Brown Shoe Co v. United States, No. 4

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtWARREN
Citation370 U.S. 294,82 S.Ct. 1502,8 L.Ed.2d 510
Decision Date25 June 1962
Docket NumberNo. 4
PartiesBROWN SHOE CO., Appellant, v. UNITED STATES

370 U.S. 294
82 S.Ct. 1502
8 L.Ed.2d 510
BROWN SHOE CO., Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES.

No. 4.
Argued Dec. 6, 1961.
Decided June 25, 1962.

[Syllabus from pages 294-295 intentionally omitted]

Page 296

Arthur H. Dean, New York City, for appellant.

Sol. Gen. Archibald Cox, for appellee.

Mr. Chief Justice WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

I.

This suit was initiated in November 1955 when the Government filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri alleging that a contemplated merger between the G. R. Kinney Company, Inc. (Kinney) and the Brown Shoe Company, Inc. (Brown), through an exchange of Kinney for Brown stock, would violate § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, 15 U.S.C.A. § 18. The Act, as amended, provides in pertinent part:

'No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital * * * of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.'

The complaint sought injunctive relief under § 15 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 25, 15 U.S.C.A. § 25, to restrain consummation of the merger.

A motion by the Government for a preliminary injunction pendente lite was denied, and the companies were permitted to merge provided, however, that their businesses be operated separately and that their assets be kept separately identifiable. The merger was then effected on May 1, 1956.

Page 297

In the District Court, the Government contended that the effect of the merger of Brown—the third largest seller of shoes by dollar volume in the United States, a leading manufacturer of men's, Women's, and children's shoes, and a retailer with over 1,230 owned, operated or controlled retail outlets1—and Kinney—the eighth largest company, by dollar volume, among those primarily engaged in selling shoes, itself a large manufacturer of shoes, and a retailer with over 350 retail outlets—'may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly' by eliminating actual or potential competition in the production of shoes for the national wholesale shoe market and in the sale of shoes at retail in the Nation, by foreclosing competition from 'a market represented by Kinney's retail outlets whose annual sales exceed $42,000,000,' and by enhancing Brown's competitive advantage over other producers, distributors and sellers of shoes. The Government argued that the 'line of commerce' affected by this merger is 'footwear,' or alternatively, that the 'line(s)' are 'men's,' 'women's,' and 'children's' shoes, separately considered, and that the 'section of the country,' within which the anticompetitive effect of the merger is to be judged, is the Nation as a whole, or alternatively, each separate city or city and its

Page 298

immediate surrounding area in which the parties sell shoes at retail.

In the District Court, Brown contended that the merger would be shown not to endanger competition if the 'line(s) of commerce' and the 'section(s) of the country' were properly determined. Brown urged that not only were the age and sex of the intended customers to be considered in determining the relevant line of commerce, but that differences in grade of material, quality of workmanship, price, and customer use of shoes resulted in establishing different lines of commerce. While agreeing with the Government that, with regard to manufacturing, the relevant geographic market for assessing the effect of the merger upon competition is the country as a whole, Brown contended that with regard to retailing, the market must vary with economic reality from the central business district of a large city to a 'standard metropolitan area' 2 for a smaller community. Brown further contended that, both at the manufacturing level and at the retail level, the shoe industry enjoyed healthy competition and that the vigor of this competition would not, in any event, be diminished by the proposed merger because Kinney manufactured less than 0.5% and retailed less than 2% of the Nation's shoes.

The District Court rejected the broadest contentions of both parties. The District Court found that 'there is one group of classifications which is understood and recog-

Page 299

nized by the entire industry and the public—the classification into 'men's,' 'women's' and 'children's' shoes separately and independently.' On the other hand, '(t)o classify shoes as a whole could be unfair and unjust; to classify them further would be impractical, unwarranted and unrealistic.'

Realizing that 'the areas of effective competition for retailing purposes cannot be fixed with mathematical precision,' the District Court found that 'when determined by economic reality, for retailing, a 'section of the country' is a city of 10,000 or more population and its immediate and contiguous surrounding area, regardless of name designation, and in which a Kinney store and a Brown (operated, franchise, or plan)3 store are located.'

The District Court rejected the Government's contention that the combining of the manufacturing facilities of Brown and Kinney would substantially lessen competition in the production of men's, women's, or children's shoes for the national wholesale market. However, the District Court did find that the likely foreclosure of other manufacturers from the market represented by Kinney's retail outlets may substantially lessen competition in the manufacturers' distribution of 'men's,' 'women's,' and 'children's' shoes, considered separately, throughout the Nation. The District Court also found that the merger may substantially lessen competition in retailing alone in 'men's,' 'women's,' and 'children's' shoes, considered separately, in every city of 10,000 or more population and its immediate surrounding area in which both a Kinney and a Brown store are located.

Brown's contentions here differ only slightly from those made before the District Court. In order fully to understand and appraise these assertions, it is necessary to set

Page 300

out in some detail the District Court's findings concerning the nature of the shoe industry and the place of Brown and Kinney within that industry.

The Industry.

The District Court found that although domestic shoe production was scattered among a large number of manufacturers, a small number of large companies occupied a commanding position. Thus, while the 24 largest manufacturers produced about 35% of the Nation's shoes, the top 4—International, Endicott-Johnson, Brown (including Kinney) and General Shoe—alone produced approximately 23% of the Nation's shoes or 65% of the production of the top 24.

In 1955, domestic production of nonrubber shoes was 509.2 million pairs, of which about 103.6 million pairs were men's shoes, about 271 million pairs were women's shoes, and about 134.6 million pairs were children's shoes.4 The District Court found that men's, women's, and children's shoes are normally produced in separate factories.

The public buys these shoes through about 70,000 retail outlets, only 22,000 of which, however, derive 50% or more of their gross receipts from the sale of shoes and are classified as 'shoe stores' by the Census Bureau.5 These

Page 301

22,000 shoe stores were found generally to sell (1) men's shoes only, (2) women's shoes only, (3) women's and children's shoes, or (4) men's, women's, and children's shoes.

The District Court found a 'definite trend' among shoe manufacturers to acquire retail outlets. For example, International Shoe Company had no retail outlets in 1945, but by 1956 had acquired 130; General Shoe Company had only 80 retail outlets in 1945 but had 526 by 1956; Shoe Corporation of America, in the same period increased its retail holdings from 301 to 842; Melville Shoe Company from 536 to 947; and Endicott-Johnson from 488 to 540. Brown, itself, with no retail outlets of its own prior to 1951, had acquired 845 such outlets by 1956. Moreover, between 1950 and 1956 nine independent shoe store chains, operating 1,114 retail shoe stores, were found to have become subsidiaries of these large firms and to have ceased their independent operations.

And once the manufacturers acquired retail outlets, the District Court found there was a 'definite trend' for the parent-manufacturers to supply an ever increasing percentage of the retail outlets' needs, thereby foreclosing other manufacturers from effectively competing for the retail accounts. Manufacturer-dominated stores were found to be 'drying up' the available outlets for independent producers.

Another 'definite trend' found to exist in the shoe industry was a decrease in the number of plants manufacturing shoes. And there appears to have been a concomitant decrease in the number of firms manufacturing shoes. In 1947, there were 1,077 independent manufacturers of shoes, but by 1954 their number had decreased about 10% to 970.6

Page 302

Brown Shoe.

Brown Shoe was found not only to have been a participant, but also a moving factor, in these industry trends. Although Brown had experimented several times with operating its own retail outlets, by 1945 it had disposed of them all. However, in 1951, Brown again began to seek retail outlets by acquiring the Nation's largest operator of leased shoe departments, Wohl Shoe Company (Wohl), which operated 250 shoe departments in department stores throughout the United States. Between 1952 and 1955 Brown made a number of smaller acquisitions: Wetherby-Kayser Shoe Company (three retail stores), Barnes & Company (two stores), Reilly Shoe Company (two leased shoe departments), Richardson Shoe Store (one store), and Wohl Shoe Company of Dallas (not connected with Wohl) (leased shoe departments in Dallas). In 1954, Brown made another major acquisition: Regal Shoe...

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1857 practice notes
  • Am. W. Bank Members, L.C. v. State, No. 20120456.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Utah
    • October 24, 2014
    ...19. First of Denver Mortg. Investors v. C.N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d 521, 528 (Utah 1979) (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 8 L.Ed.2d 510 (1962)); see also 15A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3......
  • Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. N.V. v. F.T.C., No. 05-60192.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • July 2, 2008
    ...in any line of commerce in any section of the country.") (internal quotations omitted); see also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323, n. 39, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 8 L.Ed.2d 510 (1962) ("`The use of these words ("may be") means that the bill, if enacted, would not apply to the mere p......
  • Franklin v. District of Columbia, No. 97-7162
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • March 22, 1999
    ...our own." Taylor v. Board of Educ., 288 F.2d 600, 602 (2d Cir.1961) (Friendly, J.). The antitrust case of Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 8 L.Ed.2d 510 (1962), does not, as the prisoners suppose, alter this analysis. The district court in Brown Shoe disposed of......
  • Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 9742
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 25, 1998
    ...disregard the implications of an exercise of judicial authority assumed to be proper'' in previous cases. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 307, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 1513-1514, 8 L.Ed.2d 510 (1962) (citations omitted). Based on the nature of the taking alleged in this case, we conclu......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1770 cases
  • Am. W. Bank Members, L.C. v. State, No. 20120456.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Utah
    • October 24, 2014
    ...19. First of Denver Mortg. Investors v. C.N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d 521, 528 (Utah 1979) (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 8 L.Ed.2d 510 (1962)); see also 15A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3......
  • Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. N.V. v. F.T.C., No. 05-60192.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • July 2, 2008
    ...in any line of commerce in any section of the country.") (internal quotations omitted); see also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323, n. 39, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 8 L.Ed.2d 510 (1962) ("`The use of these words ("may be") means that the bill, if enacted, would not apply to the mere p......
  • Franklin v. District of Columbia, No. 97-7162
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • March 22, 1999
    ...our own." Taylor v. Board of Educ., 288 F.2d 600, 602 (2d Cir.1961) (Friendly, J.). The antitrust case of Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 8 L.Ed.2d 510 (1962), does not, as the prisoners suppose, alter this analysis. The district court in Brown Shoe disposed of......
  • Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 9742
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 25, 1998
    ...disregard the implications of an exercise of judicial authority assumed to be proper'' in previous cases. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 307, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 1513-1514, 8 L.Ed.2d 510 (1962) (citations omitted). Based on the nature of the taking alleged in this case, we conclu......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
87 books & journal articles
  • Identifying Anticompetitive Agreements in the United States and the European Union
    • United States
    • Antitrust Bulletin Nbr. 62-2, June 2017
    • June 1, 2017
    ...is established simply by proof thattwo or more parties formed agreements to engage in the behavior.2418. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231(1918).19. This arguably took place in the United States from th......
  • Section 7 of the Clayton Act and “Control” in Bank Holding Company Regulation
    • United States
    • Antitrust Bulletin Nbr. 18-4, December 1973
    • December 1, 1973
    ...concentration in the American econ-omy...[through] unchecked corporate expansions through mergers."Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962).lIa 1970 Legis. Hist., supra note 20,at5522.Butsee 1972 Bd.Rpt., supra note 17, the 1970BHCAamendments were primarilydesigned tobringu......
  • ATOMISTIC ANTITRUST.
    • United States
    • William and Mary Law Review Vol. 63 Nbr. 6, May 2022
    • May 1, 2022
    ...275 (2d Cir. 1931). (34.) See 15 U.S.C. [section]18. (35.) Id. (36.) S. REP. NO. 63-698, at 1 (1914); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 346 (37.) See Peter C. Carstensen & Robert H. Lande, The Merger Incipiency Doctrine and the Importance of "Redundant" Competitors, 2018 WI......
  • ANTITRUST HARM AND CAUSATION.
    • United States
    • Washington University Law Review Vol. 99 Nbr. 3, February 2022
    • February 1, 2022
    ...acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."). (242.) E.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962) (Congress was indicating "that its concern was with probabilities, not certainties."). See also FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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