BROWN v. BOWMAN

• Decision Date: 31 March 2011
• Docket Number: CAUSE NO.: 1:09-CV-346-TLS
• Parties: BRYAN J. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. DR. ELIZABETH BOWMAN, TERRY HARRELL, individually, and in her official capacity as Executive Director of the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program, TIM SUDROVECH, individually, and in his official capacity as Clinical Director of the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program, DR. STEPHEN ROSS, JOHN DOES and JANE ROES, co-conspirators, and RANDALL SHEPARD, in his official capacity as Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

BRYAN J. BROWN, Plaintiff,

v. DR. ELIZABETH BOWMAN, TERRY HARRELL, individually, and in her official capacity as Executive Director of the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program,TIM SUDROVECH, individually, and in his official capacity as Clinical Director of the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program,DR. STEPHEN ROSS, JOHN DOES and JANE ROES, co-conspirators, and RANDALL SHEPARD,in his official capacity as Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court, Defendants.

CAUSE NO.: 1:09-CV-346-TLS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

Dated: March 31, 2011

OPINION AND ORDER

In this case, the Plaintiff seeks redress for alleged violations of various constitutional, statutory, and common law rights by a number of individuals involved in the Indiana bar admissions process. The Plaintiff is not suing the Indiana Supreme Court Board of Law Examiners (BLE) or any of its directors. Instead, he is suing the executive director and the clinical director of the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Committee (JLAC) and medical professionals associated with the Indiana Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program (JLAP), claiming that they conspired against him based upon his religious beliefs. Thus, the basic thrust of the Plaintiff's lawsuit is that those involved with the JLAC and the JLAP were biased against him because of his religious beliefs and that this bias resulted in a denial of his application for admission to the Indiana bar by the BLE and the Indiana Supreme Court.

This matter is before the Court on a series of Motions to Dismiss filed by the Defendants. Before the Court can reach the merits of the Plaintiff's claims, the Court must first address some preliminary questions raised by the Defendants in their Motions to Dismiss, such as whether the Court has jurisdiction to review his claims or whether the Defendants are immune from suit. As the Court discusses in greater detail in this Opinion, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the Plaintiff's claims and the Defendants are entitled to immunity. Consequently, the Court will grant the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 8, 2009, the Plaintiff filed a twenty-six count Complaint [ECF No. 1], claiming, among other things, violations of various constitutional and statutory rights, and alleging a conspiracy to discriminate against him that culminated in a denial of his application for admission to the Indiana bar by the BLE and the Indiana Supreme Court's approval of the BLE's decision. In his Complaint, he named the following Defendants: Dr. Elizabeth Bowman, a psychiatrist on JLAP's approved providers list; Terry Harrell, JLAP's Executive Director; Tim Sudrovech, JLAP's Clinical Director; Dr. Stephen Ross, a clinical psychologist who examined the Plaintiff; John Does and Jane Roes, co-conspirators; and the Honorable Randall Shepard, Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court. Counts 1-13 and 25-26 are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging constitutional deprivations under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. These counts allege violations of different parts of the First Amendment: Counts 1-3 and 9-10 claim violations of the Free Speech Clause; Counts 4, 6, and 11 claim violations of the Free Exercise Clause; Counts 5 and 8 claim violations of the Establishment Clause; and Count 7 claims violation of the Assembly Clause. Likewise, the counts in the Complaint allege violations of different parts of the Fourteenth Amendment: Counts 12 and 25-26 claim violations of the Due Process Clause; and Count 13 claims violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The remaining counts (Counts 15-24) of the Complaint present claims under various state common law, statutes, and constitutional provisions. Counts 4-13, 16-19, and 21-23 are against Defendant Bowman; Counts 4-13 and 21-23 are against Defendant Harrell; Counts 4-13 and 20-23 are against Defendant Sudrovech; Counts 4-15 and 21-23 are against Defendant Ross; and Counts 1-10 and 24-26 are against Defendant Shepard. On December 16, 2009, the Plaintiff filed a Motion Seeking Temporary Equitable Relief [ECF No. 3]. On December 30, 2009, the Court issued an Order [ECF No. 22] denying the Plaintiff's Motion.

On January 29, 2010, Defendants Shepard, Harrell, and Sudrovech (the Indiana Supreme Court Defendants) filed a Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 27] and a Memorandum in Support [ECF No. 28]. On February 1, Defendant Ross filed a Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 29] and a Memorandum in Support [ECF No. 30]. On February 24, Defendant Bowman filed a Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 42] and a Memorandum in Support [ECF No. 43]. On March 29, the Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss [ECF No. 49]. On March 31, Defendant Bowman filed a Reply [ECF No. 50]. On April 8, Defendant Ross filed a Reply [ECF No.52] and the Indiana Supreme Court Defendants filed a Reply [ECF No. 53]. On April 26, the Plaintiff, with leave of Court, filed a Supplemental Brief [ECF No. 57], addressing the issue of absolute immunity. On May 5, Defendant Bowman filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Limited to Absolute Immunity [ECF No. 58]. On May 6, Defendant Ross filed a Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 59]. On May 7, the Indiana Supreme Court Defendants filed a Supplemental Reply Memorandum Regarding Absolute Immunity [ECF No. 60]. The Motions to Dismiss are fully briefed and ready for ruling.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff applied for admission to the Indiana bar and alleges the following occurred after he submitted his application to the BLE.¹ After the BLE processed the Plaintiff's application, it ordered a hearing on his application, which occurred on January 25, 2008. After the hearing, the BLE ordered the Plaintiff to participate in the JLAP. The Plaintiff met with Defendant Ross, a psychologist, who performed three psychological examinations over the course of two meetings with the Plaintiff. On April 23, 2008, Defendant Ross issued a report finding that nothing should preclude the Plaintiff's application from going forward, but he did note the possibility of a sub-clinical bipolar disorder of a hypomanic type. Doctors that subsequently evaluated the Plaintiff, including Doctors Sass, Flueckiger, Alexy, and Bowman, ruled out the possibility of a sub-clinical bipolar disorder.

Six weeks after Defendant Ross issued his report, Defendant Sudrovech directed the Plaintiff to see a psychiatrist. The Plaintiff mailed letters on June 12 and 24, 2008, to Defendant Ross, and subsequently copied them to Defendant Sudrovech, requesting that Defendant Ross make changes to his report. The Plaintiff sent a copy of his June 24 letter to the BLE and expressed concern over the content (specifically the religious content) of Defendant Ross's psychological evaluations. Defendant Ross did not make any changes to his report. On July 30, the Plaintiff sent a letter to JLAP accepting Defendant Sudrovech's June 4 offer to provide a mentor through JLAP. The Plaintiff's June 30 letter also repeated his request for a meeting with the JLAC.

On September 8, 2008, the Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendants Sudrovech and Harrell, raising concerns about the JLAP process being used to evaluate his candidacy for admission to the Indiana bar. On September 9, the Plaintiff requested that he be permitted to submit an evaluation by a psychiatrist of his own choosing. Defendant Sudrovech denied this request because evaluations were to be provided by a psychiatrist from the JLAP providers list. It appears that on September 16 the Plaintiff met with Dr. Flueckiger for a psychiatric evaluation after the Plaintiff presented himself to the St. Joseph's Medical Group. After a one-hour evaluation, Dr. Flueckiger stated that he could recommend that the Plaintiff be permitted to sit for the Indiana bar examination. Defendants Harrell and Sudrovech continued to direct the Plaintiff to see a JLAP certified psychiatrist in order to avoid dismissal of his application. On October 13, Dr. Flueckiger evaluated the Plaintiff for another hour and deemed that he passed under Rule 12 of the Indiana Rules for Admission to the Bar and the Discipline of Attorneys (Admission and Discipline Rules). Dr. Flueckiger compiled a report on May 1, 2009, which reflects his analysis under Rule 12. The Plaintiff had requested that someone from the JLAP pre-brief Dr. Flueckiger before he re-evaluated the Plaintiff. Dr. Flueckiger was not pre-briefed.

In an effort to comply with JLAP requirements, the Plaintiff scheduled an evaluation with one of the two program-certified psychiatrists in Indianapolis, Defendant Bowman. The Plaintiff met with Defendant Bowman for testing over a period of time during his application process. Part of Defendant Bowman's evaluation involved the Plaintiff visiting Dr. William Alexy, who conducted a psychological examination during an interview. Dr. Alexy's final report concluded that he could see the Plaintiff functioning adequately as a practicing attorney. On December 24, 2008, Defendant Bowman issued a report in which she did not reach a conclusion on the Plaintiff's fitness under Rule 12, but concluded that the Plaintiff suffered from a personality disorder, not otherwise specified. After receiving Defendant Bowman's report, Defendant Sudrovech prepared a report on behalf of the JLAP to assist the BLE in making its final determination on the Plaintiffs candidacy for admission to the Indiana bar. The BLE's final determination was that the Plaintiff's application should be denied and that he would not be admitted to the Indiana bar or be able to seek admission again until 2014. The Plaintiff sought review of this decision by the Indiana Supreme Court. The court issued an order stating that "[a]fter careful review of the submissions of the parties, it is the Court's determination that the BLE's decision should stand. Accordingly, Applicant's ...