Brown v. Board of Ed. of Morgan County School Dist.

• Decision Date: 28 February 1977
• Docket Number: No. 14468,14468
• Citation: 560 P.2d 1129
• Parties: Lee BROWN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the MORGAN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant andRespondent.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 1129

560 P.2d 1129

Lee BROWN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the MORGAN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT Defendant andRespondent.

No. 14468.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Feb. 28, 1977.

A. M. Ferro and Michael T. McCoy, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.

Merlin R. Lybbert and George A. Hunt, of Worsley, Snow and Christensen, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.

BALLIF, District Judge:

The plaintiff appeals an adverse decision of both the trial judge and of a jury based on their answers to written interrogatories. The case involves the rights of plaintiff, a school teacher in Morgan County, to continued employment with the Board of Education of the Morgan County School District, or the benefit of the 'Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act.' ¹ The plaintiff first signed a contract with defendant in 1971--72 pursuant to which he was the head wrestling coach and assistant football coach and taught several classes. His employment was renewed for the years 1972--73 and 1973--74 and he continued to coach wrestling and football and to teach various subjects for those years. Plaintiff was paid a base annual salary and in addition a percentage of the base for his coaching duties.

The plaintiff was a good teacher and his athletic teams did well in competition. During the course of the 1973--74 year plaintiff did not wish to continue with his coaching responsibilities and wrote a letter to defendant resigning his duties as a coach. The defendant took the position that plaintiff was hired to teach and coach and refused to agree that the duties were separate thus treated the plaintiff's letter as a resignation of all duties. Although meetings concerning plaintiff's employment occurred thereafter, plaintiff did not withdraw his letter of resignation, and litigation ensued.

In the District Court a judgment was entered in favor of defendant wherein the trial court found '. . . as a matter of law the employment contract between plaintiff and defendant was divisible only upon the mutual consent of the parties and the defendant not having consented thereto, the plaintiff's resignation from one part of the contract was a resignation from all of the contract . . .' The effect of the decision is that the plaintiff was not terminated by defendant, but resigned of his own choosing and, therefore, the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act was found not to apply to this case.

Before concluding as above indicated, the court had submitted written interrogatories on the divisibility question to a jury which heard all of the evidence and returned findings consistent with the court's finding on that issue. The plaintiff now seeks a reversal of the trial court's finding, and asks this court to grant him judgment in the amount found by the jury that he was damaged by loss of employment, and to reinstate him as a teacher in the defendant school district.

The question to be decided by this court is whether, as a matter of law, the contract in question is divisible as to teaching and coaching. If it is not, does a review of the record herein support the lower court's judgment of dismissal against plaintiff, where '. . . On appeal the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to sustain the lower court, and the findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly against the weight of the evidence or it manifestly appears that the court misapplied the law to the established facts.' ²

While it is for the court to interpret and assess the meaning of a contract, ³ it is proper for issues of fact to be submitted to a jury. In this case the jury resolved the factual dispute as to effect of plaintiff's letter of January 8, 1974, by finding it a resignation from coaching duties only. However, the effect of such a resignation is for the court to decide after a determination has been made on the question of divisibility.

This court has repeatedly addressed itself to the question of severability of agreements and the enforceability of the parts if severable. Fundamental to such considerations are basic contract principles as to the parties' intent which is derived from looking at the entire contract and the relationship of the parts to the whole and whether it was intended that the total agreement be severable. In exploring a contract on this issue the fact finder '. . . may and should look to extraneous evidence concerning the background and surrounding circumstances in order to make that determination.' ⁴ This view is consistent with that of the Authorities in the field of Contracts, and has been applied recently in the State of Oregon in a case presenting the same questions as here considered as to a school contract requiring teaching and coaching. ⁵

The law cited by counsel for plaintiff to support his position that the contract is divisible as a matter of law is found at 6 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 860 p. 255 (3rd Ed. 1962). This treatise provides:

'The distinguishing mark of a divisible contract is that it admits of apportionment of the consideration on either side so as to correspond to the unascertained consideration on the other side. Where such a purpose appears in the contract or is clearly deducible therefrom, it is allowed great significance in ascertaining the intention of the parties. . . . when there are no opposing signs . . .. Where these latter are present it becomes a question of...