Brown-Thomas v. Hynie

• Decision Date: 06 February 2019
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 1:18-cv-02191-JMC
• Citation: 367 F.Supp.3d 452
• Parties: Deanna BROWN-THOMAS, an individual and in her capacity as intestate heir and pending Personal Representative of the estate of her sister, the deceased Venisha Brown; Yamma Brown, an individual; Michael D. Brown, an individual; Nicole C. Brown, an individual; Jeanette Mitchell Bellinger, an individual; Sarah Latonya Fegan, an individual; Ciara Pettit, an individual; and Cherquarius Williams, an individual, Plaintiffs, v. Tommie Rae HYNIE, an individual also known as Tommie Rae Brown; James J. Brown, II, an individual; Russell L. Bauknight, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of James Brown and Trustee of the James Brown I Feel Good Trust; David C. Sojourner, Jr., as the Limited Special Administrator of the Estate of James Brown and Limited Special Trustee of the James Brown I Feel Good Trust; and Does, 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

367 F.Supp.3d 452

Deanna BROWN-THOMAS, an individual and in her capacity as intestate heir and pending Personal Representative of the estate of her sister, the deceased Venisha Brown; Yamma Brown, an individual; Michael D. Brown, an individual; Nicole C. Brown, an individual; Jeanette Mitchell Bellinger, an individual; Sarah Latonya Fegan, an individual; Ciara Pettit, an individual; and Cherquarius Williams, an individual, Plaintiffs,

v.Tommie Rae HYNIE, an individual also known as Tommie Rae Brown; James J. Brown, II, an individual; Russell L. Bauknight, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of James Brown and Trustee of the James Brown I Feel Good Trust; David C. Sojourner, Jr., as the Limited Special Administrator of the Estate of James Brown and Limited Special Trustee of the James Brown I Feel Good Trust; and Does, 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants.

Civil Action No.: 1:18-cv-02191-JMC

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Aiken Division.

Signed February 6, 2019

Alyson Smith Podris, Robert C. Byrd, Parker Poe Adams and Bernstein LLP, Charleston, SC, Douglas A. Fretty, Pro Hac Vice, Marc Toberoff, Pro Hac Vice, Toberoff and Associates PC, Malibu, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Arnold Samuel Goodstein, Goodstein Law Firm, Summerville, SC, Robert Neil Rosen, Susan Corner Rosen, Rosen Law Firm, Albert Peter Shahid, Jr., Shahid Law Office, Stephen M. Slotchiver, Slotchiver and Slotchiver, Charleston, SC, S. Alan Medlin, Medlin Law Office, Howard Bryant Stravitz, Pro Hac Vice, USC School of Law, J. David Black, Nexsen Pruet Jacobs and Pollard, John Fisher Beach, Ellis Lawhorne and Sims, Lyndey Ritz Zwing Bryant, Adams and Reese, Columbia, SC, for Defendants.

ORDER

J. Michelle Childs, United States District Judge"[F]or it is procedure that marks much of the difference between rule by law and rule by fiat."¹

This matter is before the court for review of Defendant Tommie Rae Hynie ("Defendant Hynie")² and Defendant James J. Brown, II's ("Defendant Brown") Motions to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 81, 101.) Defendant Hynie's Motion was filed on September 11, 2018, while Defendant Brown's Motion was filed on August 10, 2018. (ECF Nos. 81, 101.) Within their Motions to Dismiss, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs Deanna Brown-Thomas, Yamma Brown, Michael D. Brown, Jeanette Mitchell Bellinger, Sarah LaTonya Fegan, Ciara Pettit, and Cherquarius Williams's (collectively, "Plaintiffs") Complaint (ECF No. 1) must be dismissed for insufficient service of process under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5). (ECF No. 81 at 20; ECF No. 101 at 13.) The court held arguments on this matter on January 22, 2019. (ECF No. 144.) For the reasons stated herein, the court DENIES IN PART Defendant Hynie's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 81) and Defendant Brown's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 101), both under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5). However, the court ORDERS Plaintiffs to properly serve Defendant Hynie and Defendant Brown pursuant to the provisions of the Hague Convention and laws of the United Kingdom within one hundred twenty (120) days.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

James J. Brown ("James Brown") was an American singer that was born in Barnwell, South Carolina. See Harry Weinger & Cliff White, Biography About James , JAMES BROWN , http://www.jamesbrown.com/bio (last visited Jan. 20, 2019).³ He married Defendant Hynie in December 2001. (ECF No. 1 at 10 ¶ 38.)

Through the union of Defendant Hynie and James Brown, Defendant Brown was born in 2001. (ECF No. 81 at 10.) On the morning of December 25, 2006, James Brown died. (ECF No. 1 at 3 ¶ 7.) James Brown's will omitted Defendant Hynie and Defendant Brown. (Id. at 11 ¶ 41.) In 2007, Defendant Hynie and Defendant Brown brought challenges to James Brown's will and trust. (Id. at 11 ¶ 42.) Defendant Hynie filed for her spousal rights in South Carolina, which would have entitled her to a statutory elective share and a one-half omitted spouse's share, while Defendant Brown asserted his state statutory child share as a lawful heir. (ECF No. 80-1 at 3.) James Brown's adult children also brought challenges to set aside his will. See Wilson v. Dallas , 403 S.C. 411, 743 S.E.2d 746, 750–51 (2013). (See also ECF No. 80-1 at 3; ECF No. 80-2 at 29.) As a result of these collective challenges, James Brown's will was submitted to the Probate Court of Aiken County, South Carolina. (ECF No. 1 at 11 ¶ 42.) Eventually, the Probate Court of Aiken County, South Carolina, transferred the administration of James Brown's estate to the Aiken County Court of Common Pleas. (ECF No. 1 at 11 ¶ 43; ECF No. 80-1 at 4.)

Following litigation in the Aiken County Court of Common Pleas, in 2013, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the trial court's approval of a family settlement regarding James Brown's estate, upheld the removal of several fiduciaries, and remanded the case for the appointment of new fiduciaries. (ECF No. 85 at 4 (citing Wilson , 743 S.E.2d at 768 ).) On October 1, 2013, the Aiken County Court of Common Pleas appointed Defendant Russell L. Bauknight ("Defendant Bauknight") to serve as the personal representative of the estate and trustee of the trust. (ECF No. 85-1 at 27–29.) On October 10, 2013, Defendant David C. Sojourner, Jr. ("Defendant Sojourner") was appointed as a limited special administrator of James Brown's estate and tasked with defending the estate against challenges. (ECF No. 85-1 at 35–36 ¶¶ 3–4.)

In 2015, the Aiken County Court of Common Pleas determined that Defendant Hynie was the surviving spouse of James Brown. (ECF No. 80-1 at 6.) During that same year, the lower court held that Defendant Brown was the biological son and a lawful heir to James Brown. (ECF No. 101-4.) In 2018, the South Carolina Court of Appeals also held that Defendant Hynie was the surviving spouse of James Brown. See In re Estate of Brown , 424 S.C. 589, 818 S.E.2d 770, 776 (S.C. Ct. App. 2018) ("Therefore, we find the trial court did not err in finding [Defendant Hynie] was married to Brown.").⁴ Currently, Plaintiffs are appealing the spousal status of Defendant Hynie to the South Carolina Supreme Court.⁵

Plaintiffs originally filed their Complaint on January 12, 2018, in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. (ECF No. 1.) First, Plaintiffs seek relief from the court under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304, and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. (Id. at 20–22 ¶¶ 74–77.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have "conspired ... to usurp [their] rights and interests in [James] Brown's [c]ompositions." (Id. at 4 ¶ 13.) Plaintiffs seek a declaration establishing that a "Settlement Agreement" or any "Concealed Terms," specifically among Defendants, is unenforceable and void as a matter of law. (Id. at 21 ¶ 76.) Plaintiffs believe that Defendants have wrongfully deprived them of their termination interests pursuant to a Settlement Agreement and Concealed Terms and failed to comply with the appropriate procedures of the Copyright Act. (Id. at 17, 20–21 ¶¶ 60–62, 75–76.) Further, Plaintiffs maintain that they are "entitled to a preliminary injunction during the pendency of this action, and thereafter to a permanent injunction...." (Id. at 22 ¶ 77.) Secondly, Plaintiffs bring a range of claims arising under South Carolina law. (Id. at 22–31 ¶¶ 78–114.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege the following state law claims: (1) accounting; (2) conversion; (3) unjust enrichment; (4) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; (5) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage; and (6) common law unfair competition. (Id. at 22–23, 27–28, 30 ¶¶ 79, 84, 97, 102, 109.) The United States District Court for the Central District of California transferred this matter to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina on August 7, 2018. (ECF No. 70.)

Defendant Hynie filed her Motion to Dismiss on September 11, 2018. (ECF No 81.) Defendant Brown filed his Motion to Dismiss on October 10, 2018. (ECF No. 101.) Within their Motions to Dismiss, Defendants bring legal challenges to the court's subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). (ECF No. 81 at 12–18; ECF No. 101 at 4–10.) In addition, Defendants allege that they were improperly served under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f), requiring dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5). (ECF No. 81 at 20; ECF No. 101 at 13.) As it relates to insufficient service of process, Defendant Hynie and Defendant Brown, both of whom reside in the United Kingdom,⁶ maintain that Plaintiffs failed to comply with the prescribed methods of service authorized by the Hague Convention. (ECF No. 81 at 20; ECF No. 101 at 13.) Plaintiffs responded to Defendant Hynie and Defendant Brown's Motions to Dismiss on October 4, 2018, and October 24, 2018, respectively. (ECF Nos. 96, 111.) Plaintiffs submit that Defendant Hynie and Defendant Brown's claims concerning insufficient service of process are meritless because they were properly served pursuant to the laws of the United Kingdom. (ECF No. 96 at 23; ECF No. 111 at 28.) Critical to their argument, Plaintiffs contend that they could serve Defendant Hynie and Defendant Brown under any method permitted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f). (ECF No. 96 at 24; ECF No. 111 at 29.)

On January 22, 2019, the court heard arguments from Plaintiffs and Defendants regarding the sufficiency of process under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 144.) Although Defendants were conspicuously silent as to whether service of process was proper as to Defendant Brown, they forcefully maintained that service of process was improper as to Defendant Hynie. Nevertheless, Defendants requested that the court dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint for insufficient service of process as to both Defendant Hynie and Defendant Brown. By contrast, Plaintiffs continued to argue that service of process was proper as to both Defendant Hynie...