Brown v. APL Mar.
| Docket Number | 22-cv-06999-DMR |
| Decision Date | 01 August 2023 |
| Parties | QUENTIN M. BROWN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. APL MARITIME LTD., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS, TO STRIKE, AND FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
Re: Dkt. Nos. 35, 51
Defendant APL Marine Services Ltd. (“APL”) moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss Plaintiff Quentin M. Brown's first amended complaint (“FAC”).[1]Defendant Yasin Berber moves to dismiss the FAC's fifth and sixth claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. He also moves pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(e) and 12(f) to strike or obtain a more definite statement as to the FAC's third claim for sexual assault, sexual battery, and sexual harassment. The court held a hearing on May 31, 2023. For the reasons stated below, APL and Berber's motions to dismiss are granted in part and denied in part. Berber's motion for a more definite statement is granted. The motion to strike is denied as moot.
Brown makes the following allegations in the FAC, all of which are taken as true for purposes of the motions to dismiss.[2] On or about November 21, 2021, Brown began working as a seaman and wiper aboard the M/V President Wilson. FAC ¶ 54. Three days later, Defendant Yasin Berber, a reefer technician aboard the ship, began subjecting Brown to “relentless, exhausting and damaging emotional and physical advances.” Id. ¶¶ 65, 68. Specifically, Berber's conduct included “gawking [Brown] in a sexually suggestive manner,” “panting, pinching, or intentionally rubbing against [Brown],” “making sexual gestures,” “unwelcome sexual advances,” “sexual or suggestive comments,” “suggestive gazes or sneers,” “blocking [Brown]'s way through doors,” and “sexual physical contact against [Brown]'s will.” Id. ¶ 69. Brown alleges that a week later, on December 2, 2021, Berber “shoved his hand down [Brown]'s pants, forcibly inserting a finger inside [his] anal area” without consent. Id. ¶ 70.
Throughout his tenure aboard the vessel, Brown was supervised by several managers, including First Assistant Engineer Juan Carlos Roberts, Chief Engineer Paul Hudson, Captain Paul Sallee, and Captain Mark Remijan. FAC ¶¶ 57-60. Brown alleges that these supervisors had the power to promote, demote, fire, approve raises, and set schedule and hours for himself and Berber. Id. According to Brown, these supervisors knew or should have known about Berber's conduct but nevertheless assigned Brown to work in close proximity to Berber. Id. ¶¶ 67, 72. Brown claims that supervisors and crewmembers witnessed Berber's improper interactions, harassment, and unwelcome advances to Brown in the coffee room and at the ship's mess hall. Id. ¶¶ 72.
Brown alleges that he reported the December 2, 2021 incident to Chief Engineer Paul Hudson, but Hudson failed to file a report, investigate the allegations, or otherwise take any corrective measures. Id. ¶ 76. When Brown followed up with Hudson on December 14, 2021, he alleges that he was discouraged from filing a complaint against Berber. Id. ¶ 80. According to Brown, Hudson willingly ignored or failed to take his reporting seriously because of Brown's sex; that is, because Brown, a male, reported workplace harassment, sexual assault, and rape by Berber, another male. Id. ¶¶ 77, 81. For the remainder of his employment aboard the M/V President Wilson, Brown alleges that he was a victim of retaliatory harassment. Id. ¶ 79.
Brown alleges that a day after the incident, he reported in writing to Captain Paul Sallee that Hudson was mishandling his complaints. FAC ¶ 82. Shortly thereafter, on December 16, 2021, Brown and Hudson were summoned to meet with Sallee. Id. ¶ 83. On their way to the meeting, Hudson threatened to retaliate against Brown, stating that upon the vessel's return to Oakland, California, Brown's position would be eliminated. Id. During the meeting itself, Sallee stated that he had lost Brown's written report. Id. ¶ 85. Like Hudson, Sallee failed to investigate Brown's allegations or take any corrective measures against Berber. Id. ¶ 86. On the same day, Brown asserts that he submitted his complaints by e-mail to the designated shoreside supervisor, Captain Mark Remijan, who also failed to act on Brown's allegations. Id. ¶¶ 87, 88. According to Brown, his complaints were not addressed at any time between December 16, 2021 and January 2, 2022;[3] instead, he experienced retaliation and verbal attacks by crewmembers. Id. ¶¶ 89-90.
On January 2, 2022, Brown met with Captain Paul Sallee for the second time. FAC ¶ 91. Sallee explained that he had spoken to the personnel department, who agreed that Brown should take a psychological evaluation - booked and paid for by Brown - “in order to make the next voyage.” Id. Sallee also stated that Brown “did not fit the dynamics of the ship” and informed him that Berber would remain on the ship. Id. Sallee reiterated that Brown did not fit the ship's dynamics on January 10, 2022. Id. ¶ 92. Brown claims that he was constructively discharged as a result of supervisors' and crewmembers' actions. Id. ¶ 93.
Brown filed the complaint against Defendants on November 8, 2022, and the operative complaint on March 1, 2023. [Docket Nos. 1, 28.] Brown alleges five claims against APL: (1) negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 et seq.; (2) unseaworthiness; (3) discrimination, retaliation, and malicious acts in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress. APL now moves to dismiss all claims.
Brown also asserts three claims against Berber: (1) intentional tort of sexual assault, sexual battery, and sexual harassment; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Berber moves to dismiss Brown's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and to strike Brown's claim for intentional tort of sexual assault, sexual battery, and sexual harassment. If Brown files a second amended complaint, Berber seeks an order requiring Brown to provide a more definite statement as to that claim.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (2007) (citation omitted), and may dismiss a claim “only where there is no cognizable legal theory” or there is an absence of “sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim to relief.” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)) (quotation marks omitted). A claim has facial plausibility when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). In other words, the facts alleged must demonstrate “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)); see Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that a court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” A matter is “immaterial” when it “has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded, while ‘[i]mpertinent' matter consists of statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question.” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993), rev'd on other grounds by Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994). The function of a Rule 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that arises from litigating spurious issues by dispensing of those issues before trial, and such a motion may be appropriate where it will streamline the ultimate resolution of the action. Fantasy, 984 F.2d at 1527-28.
“A motion to strike should be granted if it will eliminate serious risks of prejudice to the moving party, delay, or confusion of issues.” Lee v. Hertz Corp., 330 F.R.D. 557, 560 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Fantasy, 984 F.2d at 1528). “Motions to strike are regarded with disfavor [ ] because of the limited importance of pleadings in federal practice and because they are often used solely to delay proceedings.” Capella Photonics, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 77 F.Supp.3d 850, 858 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (quotation omitted). “The grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the pleading under attack,” and “the Court must view the pleading under attack in the light more favorable to the pleader when ruling upon a motion to strike.” Amini Innovation Corp. v. McFerran Home Furnishings, Inc., 301 F.R.D. 487, 489 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (citations omitted).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) provides that “a party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” These motions are “disfavored and rarely...
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