Broussard v. State Indus. School for Colored Youths

• Decision Date: 29 June 1956
• Docket Number: No. 42749,42749
• Citation: Broussard v. State Indus. School for Colored Youths, 90 So.2d 73, 231 La. 24 (La. 1956)
• Parties: Luelva E. BROUSSARD v. STATE INDUSTRIAL SCHOOL FOR COLORED YOUTHS.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 73

90 So.2d 73

231 La. 24

Luelva E. BROUSSARD v. STATE INDUSTRIAL SCHOOL FOR COLORED YOUTHS.

No. 42749.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 29, 1956.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 28, 1956.

Joseph W. Starring and Cadwallader & Dameron, Baton Rouge, for appellant.

Sargent Pitcher, Jr., Baton Rouge, for appellee.

FOURNET, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff, Luelva E. Broussard, a classified employee, prosecutes this appeal from the action of the State Civil Service Commission affirming her dismissal as Institution Counselor at the State Industrial School for Colored Youths for the assigned reason ¹ that she was not a fit person to be employed as a counselor to wayward youth. ²

According to the facts as found by the Civil Service Commission, the appellant married Herman Ray Graham in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on February 26, 1952, and a day or two later left him. Some four months later, on June 4, 1952, she accompanied Graham and his attorney to the courthouse where she read the petition in her husband's separation suit, predicated on her abandonment, and accepted service. Despite the fact that no further steps were taken in this suit, she, on December 31, 1952, married John L. Washington in Shreveport, ³ and although she learned through a co-worker in Juvenile Court in Shreveport as early as March or April of 1953 that he had never divorced a former wife, she continued to live with him at least until June 1, 1953, when she moved to Baton Rouge to assume full time duties with the State Industrial School for Colored Youths, living on the campus. There, in November of 1953, Washington visited her, was introduced by her as her husband, and spent the night with her in her room. (Her testimony that they occupied separate beds on this occasion was viewed by the commission with much skepticism.) In December following she stated she requested an attorney to ascertain Washington's true marital status and was advised by the attorney (the letter was not produced) in March or April of 1954 that Washington had never divorced his former wife. However, the record shows appellant, by personal notation ⁴ dated February 15, 1954, advised the personnel director of the institution she was no longer married and her name was officially 'Miss Broussard,' a change to that effect being made on the records as of March 1, 1954. She did not, however, institute suit for an annulment of this marriage until some time thereafter, ⁵ and did not receive a judgment therein until after her notice of dismissal from the state service was written and mailed. ⁶

In the meanwhile, and although she testified she had no official knowledge until August 9, 1954, that Graham's separation suit against her never proceeded to final judgment and she was not, therefore, divorced from him, she did, prior to that date, cash one or more allotment checks sent her by him through government channels. At the hearing before the commission she testified she thought this marriage had been terminated by Annulment and that she was accepting service of the final papers at the courthouse on June 4, 1952. This the commission found difficult to believe in view of her statement she read the petition in the separation suit and could have hardly been misled in this respect inasmuch as she was a college graduate; further, that although she assumed this position at the time of the hearing, in her petition for appeal to that body she alleged under sworn verification she believed she was 'divorced' from Graham at the time of her marriage to Washington.

In this court appellant contends the Civil Service Commission erred as a matter of law in the following respects: (1) Finding she was given formal notice of her dismissal prior to the 'effective date thereof,' as required by Rule 12.3 of the Civil Service Commission, (2) finding she could have committed bigamy despite the fact there was no evidence establishing she had been guilty of intentional misconduct with respect to her marital status, but, instead, showed she acted throughout in good faith, and, more particularly at the crucial date of her second marriage, in the belief she was free to remarry, reliance being placed on the criminal definition of bigamy and on certain statements with respect thereto as found in the jurisprudence; (3) in its application of the rules of evidence which led to the conclusion she had 'failed to disprove the facts upon which the appointing authority concluded that she is 'probably guilty of bigamy"; (4) denying her motion to strike from the charge that portion thereof stating she was guilty of 'probable bigamy,' which is not 'a cause legally sufficient for dismissal' under Rule 12.1 of the commission; (5) affirming her discharge on the ground of 'probable' cause or suspicion when the Constitution permits discharge for 'actual' cause only; and (6) in refusing to permit her to prove that even if in bad faith and the charge of bigamy or 'probable bigamy' were true, this did not in any way render her 'unfit for her employment,' since as a classified employee she could only be dismissed for conduct that resulted in the unsatisfactory discharge of her duties or impaired the efficiency thereof, and particularly so since her marital status formed no part of the required qualifications for the position she held, and her morals had no effect on her ability to properly discharge these duties. Additionally, she contends the commission erred (though not as a matter of law) in (7) excluding all evidence touching upon the asserted true cause for her dismissal under a general allegation, without particularization, that her separation was caused by personal prejudice and political reasons, and (8) in refusing to allow her to rebut evidence touching on other purported misconduct at the school that formed no part of the written grounds for dismissal.

There is no merit to appellant's contention she was not notified of her dismissal prior to the effective date thereof. The record discloses she was formally notified in writing of her dismissal in a letter dated June 24, 1955, and addressed to her by Dallas B. Matthews, superintendent of the State Industrial School for Colored Youths. In this letter, in which was enclosed a check for $145.83, covering her salary In full through June 30, 1955, she was advised: 'We are paying you through That date so there can be no question but that you have received your notice prior to The effective date of your discharge, as required by the Civil Service regulations.' ⁷ She readily admitted she received this letter on June 27, 1955, which was three days prior to the effective date of her dismissal, i.e., June 30, 1955. It is immaterial, therefore, that in the records of the Civil Service Commission the effective date was erroneously recorded as June 24, 1955, the date of the letter of dismissal, not the date it was to take effect. (The emphasis has been supplied.)

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