Brown v. Astrue
| Decision Date | 20 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 10-cv-04826 NC |
| Parties | SARAH W. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Plaintiff Sarah W. Brown seeks judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision denying plaintiff's claim for benefits as either a "wife" or "divorced wife" under Title II of the Social Security Act. Both parties move for summary judgment. The central issue presented is whether Social Security's denial of benefits was based on substantial evidence and was free of legal error.
Because the Commissioner's conclusion was supported by substantial evidence and was free of legal error, the Court GRANTS SSA's motion for summary judgment as to denial of "divorced wife" benefits. As to the denial of "wife" benefits, however, the Court finds this decision was not free of legal error. Accordingly, the Court DENIES both parties' motions for summary judgment with regard to "wife" benefits and remands the case to the Commissioner to redetermine whether plaintiff was validly married at the time she filed her benefits application.
On April 4, 2007, plaintiff filed an application for wife's old-age insurance benefits on the record of wage earner Holmes C. Brown. (AR 17, 21.) In her application, plaintiff stated that she married Mr. Brown on July 22, 1964, and that, while a divorce had been granted in 1974, the divorce had thereafter been ruled invalid. (AR 17, 20-21.) Accordingly, plaintiff claimed, she remained married to Mr. Brown. (AR 17, 21.)
On May 21, 2007, the SSA denied plaintiff's request for the old-age benefits associated with Mr. Brown. (AR 22.) The SSA concluded that because plaintiff was not validly married to Mr. Brown at the time she filed her application, she was not entitled to benefits. (See AR 22.) The SSA explained that despite plaintiff having "filed cases in court to have this divorce declared void," plaintiff failed to submit proof that any court had found in her favor.1 Id. Such proof, the SSA advised, would be required in order for plaintiff to receive wife's benefits. Id.
Having determined that plaintiff's marriage ended in divorce, the SSA considered plaintiff's eligibility as a divorced wife. Id. For such purposes, a "divorced wife" is a woman divorced from an insured individual, but only if she had been married to that individual "for a period of 10 years immediately before the date the divorce became effective." 42 U.S.C. § 416(d)(1). The SSA found that plaintiff married Brown in July 1964, and that the marriage subsequently ended by divorce in December 1973. (AR 22.) As such, plaintiff's marriage did not meet the statutorily required ten-year minimum. Id. Accordingly, the SSA found her ineligible for benefits as a divorced wife. Id.
On plaintiff's request for reconsideration, SSA reviewed plaintiff's claim for benefits under the "divorced wife" standard. (AR 26.) It concluded she was ineligiblefor "divorced wife" benefits because the marriage did not last ten years. (AR 26.)
Plaintiff next sought administrative review of the agency's decision. (AR 244-93.) At a February 26, 2008 hearing before Administrative Law Judge Alberto E. Gonzalez, plaintiff maintained that she remained married to Mr. Brown and, therefore, that the SSA improperly construed her claim as one for divorced wife's benefits. (AR 278.)
At the hearing, plaintiff alleged that the interlocutory divorce decree granted in December of 1973 (and made final in June of 1974) was void for lack of personal jurisdiction. (AR 262-77.) The crux of plaintiff's argument was that during the time of the divorce proceedings initiated by Mr. Brown in the District of Columbia, plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric care overseas and had no knowledge of, and did not participate in, the proceedings. (AR 13.) Plaintiff claimed that procedural defects in the divorce decree constituted "substantive legal errors of fraudulent dimension," rendering the divorce decree invalid. (Pl.'s Am. Compl. at 4; AR 262-77.) Plaintiff asserted that she therefore remained validly married to Mr. Brown. (AR 278.)
On April 23, 2008, the ALJ issued its decision, finding that plaintiff and Mr. Brown were married on July 22, 1964 and became divorced on June 27, 1974 by virtue of the interlocutory divorce decree issued six months earlier. (AR 12-13.) The ALJ therefore analyzed plaintiff's claim according to the eligibility requirements of a divorced spouse and concluded that benefits were properly denied because at the time the divorce became final, plaintiff and Mr. Brown had been married for one month short of the ten-year requirement. (AR 13.) The ALJ explained that analyzing plaintiff's claim as one for divorced spouse's benefits was the appropriate course because consideration of her status as the insured's wife would require review of the divorce decree, which the ALJ concluded it lacked authority to do. (AR 13-14.) The ALJ made this determination for the following reasons: (1) under Supreme Court precedent, federal courts do not havejurisdiction over divorce decrees (AR 13.); (2) no case law supports the proposition that the ALJ has authority to review or overturn a divorce decree (AR 14.); (3) plaintiff unsuccessfully argued the alleged invalidity of the divorce decree to multiple federal courts (AR 13-14.); and (4) the SSA's regulations make clear that the ALJ's authority is limited to reviewing administrative actions, i.e., initial determinations made by the SSA, which the divorce decree was not. (AR 14.) The ALJ's decision became final on July 30, 2010 when the SSA Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review. (AR 3-6.)
A district court has the "power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the case for a rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Commissioner's decision "should only be disturbed if it is not supported by substantial evidence or it is based on legal error." Hermes v. Sec'y of HHS, 926 F.2d 789, 790 (9th Cir. 1991) (quotations and citation omitted). The ALJ's determinations of law are reviewed de novo, although deference is owed to a reasonable construction of the applicable statutes. McNatt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000).
While a reviewing court's task is typically limited to determining whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it is equally important for the court to ensure that proper legal standards were applied. See Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978). Where a reviewing court determines that the Commissioner's findings are in fact not free of legal error, "[r]emand for further administrative proceedings is appropriate if enhancement of the record would be useful." Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004).
In order to receive old-age benefits as the wife of an insured wage earner, a claimant must be the "wife" of the insured as defined by the Act and its regulations. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b); 416(b), (h)(1)(A). Under 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A), one's status as a wife is determined by the law of the state in which the insured is domiciled at the time the application is filed. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A). Specifically, for eligibility purposes, an applicant is considered the wife of the insured if courts of the state in which the insured is domiciled would find that the applicant and the insured were validly married at the time the application was filed. Id.
The ALJ relied upon Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992); and Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582 (1859) as support for the decision to decline review of plaintiff's divorce decree. (AR 13.) This decision constitutes legal error.
These cases concern the reach of two judicially-created exceptions to the exercise of federal diversity jurisdiction - the domestic relations and probate exceptions. See Marshall, 547 U.S. at 308. Specifically, the domestic relations exception strips federal courts of the power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees even though the parties may meet the amount in controversy and diversity requirements. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703. Because this case involves the interpretation of federal law (the Social Security Act and its regulations), it arises within the context of the federal question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as opposed to the diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
As the Ninth Circuit explained in Atwood v. Fort Peck Tribal Court Assiniboine, 513 F.3d 943, 947 (9th Cir. 2008), the "domestic relations" exception is inapplicable to federal question cases. The court explained that, "[a]lthough Ankenbrandt did not addresswhether the exception applies to the federal question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the reme Court's reasoning plainly does not apply to that statute." 513 F.3d at 947. The Ninth Circuit therefore aligned with the Fourth and Fifth Circuits in expressly holding that "the domestic relations exception applies only to the diversity jurisdiction statute." Id. (citations omitted). As this case arises under the federal question jurisdiction statute, the domestic-relations exception has no application here. In sum, the ALJ erred as a matter of law in concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to determine marital status for purposes of assessing a party's entitlement to social security benefits.
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