Telephone Company. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

The trial court found: (1) That the intestate, Davis, died as the direct result of the injuries complained of in the complaint; (2) that his death "was instantaneous, and was neither attended nor preceded by any pain or suffering from the injuries or by any apprehension thereof"; and (3) that at the time of his death he was 26 years of age, and in excellent health. The evidence to show the age and health of Davis at the time of his death was offered as bearing upon the extent of the results of the injury, and as showing that "the damage from an injury resulting in death was greater in the case of a man in the prime of life and in good health than in the case of a man who was about to die anyway, whether from illness or old age." This evidence was objected to by the defendant as immaterial and irrelevant, "and because it laid no foundation to measure the damages"; and special objection was made to it "in so far as it was offered for the purpose of showing the value of Davis' life to himself." The court overruled the objections, and admitted the evidence. The defendant claimed as a matter of law that the value of the life of Davis to himself was not the rule of damages, and that mere deprivation or loss of life in itself was not a proper element of substantial damages. The court overruled these claims, and took as the measure of damages "the value at the time of the injuries of the deceased's life to himself." The reasons of appeal are based upon these rulings of the court.

Henry Stoddard, Prank L. Hungerford, and James T. Moran, for appellant.

Edward D. Robbins, for appellee.

TORRANCE, J. (after stating the facts). The important questions upon this appeal are these: (1) Under our statutes relating to death by wrongful act, can there be a recovery of substantial damages for mere loss of life alone? (2) If so, what is the measure of damages in such case? These questions will be considered in the order stated.

When this case was before this court in another aspect of it, one of the points decided was that the mere fact that death was instantaneous, and without pain or suffering of any kind, did not of itself prevent the recovery of substantial damages. Broughel v. Telephone Co., 72 Conn. 617, 45 Atl. 435. In effect, that case, we think, decides the first question against the contention of the defendant. It was found by the trial court in that case that death was the sole and only consequence of the negligent act, and yet it was decided that the plaintiff was entitled to recover substantial damages for that consequence. That decision can only be supported on the theory that under our statutes of the kind here in question damages may be recovered for the mere loss and deprivation of life alone, for in that case it was found that no other consequence save mere loss of life followed from the negligent act. A negligent act causing death is an invasion of the right to life, the first and highest of all rights, on which all others are based. That act may be attended by divers consequences and effects. It may be followed— as it is found it was in the present case— by death alone, instantly and painlessly; or it may be followed by bodily and mental suffering and agony as well as by death. We think our statutes make the wrongdoer in such cases liable in damages to the executor or administrator of the decedent for any and all such consequences, and among them for the mere loss and deprivation of life. For such consequences he is to pay "just damages," not exceeding a prescribed amount. This view of this matter was the one taken in Murphy v. Railroad Co., 30 Conn. 184. This court there said: "If to take one's liberty or one's property without Justification is an injury, how much more is the taking of human life? The elementary books, in speaking of absolute rights, classify them thus: (1) The right of personal security; (2) the right of personal liberty; and (3) the right to acquire and enjoy property. If these rights are valued in this order of preference, then every man of common understanding would at once pronounce it absurd to hold that it is no injury to a person to take his life, while it is to strike him a light blow. Such a distinction is not worth talking about, and has no foundation or existence in the law, as it has none in common sense." In the legislation of this state, statutes making wrongdoers liable in damages for mere loss of life have been quite common. The first printed edition of the statutes contained a provision of this kind. It was therein provided that, "if any person shall lose his life" by means of a defective bridge or highway under certain circumstances, the wrongdoer should pay "to the parents, husband, wife, or children, or next of kin to the person deceased," the sum of $334, to be recovered in an action at law. Revision 1808, p. 120. In 1851 an act was passed providing that, "if any person shall be deprived of life" in consequence of certain acts or omissions of the servants of any railroad company, such company should pay to the parties named in the act the sum of $1,000, to be recovered in an action of debt on the statute. Pub. Acts 1851, c. 43. In 1853 an act was passed providing that, if the life of any person "shall be lost" under certain prescribed circumstances by reason of the negligence of a railroad company, such company should be liable to pay damages not exceeding $5,000 nor less than $1,000 to the persons described in the act. Pub. Acts 1853, c. 74. In 1869 an act was passed providing that, if the life of any person "shall be lost" by the neglect of a railroad company to maintain fences as prescribed in the act, such company should be liable to pay damages not exceeding $5,000 to the persons named in the act. Pub. Acts 1869, c. 48. In 1877 a general act was passed providing that for injuries "resulting in death" from negligence "the party legally in fault for such Injuries" should be liable for "just damages, not exceeding five thousand dollars." Pub. Acts 1877, c. 78. These and other acts of a kindred nature, as they existed at the time of the Revision of 1888, were embodied in sections 1008 and 1009 of that revision, and it was under the provisions of these sections that the present suit was brought. This legislation clearly shows an intent...