Brown v. Bridges, 12-CV-4947-P

• Decision Date: 30 January 2015
• Docket Number: No. 12-CV-4947-P,12-CV-4947-P
• Parties: DEMITRI BROWN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CHRISTOPHER B. BRIDGES, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

DEMITRI BROWN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CHRISTOPHER B. BRIDGES, et al., Defendants.

No. 12-CV-4947-P

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

January 30, 2015

ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

On July 1, 2014, the assigned Magistrate Judge issued Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation ("FCR") in which he recommended that the Court (1) deny Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions (doc. 108) and Defendant's Motion for Plaintiffs to be Held in Civil Contempt (doc. 109); (2) order Plaintiffs¹ to pay Defendant² $19,342.00 in fees and costs within twenty-one days with a warning that failure to do so will result in an order to show cause why the Court should not hold them in contempt or otherwise sanction them; (3) order Defendant to serve an additional supplemental response to an interrogatory seeking a description of certain documents (Interrogatory 3);³ (4) order Defendant to provide a declaration addressing efforts to identify documents to be describedin response to Interrogatory 3; (5) order Defendant to produce copies of documents that are responsive to Plaintiffs' Second Set of Requests for Production ("Second Requests") or otherwise make the copies available to Plaintiffs at their respective locations; and (6) warn Defendant that future failures to comply with a court order may subject him to sanctions. (See FCR, doc. 125.) Defendant timely objected to the recommendation. (See Def.'s Obj'n to FCR [hereinafter Obj'ns], doc. 130.) He urges the Court to adopt his objections rather than the FCR. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff responded to the objections and urges the Court to impose sanctions for that filing. (See Pl.'s Resp. Def.'s Obj'n [hereinafter Resp.], doc. 138.) For the reasons that follow, the Court accepts the FCR, after reviewing all relevant matters of record, including the FCR, the filed objections, and the response to the objections, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

I. AUTHORITY OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Section 636(b)(1) of Title 28 of the United States Code grants magistrate judges authority to consider and handle both non-dispositive and dispositive pretrial matters, subject to different standards of review by a district court judge. Section 636(b)(1)(A) permits district judges to "designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court," except for

a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action.

The district judge may review and reconsider any pretrial matter decided by a magistrate judge under the authority of subparagraph (A) when "it has been shown that the magistrate judge's order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law."

Section 636(b)(1)(B) permits district judges to refer dispositive matters to a magistrate judge for issuance of proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition.⁴ The statute provides for the filing of written objections to proposed findings and recommendations and for a de novo determination of matters "to which objection is made." Objections asserted in accordance with this provision serve "to narrow the dispute" and enable district judges "to focus attention on those issues - factual and legal - that are at the heart of the parties' dispute." Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 & n.6 (1985). And § 636(b)(1) "does not on its face require any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of an objection." Id. at 149. Nevertheless, "while the statute does not require the judge to review an issue de novo if no objections are filed, it does not preclude further review by the district judge, sua sponte or at the request of a party, under a de novo or any other standard." Id. at 154.

Like § 636(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 recognizes that the authority of magistrate judges and the corresponding review by the district court ultimately depend on whether the referred matter is properly characterized as dispositive or non-dispositive. 12 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3068 (3d ed. 2014). This distinction has constitutional significance because the Constitution of the United States "requires that Article III judges exercise final decision-making authority, and therefore, a district court judge must make the final determination on dispositive matters." Segal v. L.C. Hohne Contractors, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 790, 793 (S.D. W. Va. 2004) (citing Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1463 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 683 (1980))). Given the constitutionalconcerns about magistrate judges making dispositive rulings, courts do not confine application of § 636(b)(1)(B) to the eight listed motions; they instead key their review "to the underlying considerations of the dispositive-nondispositive dichotomy." 12 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3068.2 (3d ed. 2014). Consequently, when a referred matter is "not among the listed exceptional motions, the lenient 'clearly erroneous or contrary to law' standard of Section 636(b)(1)(A) would be applied so long as the judge did not conclude that the motion was nevertheless dispositive." Id.

Rule 72 provides further guidance as to reviewing both dispositive and non-dispositive pretrial rulings of magistrate judges. Parties have fourteen days to object to either type of ruling. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) and (b)(2). For non-dispositive matters, Rule 72(a) mandates that the district judge "consider timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law." For dispositive matters, Rule 72(b)(3) provides for a de novo determination of "any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to." While Rule 72(b) does not facially require any review in the absence of a specific objection, the advisory committee notes following its adoption in 1983 state: "When no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation."

Rule 72(a) and § 636(b)(1)(A) set out a "highly deferential standard [that] requires the court to affirm the decision of the magistrate judge unless 'on the entire evidence [the court] is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" Baylor Health Care Sys. v. Equitable Plan Servs., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 2d 678, 689 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). Over the years, courts have noted the following princi-ples of review:

The clearly erroneous standard applies to the factual components of the magistrate judge's decision. The district court may not disturb a factual finding of the magistrate judge unless, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. If a magistrate judge's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, a district judge may not reverse it. The legal conclusions of the magistrate judge are reviewable de novo, and the district judge reverses if the magistrate judge erred in some respect in [his or her] legal conclusions. [T]he abuse of discretion standard governs review of that vast area of choice that remains to the [magistrate judge] who has properly applied the law to fact findings that are not clearly erroneous.

Id. (quoting Arters v. Univision Radio Broadcasting TX, L.P., No. 3:07-CV-0957-D, 2009 WL 1313285, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 12, 2009) while omitting citations and internal quotation marks); accord Lahr v. Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P., 164 F.R.D. 204, 208 (N.D. Tex. 1996); Smith v. Smith, 154 F.R.D. 661, 665 (N.D. Tex. 1994).

Because "a magistrate judge may not seek out work or expand his or her role beyond that assigned by the district judge . . . the starting point in any analysis of an action by a magistrate judge is the scope of the specific referral to that magistrate judge by the district court." 12 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3068 (3d ed. 2014). In this case, the reference order does not limit the authority of the magistrate judge. (See Electronic Order Referring Motion, doc. 112.) That order merely states that the two sanction motions (docs. 108 and 109) and a motion to compel with accompanying request for sanctions (doc. 111) were referred to the magistrate judge. (See id.) In such instances, the authority of the magistrate judge regarding the referred motions is not constrained by the order of reference.

By issuing an FCR on the two sanction motions, the assigned magistrate judge proceeded cautiously and considered that portion of the referral as arising under § 636(b)(1)(B), which promptsa de novo determination of those portions of the FCR to which objection is made.⁵ The district court, however, is not required to apply the more stringent review merely because the magistrate judge has issued a recommendation. See Segal v. L.C. Hohne Contractors, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 790, 794-96 (S.D. W. Va. 2004) (recognizing that despite the magistrate judge's issued findings and recommendation, the proper review is for clear error under Rule 72(a)). The proper standard of review instead results from the nature of the matter referred.

Both referred motions address sanctions stemming from the discovery process. Plaintiff moved for hefty monetary sanctions ($2,000,000) and dismissal of defendants' claims with prejudice for alleged...