Brown-Thomas v. Hynie

• Decision Date: 21 August 2019
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-02191-JMC
• Citation: 441 F.Supp.3d 180
• Parties: Deanna BROWN-THOMAS, an individual and in her capacity as intestate heir and pending Personal Representative of the estate of her sister, the deceased Venisha Brown; Yamma Brown, an individual; Michael D. Brown, an individual; Nicole C. Brown, an individual; Jeanette Mitchell Bellinger, an individual; Sarah LaTonya Fegan, an individual; Ciara Pettit, an individual; and Cherquarius Williams, an individual, Plaintiffs, v. Tommie Rae HYNIE, an individual also known as Tommie Rae Brown; James J. Brown, II, an individual; Russell L. Bauknight, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of James Brown and Trustee of the James Brown I Feel Good Trust; David C. Sojourner, Jr., as the Limited Special Administrator of the Estate of James Brown and Limited Special Trustee of the James Brown I Feel Good Trust; and Does, 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

441 F.Supp.3d 180

Deanna BROWN-THOMAS, an individual and in her capacity as intestate heir and pending Personal Representative of the estate of her sister, the deceased Venisha Brown; Yamma Brown, an individual; Michael D. Brown, an individual; Nicole C. Brown, an individual; Jeanette Mitchell Bellinger, an individual; Sarah LaTonya Fegan, an individual; Ciara Pettit, an individual; and Cherquarius Williams, an individual, Plaintiffs,

v.Tommie Rae HYNIE, an individual also known as Tommie Rae Brown; James J. Brown, II, an individual; Russell L. Bauknight, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of James Brown and Trustee of the James Brown I Feel Good Trust; David C. Sojourner, Jr., as the Limited Special Administrator of the Estate of James Brown and Limited Special Trustee of the James Brown I Feel Good Trust; and Does, 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-02191-JMC

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Aiken Division.

Signed August 21, 2019

Alyson Smith Podris, Robert C. Byrd, Parker Poe Adams and Bernstein LLP, Charleston, SC, Douglas A. Fretty, Pro Hac Vice, Marc Toberoff, Pro Hac Vice, Toberoff and Associates PC, Malibu, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Arnold Samuel Goodstein, Goodstein Law Firm, Summerville, SC, Gerald Malloy, Malloy Law Firm, Hartsville, SC, Robert Neil Rosen, Susan Corner Rosen, Thomas Andrew Haffey, Rosen Law Firm, Charleston, SC, S. Alan Medlin, Medlin Law Office, Howard Bryant Stravitz, Pro Hac Vice, Usc School of Law, Columbia, SC, for Defendant Tommie Rae Hynie.

Albert Peter Shahid, Jr., Shahid Law Office, Charleston, SC, Stephen M. Slotchiver, Slotchiver and Slotchiver LLP, Mount Pleasant, SC, for Defendant James J. Brown, II.

J. David Black, Nexsen Pruet Jacobs and Pollard, Columbia, SC, for Defendant Russell L. Bauknight.

John Fisher Beach, Ellis Lawhorne and Sims, Lyndey Ritz Zwing Bryant, Adams and Reese, Columbia, SC, for Defendant David C. Sojourner, Jr.

ORDER AND OPINION

J. Michelle Childs, United States District Judge

This matter is before the court on Defendant Tommie Rae Hynie ("Defendant Hynie"),¹ Defendant James J. Brown, II ("Defendant Brown"), Defendant Russell L. Bauknight ("Defendant Bauknight"), and Defendant David C. Sojourner, Jr.’s ("Defendant Sojourner") (collectively, "Defendants") Motions to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 80, 81, 85, 101.) Defendants’ Motions, primarily seeking dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), require the court to first address novel jurisdictional issues implicating the Copyright Act of 1976's ("the Act") termination provisions, 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304, and then resolve the application of various judicially-created abstention doctrines to claims brought by Plaintiffs Deanna Brown-Thomas, Yamma Brown, Michael D. Brown, Nicole C. Brown, Jeanette Mitchell Bellinger, Sarah LaTonya Fegan, Ciara Pettit, and Cherquarius Williams (collectively, "Plaintiffs"). (See ECF Nos. 80, 81, 85, 101.) Defendant Bauknight's Motion requires the court to settle a remaining ground, involving personal jurisdiction, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). (See ECF No. 80-1.) The court held arguments on these matters on June 19, 2019. (ECF No. 180.) After careful consideration of the filings of Plaintiffs and Defendants, the court DENIES IN PART Defendants Bauknight, Hynie, and Brown's Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 80, 81, 101) under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2).² In addition, the court DENIES the entirety of Defendant Sojourner's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 85).

I. FACTUAL, PROCEDURAL, AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND

A. Relevant Factual Background and State Court Litigation

James J. Brown ("James Brown") was an American singer that was born in Barnwell, South Carolina. See Harry Weinger & Cliff White, Biography About James , JAMES BROWN , http://www.jamesbrown.com/bio (last visited Jan. 20, 2019).³ Some of James Brown's greatest songs include, but are not limited to, the following: "I Got You (I Feel Good)," "Living in America," "Cold Sweat (Part 1)," and "Say it Loud–I'm Black and I'm Proud."⁴ Kirstin Corpuz, James Brown's Biggest Billboard Hot 100 Hits , BILLBOARD (May 3, 2017), https://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/chart-beat/7775674/james-brown-songs-billboard-hot-100-hits. He married Defendant Hynie in December 2001. (ECF No. 1 at 10 ¶ 38.) Through the union of Defendant Hynie and James Brown, Defendant Brown was born in 2001. (ECF No. 81 at 10.) On the morning of December 25, 2006, James Brown died. (ECF No. 1 at 3 ¶ 7.) James Brown's will omitted both Defendant Hynie and Defendant Brown. (Id. at 11 ¶ 41.)

In 2007, Defendant Hynie and Defendant Brown brought challenges to James Brown's will and trust in the state courts of South Carolina. (Id. at 11 ¶ 42.) Defendant Hynie filed for her spousal rights in South Carolina, claiming a statutory elective share and a one-half omitted spouse's share, while Defendant Brown asserted his state statutory child share as a lawful heir. (ECF No. 80-1 at 3.) James Brown's adult children also brought challenges to set aside his will. See Wilson v. Dallas , 403 S.C. 411, 743 S.E.2d 746, 750–51 (S.C. 2013). (See also ECF No. 80-1 at 3; ECF No. 80-2 at 29.) As a result of these collective challenges, James Brown's will was submitted to the Probate Court of Aiken County, South Carolina. (ECF No. 1 at 11 ¶ 42.) Eventually, the Probate Court of Aiken County, South Carolina, transferred the administration of James Brown's estate to the Aiken County Court of Common Pleas. (ECF No. 1 at 11 ¶ 43; ECF No. 80-1 at 4.)

Following extensive litigation in the Aiken County Court of Common Pleas, in 2013, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the trial court's approval of a family settlement regarding James Brown's estate, upheld the removal of several fiduciaries, and remanded the case for the appointment of new fiduciaries. (ECF No. 85 at 4 (citing Wilson , 743 S.E.2d at 768 ).) On October 1, 2013, the Aiken County Court of Common Pleas appointed Defendant Bauknight to serve as the personal representative of the estate and trustee of the trust. (ECF No. 85-1 at 27–29.) On October 10, 2013, Defendant Sojourner was appointed as a limited special administrator of James Brown's estate and tasked with defending the estate against legal challenges. (ECF No. 85-1 at 35–36 ¶¶ 3–4.)

In 2015, the Aiken County Court of Common Pleas determined that Defendant Hynie was the surviving spouse of James Brown. (ECF No. 80-1 at 6.) During that same year, the lower court held that Defendant Brown was the biological son and a lawful heir to James Brown. (ECF No. 101-4.) In 2018, the South Carolina Court of Appeals also held that Defendant Hynie was the surviving spouse of James Brown. See In re Estate of Brown , 424 S.C. 589, 818 S.E.2d 770, 776 (S.C. Ct. App. 2018) ("Therefore, we find the trial court did not err in finding [Defendant Hynie] was married to Brown.").⁵ Currently, Plaintiffs are appealing the spousal status of Defendant Hynie to the South Carolina Supreme Court (ECF No. 151 at 4) and, as represented to the court during a hearing held on June 19, 2019, the parties have completed briefing concerning that matter.⁶ (See ECF No. 180.)

B. Relevant Statutory Provisions: The Copyright Act of 1976

The Copyright Act of 1976 contains two provisions expressly relating to the termination of copyright grants. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c). See also Lydia Pallas Loren, Renegotiating the Copyright Deal in the Shadow of the "Inalienable" Right to Terminate , 62 FLA. L. REV. 1329, 1331 (2010) ("Few people realize that many contracts that purport to transfer ‘all right, title and interest’ in a copyright can be terminated by the author of the copyrighted work after thirty-five years (in some cases), after fifty-six years (in other cases), and sometimes even after seventy-five years."). Congress enacted these statutory provisions to address "the unequal bargaining position of authors, resulting in part from the impossibility of determining a work's value until it has been exploited," and safeguard authors from the "unremunerative transfers" of copyright grants. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976). See also Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder , 469 U.S. 153, 172–73, 105 S.Ct. 638, 83 L.Ed.2d 556 (1985) ("[T]he termination right was expressly intended to relieve authors of the consequences of ill-advised and unremunerative grants that had been made before the author had a fair opportunity to appreciate the true value of his work product." (footnote omitted)); Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Judicial Resistance to Copyright Law's Inalienable Right to Terminate Transfers , 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 227, 227 (2010) ("For a century, Congress has sought to protect authors and their families by allowing them to grant their copyrights for exploitation and then, decades later, recapture those same rights."). As to the special nature of these provisions, the United States Supreme Court has noted that the Copyright Act of 1976 "provides an inalienable termination right" for both authors and his or her statutory heirs. Stewart v. Abend , 495 U.S. 207, 230, 110 S.Ct. 1750, 109 L.Ed.2d 184 (1990) (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304 ).

Section 203 of the Copyright Act of 1976 concerns, besides a work made for hire, "the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of any right under a copyright" made "on or after" January 1, 1978. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a). It only applies to copyright grants executed by the author. Id. § 203(a). As expressly contemplated by this provision, a previous copyright grant may be terminated if certain conditions are met. See id. §§ 203(a)(1)–(5). For example, as one condition, section 203 permits holders of the termination right to only effect termination "during a period of five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution of the grant." See id. § 203(a)(3). Additionally, if an author is deceased, the termination right is intricately divided among an...