Broughton v. State

• Decision Date: 15 January 1895
• Citation: 105 Ala. 103,16 So. 912
• Parties: BROUGHTON v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

16 So. 912

105 Ala. 103

BROUGHTON v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 15, 1895

Appeal from circuit court, Escambia county; J. M. Carmichael, Judge.

Indictment in two counts against John Broughton, alias Broaden, alias Broudon,-First, for stealing property from a storehouse; and second, for receiving property knowing that it had been stolen from a storehouse. A demurrer to the indictment was overruled, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Rabb &amp Stevens, for appellant.

Wm. L Martin, Atty. Gen., for the State.

McCLELLAN. J.

The following is the indictment in this case, omitting caption and conclusion: "The grand jury of said county charge that before the finding of this indictment John Broughton alias Broaden, alias Broudon, feloniously took and carried away from the storehouse of John Emmons, one umbrella, of the value of one dollar and fifty cents, and one pair of shoes of the value of three dollars, the personal property of John Emmons. And the grand jury of said county further charge that before the finding of this indictment John Broughton, alias Broaden, alias Broudon, did buy, receive, conceal, or aid in concealing one umbrella, of the value of one dollar and fifty cents, and one pair of shoes, of the value of three dollars the personal property of John Emmons, knowing they had been stolen from the storehouse of John Emmons, and not having the intent to restore it to the owner." The defendant demurred to the indictment on the ground that there was a misjoinder of offenses, in that the first count charged a felony and the second a misdemeanor; and the overruling of this demurrer is the only matter presented for review. We do not think the demurrer was well taken. To steal goods from a storehouse is felony, regardless of the amount of their value. Code, § 3789. And section 3794 of the Code provides, in substance, that any person who receives, buys, etc., "any personal property whatever, knowing that it has been stolen, and not having the intent to restore it to the owner, must, on conviction, be punished as if he had stolen it." The court is of the opinion that the effect of this statute is to punish the receiver with guilty knowledge precisely as the thief is punished. The guilty knowledge, or course, must extend, in cases like this, to the special facts which aggravate the offense of taking and carrying away with felonious intent. It is so alleged here. The charge in the second count...