Broussard v. First Tower Loan, LLC, CIVIL ACTION NO: 15-1161
| Citation | 150 F.Supp.3d 709 |
| Decision Date | 09 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | c/w 15-2500,CIVIL ACTION NO: 15-1161 |
| Parties | Tristan Broussard v. First Tower Loan, LLC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Ryan P. Delaney, Delaney & Robb, Attorneys at Law, LLC, Metairie, LA, Amy Whelan, Barbara J. Chisholm, James M. Finberg, P. Casey Pitts, Altshuler Berzon LLP, San Francisco, CA, Samuel Eugene Wolfe, Montgomery, AL, for Tristan Broussard.
David M. Whitaker, Zoe Wilde Vermeulen, Kean Miller LLP, New Orleans, LA, Erin Lutkewitte Kilgore, Scott Deloss Huffstetler, Kean Miller, Baton Rouge, LA, for First Tower Loan, LLC.
CARL J. BARBIER
Before the Court is a Motion to Compel Arbitration, Appoint Arbitrator and to Stay Proceedings (Rec. Doc. 85) filed by Defendant, First Tower Loan, LLC (“Tower”); an opposition thereto (Rec. Doc. 99) filed by Intervenor, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”); an opposition (Rec. Doc. 102) filed by Plaintiff, Tristan Broussard (“Broussard”); and Defendant's reply (Rec. Doc. 107). Also before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Stay EEOC Claims Pending Arbitration (Rec. Doc. 96) , the EEOC's opposition (Rec. Doc. 100), Plaintiff's opposition (Rec. Doc. 103), and Defendant's reply (Rec. Doc. 110). Having considered the motion and legal memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that the motions should be GRANTED for the reasons set forth more fully below.
This litigation derives from Broussard's employment with Tower and subsequent termination. Broussard is a twenty-one-year-old resident of Lake Charles, Louisiana. (Rec. Doc. 1 at 2.) Tower is a consumer loan company, headquartered in Mississippi, with branches in five states, including Louisiana. Id. at 3. Broussard is a transgender man, meaning he outwardly appears to be male and his gender identity is male. Id. at 4. However, his birth sex is female. Id.
In early February 2013, Broussard applied for a job as a Manager Trainee in Tower's Lake Charles office. Id. at 1. Leah Sparks, the manager of Tower's Lake Charles office, interviewed Broussard for the position on February 25, 2013. Id. at 4. Later that same day, Sparks called Broussard to offer him the position. Id. Broussard accepted the position and began working for Tower on March 4, 2013. Id.
When Broussard arrived for his first day of work, Sparks presented him with the paperwork required to be completed by new employees. These materials included Tower's Employment Agreement, which contains the following arbitration provision: “Except for the injunctive relief authorized by the foregoing paragraph,1 all other disputes, legal or otherwise, relating to the employment relationship shall be submitted to binding arbitration by the parties .” (Rec. Doc. 85-2, at 4) (emphasis added). The Employment Agreement also states, “Signature by the employee on this contract constitutes an offer of employment by the employer, which offer is not accepted, and neither an employment relationship nor contract is formed or consummated until Tower signs this contract at its corporate headquarters in Rankin County, Mississippi.” Id. Broussard signed the Employment Agreement in Sparks's presence on March 4, 2013. Id.
In addition, the paperwork included a separate document extending an offer of employment to Broussard “(Acceptance Form”), which Sparks signed on behalf of Tower. Id. at 3. The Acceptance Form states, Id. Further, it provides that “[t]he terms of your employment offer are governed by the terms outlined in the employment agreement you will sign.” Id. Broussard signed the Acceptance Form in Sparks's presence on March 4, 2013. Id. Sparks then forwarded Broussard's paperwork to Tower's headquarters in Mississippi. Id. at 2. Tower received Broussard's Employment Agreement and other new-hire materials at its headquarters on March 7, 2013, and stamped them as “received” with that date. (Rec. Doc. 85-3, at 2.)
Tower also required Broussard to provide a valid form of identification. (Rec. Doc. 1, at 5.) Broussard provided his driver's license. Id. As Broussard completed the paperwork for his employment with Tower, Sparks noticed that his driver's license listed his sex as female. Id. at 5. When Sparks asked Broussard about the listed sex, he explained that he is a transgender man. Id.
On March 11, 2013, Tower Loan Vice President David Morgan visited the Lake Charles office. Id. at 6. Morgan gave Broussard a copy of the company's dress code for female employees and informed Broussard that the company would require him to dress as female. Id. Morgan also presented Broussard with a written statement and told him that he must sign the statement in order to continue working at Tower. Id. at 7. The statement expressed that Broussard's “preference to act and dress as male” was not “in compliance with Tower Loan's personnel policies.” Id. Further, the statement indicated that when an overnight room is required for out-of-town meetings, Broussard would be assigned to a room with a female. Id. Broussard refused to sign the statement, and his employment terminated.2 Id.
After Broussard's new-hire paperwork arrived at Tower's headquarters on March 7, 2013, it was processed in the regular course of business. (Rec. Doc. 85-3, at 2.) The Employment Agreement and other forms were reviewed by administrative staff for completeness and were thereafter presented to J. Lynne Card, Tower's Vice President and Director of Human Resources, for her signature on behalf of Tower. Id. Card reviewed Broussard's file and signed the Employment Agreement no later than March 26, 2013.3
Broussard filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on August 27, 2013. (Rec. Doc. 1, at 8.) The EEOC determined that Broussard's claim was meritorious and issued a Notice of Right to Sue on January 20, 2015. Id. at 8-9. Broussard filed the instant action on April 13, 2015, asserting claims against Tower for discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq .
(Rec. Doc. 1, at 9.) In response, on April 23, 2015, Tower filed suit against Broussard in the Chancery Court of Rankin County, Mississippi, seeking to compel Broussard to arbitrate the claims asserted in his action against Tower. (No. 15–2500, Rec. Doc. 1.) On May 26, 2015, Broussard removed Tower's suit to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Id. Upon Broussard's motion, on July 7, 2015, the Southern District of Mississippi transferred Tower's suit to this Court, where it was consolidated with Broussard's case. (No., Rec. Doc. 18.) Thereafter, on September 8, 2015, the EEOC filed a motion to intervene, which the Court granted. (Rec. Doc. 70.)
Tower filed the instant Motion to Compel Arbitration, Appoint Arbitrator and to Stay Proceedings (Rec. Doc. 85) on November 5, 2015, and Motion to Stay EEOC Claims Pending Arbitration (Rec. Doc. 96) on November 16, 2015. The EEOC and Broussard filed their oppositions on November 24, 2015. With leave granted from the Court, Tower filed a reply in support of its motion to compel arbitration on December 2, 2015, and a reply in support of its motion to stay on December 3, 2015. The motions are before the Court on the briefs, without oral argument.
Tower contends that all of the Title VII claims asserted in Broussard's complaint are subject to and within the scope of a mandatory arbitration agreement between Broussard and Tower. First, Tower argues that a valid arbitration agreement exists within the Employment Agreement signed by both parties. (Rec. Doc. 85-1, at 5-6.) As Tower points out, the Agreement makes clear that Broussard's signature on the document constituted an “offer of employment by the employee.” Id. at 7. Because the Agreement did not contain an expiration date, Tower claims it was a revocable offer. Id. at 8. Tower maintains that it accepted the offer in a reasonable amount of time, and therefore the agreement to arbitrate became effective when Card signed the Agreement on its behalf. Id.
Next, Tower argues that Broussard's termination does not constitute a revocation or rejection of the offer. Id. at 8–9. According to Tower, termination of employment merely signifies an end to the employment relationship that is governed by the terms of the Employment Agreement. Id. at 8. Moreover, Tower claims that termination of Broussard's employment is irrelevant. Id. at 10. Because the Agreement plainly covers disputes regarding allegation of wrongful discharge, which cannot be alleged where an employee is still employed, Tower insists that the Agreement clearly contemplates that the arbitration provision will survive potential termination. Id. at 11.
Tower further submits that Broussard would be bound to the arbitration provision even if Tower had never signed the Agreement. Id. at 9. Tower claims that “under Louisiana law, where one party drafts and presents a contract and the other party signs it, the contract is valid and binding upon the signing party, even where the other party fails to sign the contract.” Id. Additionally, Tower argues that because Broussard accepted the benefits of the Agreement, the ability to begin employment with Tower, he is bound by all of the terms of the Agreement. Id.
In addition, Tower contends that the Acceptance Form, by which Tower offered and Broussard accepted Tower's offer of employment, constitutes a valid agreement to arbitrate, irrespective of the timing of when Tower eventually signed the Employment Agreement. Id. at 10. Tower asserts that the Acceptance Form incorporated the terms of the Employment Agreement by reference, including the arbitration provision. Id. For this reason, Tower...
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