Brown v. Baskin

• Decision Date: 26 November 1948
• Docket Number: No. 1964.,1964.
• Citation: 80 F. Supp. 1017
• Parties: BROWN v. BASKIN et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

80 F. Supp. 1017

BROWN v. BASKIN et al.

No. 1964.

United States District Court E. D. South Carolina. Charleston Division.

November 26, 1948.

Harold R. Boulware, of Columbia, S. C., Edward R. Dudley, Thurgood Marshall and Constance Baker Motley, all of New York City, for plaintiff.

Robert McC. Figg, Jr., of Charleston, S. C., Sidney S. Tison, of Bennettsville, S. C., Eugene S. Blease, of Newberry, S. C., George Warren, of Hampton, S. C., Price & Poag and Jas. H. Price, all of Greenville, and Thomas A. Babb, of Laurens, S. C., for defendant.

WARING, Chief Judge.

The plaintiff in this action is a Negro residing in Beaufort County, South Carolina, a native born citizen of the United States, more than 21 years of age, who is a duly and legally qualified elector under the Constitution and laws of the United States and of the State of South Carolina, has paid his poll tax and is subject to none of the disqualifications provided for voting under the laws of the Nation or the State. He signed the books of enrollment of the Democratic Party in South Carolina, but subsequently his name was erased therefrom and the party officials informed him that he would not be permitted to enroll as a member of the party, and that he could participate in the primary elections to be held in South Carolina only as provided in the rules and provisions adopted by the Democratic Party in its 1948 convention.

This action was brought against William P. Baskin, State Chairman of the Democratic Party of South Carolina and a large number of other parties, some of whom were members of the State Executive Committee and some of whom were the Chairmen of the various county committees.

The matter came on for a hearing on a prayer for a temporary injunction and resulted in an Order granting such injunction based upon the opinion, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed July 20, 1948. See Brown v. Baskin, D. C., 78 F.Supp. 933. The injunction Order was modified in some particulars by Order filed July 22, 1948.

The matter now comes before me on the prayer of the complaint for an Order of permanent injunction. At the hearing in July the County Chairmen of three counties of South Carolina made returns showing that they had fully complied with the law and on the showing made were dismissed as party defendants. At the hearing for permanent injunction the County Chairman of Ridgeland County has made a like showing and has been dismissed by separate Order. The case remains for consideration against the other defendants.

All of the facts are quite fully set out in the Opinion referred to and need not be repeated here. At the hearing a stipulation was entered into that all of the testimony taken on the application for a preliminary injunction should be considered and various other facts and conditions were stipulated. The Court will take judicial notice of the fact that the temporary injunction was obeyed by the parties and that a primary election was had and no reports of violation were made to this Court. It is a matter of common knowledge that a large number of Negroes voted after having been enrolled as provided in the Order for Preliminary Injunction. No new facts or circumstances were introduced at this hearing and the matter was submitted after argument.

On behalf of the defendants it was argued that the form of oath and rules that had heretofore been adopted by the State Party (see opinion in Brown v. Baskin, supra 78 F.Supp. at pages 936, 937) were fully justified and not forbidden by any rule of law. The argument is in great part based upon the private club theory, namely that the State Democratic Party not being now covered by any statutes of the State of South Carolina, was and is a private organization that could make its own rules and by-laws; and that this Court did not have the power or authority to rule as to who should be admitted whether on racial or other grounds. But the private club theory has been completely outlawed and demolished by the decisions resulting from a case brought a little over a year ago in this court, see Elmore v. Rice, D.C., 72 F. Supp. 516; Rice v. Elmore, 4 Cir., 165 F.2d 387, certiorari denied 333 U.S. 875, 68 S. Ct. 905, and while the attorneys for the defendants state that they realize this Court is bound to and will follow those decisions, they still maintain that they do not believe they were justified, and that the rules adopted by the convention of the Democratic State Party were not in conflict with the Constitution and Laws of the United States. I hold distinctly otherwise. And so no real attempt has been made to justify the rules as to qualifications for voting and enrolling, namely Rules No. 6 and No. 7, quoted in full in the opinion in the case above cited 78 F.Supp. at page 936.

But on behalf of the Committee it is still argued that there is justification of the oath required prospective enrollees upon the ground that the party authorities had a right to require a declaration of principles and to require an oath from prospective members pledging their allegiance to the principles of the Democratic Party of South Carolina in supporting the social, religious and educational separation of races and also in the principles of States Rights and that the enrollee is opposed to "the proposed Federal so-called FEPC law."

As discussed in my former opinion in this case considering the rules and proposed oath, it is crystal clear that there was and could be but one reason for the adoption of the same, namely the classification of voters according to their being white or Negro, resulting in having two different methods of qualifications for voting and further resulting in the complete denial to one group of membership in the party and no voice in its management or the election of its officials or even a representation in its precinct, county or state gatherings or conventions. To say that these rules conform or even pretend to conform to the law as laid down in the case of Elmore v. Rice is an absurdity. Under the rules adopted by the State Party a Negro could never become a member, could never attend any meeting, could never have any vote in the election of the officials in charge of the party affairs, could never have a vote or even a voice in the adoption of rules, platforms or any part whatsoever in the government of the party. In...