Brown v. Bd. of Trs. Sealy Indep. Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 09 May 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 11–cv–1755.
• Citation: 871 F.Supp.2d 581
• Parties: Roshonda R. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES SEALY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

871 F.Supp.2d 581

Roshonda R. BROWN, Plaintiff,

v.BOARD OF TRUSTEES SEALY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 11–cv–1755.

United States District Court,

S.D. Texas,

Houston Division.

May 9, 2012.

Murray Edward Malakoff, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.

Andrew David Clark, Austin, TX, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KEITH P. ELLISON, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 30), filed on behalf of the Board of Trustees Sealy Independent School District and Scott Kana. After considering the motion, the responses thereto, and the applicable law, the Court finds that Defendant's motion must be PARTIALLY GRANTED and PARTIALLY DENIED. Plaintiff may proceed solely on her Title VII and Texas Commission on Human Rights Act claims brought against the Sealy ISD Board of Trustees.

I. BACKGROUND

Roshonda Brown (“Plaintiff” or “Brown”), an African American woman, worked as a teacher in the Sealy Independent School District (“Sealy ISD” or “SISD”) system for fourteen years.¹ (Complaint (“Compl.”), Doc. No. 25, ¶¶ 1, 26.) After graduating from college and receiving her teaching certificate, Brown taught math and biology classes for eight years at Sealy High School, her alma mater. ( Id. ¶¶ 20, 22.) In addition to her teaching duties, Brown served as a sponsor for the Sealy High School cheerleading team and as a bus driver. ( Id. ¶ 21.) In 2004, Brown was transferred from Sealy High School to Selman Elementary School, an elementary school within SISD. ( Id. ¶ 23.) At Selman, Brown taught physical education courses and also served as head coach for the Sealy High School cross country and track teams. ( Id. ¶¶ 23–24.) Over the course of her employment, Brown received “positive” and “meets or exceeds expectations” reviews in all categories of professional evaluations. ( Id. ¶ 26.) In 2010, after a total of fourteen years as a teacher in the Sealy ISD system, Brown was terminated. ( Id. ¶ 27.)

At some point during her career, Brown began to suffer from attention deficit hyperactive disorder (“ADHD”), which affects her short-term memory and her ability to concentrate. ( Id. ¶ 73.) Brown told Dale Lechler (“Lechler”), her immediate supervisor, about her ADHD and the fact that she was on medication for the condition. ( Id. ¶ 84.) According to the Complaint, the Sealy ISD Board of Trustees (“Board”) was aware of Brown's condition through Lechler, who also served as a trustee on the Board, but the Board did not give Brown any lesser sanction apart from termination when her case came ultimately came before the Board. ( Id. ¶ 85.)

Brown alleges that she was the subject of a series of suspensions and reprimands that stemmed from a single incident occurring in late 2009. ( Id. ¶ 28.) In December 2009, Brown observed Scott Kana (“Kana”), the assistant superintendent ² of Sealy ISD, intoxicated at a school function on SISD property. ( Id.) Brown claims she was not the only individual to have observed Kana intoxicated. ( Id. ¶ 34.) Concerned “about the example and appearance that a high level administrator would set for the faculty, employees, and students of [Sealy ISD],” Brown reported what she believed to be Kana's state of intoxication to Pamela Morris, the superintendent at the time. ( Id. ¶ 31.) In the months following her report, Brown became the subject of a series of disciplinary actions. ( Id.) In total, Brown was the subject of nine different adverse disciplinary actions in the three month period between January and March 2011.³

On January 5, 2010, Brown received a municipal court citation for Class C theft under the Texas Penal Code.⁴ ( Id. ¶ 75.) On January 14, 2010, Brown received her first written reprimand from Sealy ISD. ( Id. ¶ 37.) The reprimand was for Brown's failure to notify her supervisor of the Class C citation. ( Id. ¶ 38.) On January 29, 2010, Brown received another reprimand directing her to refrain from engaging in further acts of moral turpitude. ( Id. ¶ 39.) On February 10 and February 17, 2010, Brown's immediate supervisor sent her memorandums directing her to report to work every day and to follow established procedures for taking a personal or sick day. ( Id. ¶ 40.) On February 26, 2010, Brown received another written reprimand for failing to fulfill her teaching duties; the reprimand stated that Brown had been absent from her duties for a twenty-five minute period. ( Id. ¶ 42.) Following the reprimand, Brown received a memorandum directing her to avoid further absences and perform her teaching duties. ( Id. ¶ 43.) On the same day, February 26, Brown was suspended with pay and ordered not to report to work until March 1, 2010. ( Id. ¶ 45.)

On March 1, 2010, Brown received a second Class C citation for theft. ⁵( Id. ¶ 48.) Brown reported for work on March 2, 2010, and received a suspension based on the citation and Sealy ISD's need to investigate the incident. ( Id. ¶ 47.) After returning from the suspension on March 5, Brown was issued another letter of suspension, this time with pay, on March 8, 2010. ( Id. ¶ 49.) The reason given for the suspension was Sealy ISD's need to further investigate Brown's March theft citation. ( Id. ¶ 51.) On March 22, 2010, Brown received another suspension from her supervisor, notifying her that her suspension was extended, with pay, until March 23, 2010 and directing Brown to report to her supervisor on March 24, 2010. ( Id. ¶¶ 52–53.) The justifications for the suspension were dual: Sealy ISD wished to further investigate Plaintiff's March 1 citation and, additionally, Kana was appointed as interim superintendent for Sealy ISD. ( Id. ¶¶ 52, 59.)

On March 29, 2010, Brown again received a written reprimand from her immediate supervisor. The reprimand concluded that Brown had engaged in acts of “moral turpitude,” including violations of Sealy ISD policies and the Code of Ethics and Standard Practices for Texas Educators. ( Id. ¶ 57.) On March 30, 2010, Brown was again suspended—this time directly by Kana. ( Id. ¶ 61.) During Brown's suspension, which lasted until April 5, 2010, Kana recommended that the Sealy Board of Trustees “undertake further adverse personnel actions” against Brown. ( Id. ¶ 62.) Acting on Kana's recommendations, the Board of Trustees suspended Brown without pay and proposed the termination of her two-year teaching contract. ( Id. ¶ 63.)

Brown appealed the recommendation to the Texas Education Agency's hearing examiner presiding over her case. ( Id. ¶ 64.) The hearing examiner “noted Plaintiff's differential treatment when compared with the disciplinary actions meted out to other [Sealy ISD] employees with graver infractions” and recommended that the Board of Trustees consider reinstating Brown. ( Id. ¶ 66.) Instead, the Board of Trustees terminated Brown on June 17, 2010. ( Id. ¶ 67.) Following her termination, Brown filed an employment discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). On February 1, 2011, Plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. (Doc. No. 1, at 12.) Acting pro se, Brown filed her initial complaint on May 6, 2011. (Doc. No. 1.) After obtaining counsel, Brown filed an amended complaint on November 7, 2011.⁶ (Doc. No. 25.)

Plaintiff has sued the Board of Trustees of Sealy Independent School District (“SISD Board Defendants”) and Superintendent Scott Kana (“Kana” or “Defendant Kana”), both in his official and individual capacity (collectively, “the SISD Defendants” or “Defendants”). Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, including both free speech and equal protection violations, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”). Plaintiff asserts all claims against both the SISD Board Defendants and Defendant Kana. ( Id. ¶¶ 14–71, 100–103, 72–99, 104–108.)

On November 21, 2011, the SISD Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 30.) In their motion to dismiss, the Sealy ISD Defendants argue that the Complaint should be dismissed on the following grounds: (1) Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to establish that the subject of her speech involved a matter of public concern sufficient to support her First Amendment retaliation claim; (2) Plaintiff fails to allege a custom or policy as the moving force behind the alleged violations of §§ 1981 and 1983; (3) Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for improper discrimination or retaliation under the ADA; (4) both Plaintiff's ADA and Title VII claims cannot be asserted against Kana in his individual or official capacity; (5) the doctrine of qualified immunity requires dismissal of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Defendant Kana; and (6) Plaintiff's TCHRA claims cannot be maintained against Kana in his individual capacity.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the “court accepts ‘all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’ ” Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir.2004) (quoting Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir.1999)). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges a complaint on the basis that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a defendant's motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim has the requisite facial plausibility “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Mere “labels and conclusions” or “formulaic recitation [s] of the elements of a cause of...