Broughton v. State, No. 50612

• Court: New York Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: WACHTLER; BREITEL; COOKE
• Citation: 37 N.Y.2d 451,335 N.E.2d 310,373 N.Y.S.2d 87
• Docket Number: No. 50612
• Decision Date: 10 July 1975
• Parties: , 335 N.E.2d 310 Kenneth G. BROUGHTON, as father and natural guardian of Susan M. Broughton, an infant, Respondent, v. STATE of New York, Appellant. Donald SCHANBARGER, Appellant-Respondent, v. Robert KELLOGG, Respondent-Appellant, and Peter Cooper, Respondent. Claim

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373 N.Y.S.2d 87 37 N.Y.2d 451, 335 N.E.2d 310 Kenneth G. BROUGHTON, as father and natural guardian of
Susan M. Broughton, an infant, Respondent,
v.
STATE of New York, Appellant.
Donald SCHANBARGER, Appellant-Respondent,
v.
Robert KELLOGG, Respondent-Appellant, and Peter Cooper, Respondent. Claim No. 50612. Court of Appeals of New York. July 10, 1975.
Certiorari Denied Nov. 3, 1975. See 96 S.Ct. 277.

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Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (Jeremiah Jochnowitz and Ruth Kessler Toch, Albany, of counsel), for appellant in the first above-entitled action.

Donald Tirschwell, New City, for respondent in the first above-entitled action.

Donald Schanbarger, appellant-respondent pro se in the second above-entitled action.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (Peter J. Dooley and Ruth Kessler Toch, Albany, of counsel), for Robert Kellogg, respondent-appellant and Peter Cooper, respondent in the second above-entitled action.

WACHTLER, Judge.

These appeals, both involving actions for false imprisonment, present questions as to the applicability of the prima facie rule and the extent of compensable damages. Since both cases have been before our court previously in the context of criminal appeals, only a cursory review of the facts is necessary. (See People v. Broughton, 30 A.D.2d 813, 292 N.Y.S.2d 164, affd., 23 N.Y.2d 809, 297 N.Y.S.2d 310, 244 N.E.2d 878; People v. Schanbarger, 24 N.Y.2d 288, 300 N.Y.S.2d 100, 248 N.E.2d 16.)

On the evening of November 14, 1967 Susan Broughton was a visitor in a mobile home leased to certain other parties. She was arrested by police officers who, while searching the trailer pursuant to a search warrant, found several pounds of marijuana secreted throughout the premises. Respondent was then brought to the Stony Point Barracks where she was fingerprinted, photographed and subjected to a full body search. Thereafter she was indicted for criminal possession of a dangerous drug in the first degree (Penal Law, § 220.20, as enacted by L.1965, ch. 1030, and repealed by L.1973, ch. 276).

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Subsequently the evidence was suppressed on the ground that the search warrant affidavit was insufficient as a matter of law and in a related proceeding the indictment was dismissed. There the County Court found 'not a scintilla of evidence' connecting Broughton with the criminal activity (43 A.D.2d 389, 390, 352 N.Y.S.2d 234, 235). The instant action was commenced and following a bifurcated nonjury trial, claimant was awarded damages for 'lost wages, mental anguish, humiliation and anxiety' together with a sum for legal services rendered in her defense (p. 391, 352 N.Y.S.2d p. 236). The Appellate Division affirmed this judgment.

The second case before us involves a false arrest claim by Donald Schanbarger against the State Trooper who arrested him. As Schanbarger was walking along an East Greenbush road in the early morning hours of April 30, 1968, he was stopped by a trooper and questioned as to his identity and destination. When respondent refused to answer he was arrested for loitering (Penal Law, § 240.35, subd. 6, as enacted by L.1965, ch. 1030, as amd. by L.1968, ch. 668). He was tried before a Justice of the Peace in East Greenbush and convicted. The County Court of Rensselaer County affirmed this judgment. On appeal to our court we concluded that the testimony of the trooper was 'clearly insufficient to establish any basis for a Reasonable suspicion that the Defendant might be engaged or was about to engage in crime' and the judgment was reversed (People v. Schanbarger, 24 N.Y.2d 288, 291, 300 N.Y.S.2d 100, 102, 248 N.E.2d 16, 17; emphasis in original).

Following his exoneration Schanbarger instituted this action against the trooper alleging several causes of action including one for false arrest. After a nonjury trial in Supreme Court, Rensselaer County, judgment was granted to Schanbarger on the false arrest action 'for the indignity of being arrested and imprisoned and for the humiliation he suffered as a result of the arrest.' Both parties appealed to the Appellate Division which affirmed the judgment in favor of Schanbarger (Schanbarger v. Kellogg, 43 A.D.2d 362, 352 N.Y.S.2d 50).

Both appellants assert the prima facie rule as grounds for reversal. In Broughton the claim is made that reasonable cause to believe she had committed a crime should be presumed by virtue of her arraignment and subsequent indictment by the Grand Jury. Similarly, in Schanbarger the appellant contends that the arraignment constituted a judicial recognition of probable cause to arrest which should generate a presumption in a subsequent action for false arrest. A corollary of the prima facie rule is that the presumption is rebuttable only where the plaintiff establishes fraud, perjury or the misrepresentation or falsification of evidence. It is our view that the prima

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facie rule applies only in causes of action for malicious prosecution and is totally misplaced when applied in false imprisonment actions.

Our conclusion is founded on the common-law distinctions between malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. Although these are kindred actions, each protects a different personal interest and is composed of different elements. Unfortunately, in cases where both false imprisonment and malicious prosecution are alleged, the opinions fail to differentiate between these torts thereby generating confusion as to the pertinency of malice and want of probable cause. (See, e.g., Langley v. City of New York, 40 A.D.2d 844, 337 N.Y.S.2d 460, affd., 34 N.Y.2d 885, 359 N.Y.S.2d 281, 316 N.E.2d 716; Schultz v. Greenwood Cemetery, 190 N.Y. 276, 83 N.E. 41; see, generally, Prosser, Torts (4th ed.), § 11; False imprisonment; liability of private citizen for false arrest by officer, Ann., 21 A.L.R.2d 643.) A careful analysis of the purpose and elements of the respective torts illustrates the distinct nature of...