Brown as Trustee of George E. Heard Revocable Trust, Dated February 24, 2000 v. Barnes
| Decision Date | 07 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | WD 84279 |
| Citation | 641 S.W.3d 241 |
| Parties | Joe D. BROWN, in his Capacity AS Successor TRUSTEE OF the GEORGE E. HEARD REVOCABLE TRUST, DATED FEBRUARY 24, 2000, Respondent, v. Douglas Lee BARNES and Kyle Barnes, Appellants. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Joshua P. Fay, Macon, MO, Attorney for Respondent.
Trentis E. Miller, Chillicothe, MO, Attorney for Appellants.
Before Special Division: Mark D. Pfeiffer, Presiding Judge, Alok Ahuja, Judge, and Jeff Harris, Special Judge
Mr. Douglas Barnes and Mrs. Kyle Barnes (the "Barneses") appeal from the judgment entered by the Circuit Court of Sullivan County, Missouri ("trial court"), awarding Mr. Joe D. Brown, in his capacity as Successor Trustee ("Trustee") of the George E. Heard Revocable Trust ("Trust"), possession of the real property commonly known and numbered as 29437 Highway T, Milan, Missouri (the "Property"), on his Petition for Unlawful Detainer. The Barneses assert four points on appeal. They contend that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment because the Trustee failed to prove that the Trust was lawfully entitled to immediate possession of the Property, and the Barneses properly interjected issues with regard to their right of possession (Point One); the Trustee failed to prove that the Trust and the Barneses were in a landlord-tenant relationship and failed to prove that the Barneses were both served with demand for possession in accordance with section 534.0501 (Point Two); the Trustee failed to prove that the Trust properly terminated the landlord-tenant relationship with both of the Barneses in accordance with section 441.060 (Point Three); and the Trustee's claim for unlawful detainer is barred by the statute of limitations in section 534.300 (Point Four). We affirm. For ease of analysis, we address the Barneses’ points on appeal out of order.
The Trust was the record owner of the Property, which consisted of two contiguous tracts of land in Sullivan County, Missouri. The Property was conveyed to the Trust in May and November 2000 following the Trust's creation. The Barneses resided in a home located on the Property and used the gated driveway to the home that crossed over both parcels. The Trust and the Barneses had no written lease or rental agreement regarding leasing or renting the Property; however, there was an oral agreement that allowed the Barneses to reside in the home in exchange for performing maintenance and upkeep on the Property. There was no writing in existence, recorded or otherwise, that purported to transfer any interest in the Property to the Barneses. Title to the Property has never been conveyed to the Barneses by any form of recorded deed.
On April 19, 2019, the Trust's attorney sent to the Barneses’ attorney a letter on behalf of the Trust providing notice that the Barneses must vacate and surrender all real property owned by the Trust within thirty-one days from the date of the letter or on or before May 20, 2019. The Barneses did not vacate and/or surrender the Property to the Trust, and they continued to occupy the residence as well as use the gated driveway to the home.
On May 22, 2019, Trustee filed a petition in unlawful detainer against the Barneses. Summonses were personally served on the Barneses’ attorney of record. The Trustee subsequently filed a first and second amended petition in unlawful detainer. On January 8, 2020, the trial court granted Trustee leave to file a third amended petition.
Trustee filed a motion for summary judgment on May 29, 2020, asserting that the Trust was the lawful owner of the Property, that the Barneses occupied the home situated on the Property with the consent of the Trust, that the Barneses failed to vacate the Property after the Trust withdrew its consent via written termination of their tenancy, and that the Trust was entitled to immediate possession of the Property. The Trustee argued that the Trust was entitled to summary judgment as there were no genuine issues of material fact with respect to the Trust's ownership of the Property, as to the Trust's immediate right to possession of the Property, and as to the request for the Barneses to vacate the Property. After hearing arguments of counsel in December 2020, the trial court agreed with the Trustee that there were no genuine issues of material fact that denied the Trust the right to immediate possession of the Property as a matter of law in accordance with Chapter 534. The trial court granted Trustee's motion for summary judgment on January 11, 2021, and ordered that the Trust have restitution of the Property, which the trial court found was unlawfully detained by the Barneses.
The Barneses timely appealed.
The propriety of summary judgment is an issue of law, and our review of a grant of summary judgment is essentially de novo. Doe 122 v. Marianist Province of the U.S. , 620 S.W.3d 73, 76 (Mo. banc 2021) (citing ITT Com. Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp. , 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993) ). We " ‘review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered.’ " Id. (quoting ITT Com. Fin. Corp. , 854 S.W.2d at 376 ). "Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party establishes there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (citing ITT Com. Fin. Corp. , 854 S.W.2d at 382 ; Rule 74.04). "A genuine issue is a dispute that is real, not merely argumentative, imaginary, or frivolous." Id. (citing ITT Com. Fin. Corp. , 854 S.W.2d at 382 ).
In the Barneses’ second point, they contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact in that Trustee failed to prove that the parties were in a landlord-tenant relationship. The Barneses also argue that they do not fall under any category covered by the unlawful detainer statute; but if they did fall under a category, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to which category, thereby raising an inference that they are in the wrongful possession class. We disagree.
Section 534.030.1 defines four distinct scenarios under which a person is guilty of unlawful detainer:
When any person willfully and without force holds over any lands, tenements or other possessions, [1 – the holdover tenant class] after the termination of the time for which they were demised or let to the person, or the person under whom such person claims; or [2 – the foreclosure class] after a mortgage or deed of trust has been foreclosed and the person has received written notice of a foreclosure; or at least ten business days have elapsed after the date of the notice described in subsection 3 of this section; or [3 – the holdover employee class] when premises are occupied incident to the terms of employment and the employee holds over after the termination of such employment; or [4 – the wrongful possession class] when any person wrongfully and without force, by disseisin, shall obtain and continue in possession of any lands, tenements or other possessions, and after demand made, in writing, for the delivery of such possession of the premises by the person having the legal right to such possession, or the person's agent or attorney, shall refuse or neglect to vacate such possession, such person is guilty of an "unlawful detainer" .
See Kocina v. Johannes , 505 S.W.3d 474, 477 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016).
In McNeill v. McNeill , 456 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. App. 1970), the court defined the relationship of landlord and tenant:
In simplest terms, the relationship of landlord and tenant is defined as that which arises from a contract, express or implied, by which one person occupies the real property of another with his permission and in subordination to his rights, the occupant being known as the "tenant" and the person in subordination to whom he occupies as the "landlord." Such contract may be implied from "slight evidence," "as from a permissive holding"; and, although usually incident thereto, reservation of rent by the owner is not essential to creation of the landlord-tenant relationship.
Id. at 804-05 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). There was no written lease or rental agreement between the Trust and the Barneses regarding leasing or renting the Property; however, there was undisputedly an oral agreement that permitted the Barneses to occupy the Property in exchange for performing maintenance and upkeep on the Property. Similarly, in Phelps v. Phelps , 299 S.W.3d 707 (Mo. App. S.D. 2009), a property owner filed an unlawful detainer action against her son and daughter-in-law, who had lived in a farmhouse owned by the son's mother for almost twenty-five years with no formal lease. Id. at 708. The court rejected the son and daughter-in-law's argument that their possession was not as tenants because the son's mother had allegedly orally agreed to convey the farm to son in return for his performing remodeling work on her other property. Id. at 709-10. The court determined that the son and daughter-in-law's occupancy of the property with mother's consent was sufficient to create a landlord-tenant relationship. Id. Here, the record reflects that the Trust was the record owner of the Property, and the Barneses occupied the Property with the consent of the Trust; therefore, the Trust and the Barneses had a landlord-tenant relationship.
The Trust withdrew its consent to the Barneses’ tenancy as evidenced by the Trust's attorney's April 19, 2019 letter sent to the Barneses’ attorney on behalf of the Trust providing notice that the Barneses must vacate and surrender all real property owned by the Trust within thirty-one days from the date of the letter or on or before May 20, 2019. As of May 20, 2019, the landlord-tenant...
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