Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka
Decision Date | 17 May 1954 |
Docket Number | No. 4,No. 1,No. 2,No. 10,1,2,4,10 |
Citation | 38 A.L.R.2d 1180,98 L.Ed. 873,74 S.Ct. 686,347 U.S. 483,53 O.O. 326 |
Parties | BROWN et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, SHAWNEE COUNTY, KAN., et al. BRIGGS et al. v. ELLIOTT et al. DAVIS et al. v. COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY, VA., et al. GEBHART et al. v. BELTON et al. |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Attorneys and Law Firms
Mr.Robert L. Carter, New York City, for appellants Brown and others.
Mr. Paul E. Wilson, Topeka, Kan., for appellees Board of Education of Topeka and others.
Messrs. Spottswood Robinson III, Thurgood Marshall, New York City, for appellants Briggs and Davis and others.
Messrs. John W. Davis,T. Justin Moore, J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Richmond, Va., for appellees Elliott and County School Board of Prince Edward County and others.
Asst. Atty. Gen. J. Lee Rankin for United States amicus curiae by special leave of Court.
Mr. H. Albert Young, Wilmington, Del., for petitioners Gebhart et al.
Mr. Jack Greenberg, Thurgood Marshall, New York City, for respondents Belton et al.
These cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. They are premised on different facts and different local conditions, but a common legal question justifies their consideration together in this consolidated opinion. 1
In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis. In each instance,they have been denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race. This segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases other than the Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called 'separate but equal' doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256. Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate. In the Delaware case, the Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted to the white schools because of their superiority to the Negro schools.
The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not 'equal' and cannot be made 'equal,' and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Because of the obvious importance of the question presented, the Court took jurisdiction.2 Argument was heard in the 1952 Term, and reargument was heard this Term on certain questions propounded by the Court.3
Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, itis not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among 'all persons born or naturalized in the United States.' Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.
An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment's history, with respect to segregated schools, is the status of public education at that time. 4 In the South, the movement toward free common schools, supportedby general taxation, had not yet taken hold. Education of white children was largely in the hands of private groups. Education of Negroes was almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race were illiterate. In fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some states. Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences as well as in the business and professional world. It is true that public school education at the time of the Amendment had advanced further in the North, but the effect of the Amendment on Northern States was generally ignored in the congressional debates. Even in the North, the conditions of public education did not approximate those existing today. The curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded schools were common in rural areas; the school term was but three months a year in many states; and compulsory school attendance was virtually unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising that there should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education.
In the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment, decided shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted it as proscribing all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race. 5 The doctrine of"separate but equal" did not make its appearance in this court until 1896 in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, involving not education but transportation. 6 American courts have since labored with the doctrine for over half a century. In this Court, there have been six cases involving the 'separate but equal' doctrine in the field of public education.7 In Cumming v. Board of Education of Richmond County, 175 U.S. 528, 20 S.Ct. 197, 44 L.Ed. 262, and Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 48 S.Ct. 91, 72 L.Ed. 172, the validity of the doctrine itself was not challenged.8 In more recent cases, all on the graduate schoollevel, inequality was found in that specific benefits enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro students of the same educational qualifications. State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59 S.Ct. 232, 83 L.Ed. 208; Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631, 68 S.Ct. 299, 92 L.Ed. 247; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 70 s.Ct. 848, 94 L.Ed. 1114; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 70 S.Ct. 851, 94 L.Ed. 1149. In none of these cases was it necessary to re-examine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And in Sweatt v. Painter, supra, the Court expressly reserved decision on the question whether Plessy v. Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public education.
In the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings below that the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other 'tangible' factors. 9 Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible factorsin the Negro and white schools involved in each of the cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public education.
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughoutthe Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.
In Sweatt v. Painter, supra (339 U.S. 629, 70 S.Ct. 850), in finding that a segregated law school for Negroes could not provide them equal educational opportunities, this Court relied in large part on 'those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school.' In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, supra (339 U.S. 637, 70 S.Ct. 853), the Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all other students, again resorted to intangible considerations: '* * * his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession.'
Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on their educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Evans v. Buchanan
... ... , 1974, we found unanimously that many schools in Wilmington which were black schools prior to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) ( Brown I ) remained ... ...
-
People ex rel. Lynch v. San Diego Unified School Dist.
... ... In Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 691, 98 L.Ed. 873 (Brown I), the ... ...
-
Mulkey v. Reitman
... ... Warley ... Page 886 ... (1917) 245 U.S. 60, 38 S.Ct. 16, 62 L.Ed. 149; Brown v. Board of Education (1954) 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873; Barrows v. Jackson (1953) ... ...
-
Hiatt v. City of Berkeley
... ... Brown v. Board of Education, supra, [347 U.S. 483], at 492 [74 S.Ct. 686, at 690, 98 L.Ed. 873]; accord, ... ...
-
Supreme Court Hears Oral Argument in Case on Race Conscious Admissions in Higher Education
...protection under the 14th Amendment. Legal Background and Oral Argument Highlights In 1954, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954) 347 U.S. 483, changed the trajectory of U.S. history by prohibiting segregation in public schools. Parties on both sides of oral argument invoked Brown, e......
-
The Ideology of Supreme Court Opinions and Citations
...opinion language and precedential consequences should be considered. 746 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:693 APPENDIX Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956) Pennsylva......
-
Nonbelievers and Government Speech
...and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens”), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions , 69 YALE L.J. 421, 427 (1960) (arguing that the meaning of segregation......
-
Miranda deconstitutionalized: when the Self-Incrimination Clause and the Civil Rights Act collide.
...that the Equal Protection Clause no longer allowed separate but equal education for African-Americans. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). In 1973, the privacy penumbra of the Bill of Rights began protecting a woman from state interference in her decision to terminate her......
-
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE.
...of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 140 (1893). (6) Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled fry Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483(1954). (7) Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205-208 (8) Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). (9) NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES......