Brown v. Bledsoe
| Decision Date | 11 January 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 3:11-CV-986 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
| Parties | PETER BROWN, Petitioner v. B.A. BLEDSOE, WARDEN, Respondent |
(JUDGE NEALON)
(MAGISTRATE JUDGE BLEWITT)
On May 23, 2011, Peter Brown ("Petitioner") filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his 2004 federal sentence from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. (Doc. 1). On May 25, 2011, Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment. (Docs. 4-5). On June 6, 2011, Magistrate Judge Thomas M. Blewitt issued a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") recommending that the habeas petition be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the motion for summary judgment be denied. (Doc. 9). On June 24, 2011, Petitioner filed objections to the R&R. (Doc. 12). For the reasons set forth below, the R&R will be adopted.
In 2003, Petitioner was charged in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana with two (2) counts of unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), arising from evidence obtained during a search of his apartment. See United States v. Brown. 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11914 (S.D. Ind.2004). The trial court denied his motion to suppress. Id. Petitioner was subsequently convicted by a jury of each charge and was sentenced to one hundred eight (108) months imprisonment. See United States v. Brown. 125 Fed. Appx. 51, 52 (7th Cir. 2005). On direct appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the order denying suppression and rejected Petitioner's argument that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Id. Further, the appellate court concluded that any argument that Petitioner's sentence was unconstitutional under Blakely2 and Booker3 would be frivolous because he did not object to the characterization of his previous convictions and because "the existence of a prior conviction need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at p. 54 (citing United States v. Pittman, 388 F.3d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir. 2004)).
On April 12, 2005, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 with the sentencing court. See United States v. Brown, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38834 (S.D. Ind. 2005). The motion was dismissed with prejudice on July 5, 2005. Id. Specifically, the Court denied the motion as it related to any search issues because they were previously litigated. Id. at *2. As to the new claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the District Court held that Petitioner did not satisfy his burden of proof. Id. at *4. Additionally, the Court determined thatbecause the sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum of ten (10) years, a corresponding jury finding pursuant to Apprendi "is beside the point." Id. at *5. Finally, the Court held that Petitioner's suggestion that his state court conviction for reckless homicide was not a "crime of violence" for purposes of applying USSG § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) "is absurd." Id. On appeal, Petitioner's request for a rehearing was denied. See Brown v. United States, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 4472 (7th Cir. 2006).
On May 17, 2007, Petitioner filed a habeas motion in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Brown v. Attorney General of Indiana, 2:07-cv-109 (S.D. Ind. May 17, 2007). He challenged his 1992 state court conviction in Marion County, Indiana for reckless homicide. Id. at (Doc. 19). Petitioner, who had received a state sentence of four (4) years, was discharged when the federal habeas motion was filed. Id. Accordingly, on November 14, 2007, the District Court dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction because Petitioner was not "in custody." Id. More than two (2) years later, Petitioner filed a motion seeking relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1). Id. at (Doc. 41). Petitioner argued that his federal confinement was enhanced by the state court conviction and therefore he did meet the "in custody" requirement. Id. at (Doc. 57). The District Court denied relief. Id. at (Doc. 45). On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that Petitioner failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right and denied his request for a certificate of appealability. Id. at (Doc. 57).
Petitioner again filed a motion to vacate sentence on April 30, 2008, challenging the validity of his 1992 state court conviction for reckless homicide. Brown v. Attorney General of Indiana, 1:08-cv-567 (S.D. Ind. April 30, 2008). On May 16, 2008, the United States DistrictCourt for the Southern District of Indiana determined that the action was brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, rather than section 2255, and directed Petitioner to show cause why the case should not be dismissed as an unauthorized successive habeas petition. Id. at (Doc. 6). Petitioner responded that his motion should be considered a writ of error coram nobis. Id. at (Doc. 8). On May 29, 2008, the Court held that although Petitioner labeled the motion as being filed under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, to avoid his restriction on filing a successive section 2254 motion, the writ is not available to challenge a state conviction. Id. at (Doc. 9). The District Court explained that its decision in Brown v. Attorney General of Indiana, 2:07-cv-109 (S.D. Ind. November 14, 2007), was a ruling on the merits as to trigger the requirements for filing a successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 and that Petitioner failed to meet these limitations. Id.. Therefore, the case was dismissed. Id. Petitioner's request for a certificate of appealability was thereafter denied by the Court of Appeals for his failure to timely pay the docketing fee. Id. at (Doc. 19).
On May 23, 2011, the same day the instant action was filed in this Court, Petitioner also filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. Brown v. Attorney General of Indiana, 1:11-cv-695 (S.D. Ind. May 23, 2011); Brown v. AG of Ind., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93308 (S.D. Ind. 2011). In that case, Petitioner argued that the state breached the 1992 plea agreement. Id. The District Court dismissed the petition on August 18, 2011, as an unauthorized second or successive habeas application. Id. The matter is currently pending on appeal in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at (Docs. 11-15).
In the case at hand, initiated on May 23, 2011, by a petition for writ of habeas corpusunder 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Petitioner alleges that the State of Indiana breached the plea agreement he entered into regarding his 1992 conviction for Reckless Homicide and that this breach invalidated the conviction. (Doc. 1, pp. 8-13). The petition claims that, consequently, the state conviction should not have been used in 2004 by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana to enhance Petitioner's federal sentence. (Id.). Petitioner alleges that he is actually innocent of the sentence enhancement and that he should have received a significantly lower federal sentence. (Id. at pp. 13-18). He further asserts that the Indiana District Court erred in 2007 when it dismissed his prior habeas application based on its finding that he was not "in custody." (Id. at p. 6). Petitioner argues that this Court has jurisdiction to address the Indiana District Court's holding and his 1992 state court conviction in his section 2241 habeas petition because 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of his detention. (Id at pp. 1-8, 18-21).
On June 6, 2011, Magistrate Judge Blewitt filed an R&R concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 2255 governs Petitioner's claims and that the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Petitioner did not obtain permission from the court of appeals to file a successive habeas application. (Doc. 9). Petitioner filed objections to the R&R on June 24, 2011. (Doc. 12).
When objections to a report and recommendation have been filed under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), the district court must make a de novo review of those portions of the report to which specific objections are made. Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1106 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989); Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 6-7 (3d Cir. 1984) (); Mutombo v. Carl, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27124 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (Kane, J.); Cf Cruz v. Chater, 990 F. Supp. 375, 377 (M.D. Pa. 1998) (Vanaskie, J.) (). The district court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and recommendations contained in the report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); M.D. Pa. Local Rule 72.3.
Motions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are the presumptive means by which federal prisoners can challenge their convictions or sentences that are allegedly in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or are otherwise subject to collateral attack. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974); O'Kereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117,122-23 (3d Cir. 2002); Cf 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (). Section 2255 "channels collateral attacks by federal prisoners to the sentencing court rather than to the court in the district of confinement so that they can be addressed more efficiently." Fraser v. Zenk, 90 Fed. Appx. 428, 430 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004), citing United States v. Havman, 342 U.S. 205, 210-19 (1952).
Review of a petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is limited to circumstances where the remedy available...
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