Brown v. Bronson

• Decision Date: 10 January 1877
• Citation: 35 Mich. 415
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Sarah C. Brown v. Kate M. Bronson and others

35 Mich. 415

Sarah C. Brown v. Kate M. Bronson and others

Supreme Court of Michigan

January 10, 1877

Heard January 4, 1877; January 5, 1877

Appeal in Chancery from Mecosta Circuit.

The premises involved in this controversy are a hotel and grounds, known as the Mason House property, at Big Rapids Michigan.

Decree affirmed, with costs.

W. N Draper and Roben & Marsh, for complainant.

Perkins & Chase, for defendants.

OPINION

Campbell, J.:

The bill in this case was filed bye the widow of Henry B. Brown, deceased, to recover her dower of certain property in Big Rapids, Mecosta county, which Brown was claimed to have conveyed to the defendants, who were his children, and would have been his heirs-at-law of any property which he owned at his death. This deed purported to have been made September 26th, 1871, two days before Brown's marriage with complainant. The bill claimed that if the deed was genuine it was in fraud of complainant, but disputed its genuineness and delivery.

Both parties to the marriage were beyond middle life, and had grown up children at the time. The defendants were children of Brown by a former wife. They claimed that the deed was delivered and intended to operate at once, and that it was made in fulfilment of a trust in their favor, the land being asserted to have been purchased with the proceeds of property held in trust for them from their mother's estate.

The court below, on the 14th of October, 1875, made a decree declaring complainant entitled to dower from her husband's death, December 13th, 1872, and ordering an inquiry as to her damages for dower withheld, and also, as to whether dower could be assigned by metes and bounds, and if not, to compute the present value of the dower interest according to the tables published in the Compiled Laws.

On the 4th of May, 1876, a further decree was made, after the commissioner had reported, whereby it was adjudged that dower could not be assigned by metes and bounds, or out of the rents and profits, and allowing a gross sum of three thousand two hundred and sixty-three dollars and forty cents, in lieu of dower, and a further sum of one thousand one hundred and sixty-two dollars and eighty-nine cents, for arrears.

We are satisfied that if the deed had been executed and delivered at the time of its date, it would have been a legal fraud on complainant, under the rule in Cranson v. Cranson, 4 Mich. R, 230. And assuming all that is claimed for defendants on the facts, the land was then owned by Henry B. Brown in his own right, and free from any trust whatever. The land in Illinois, which it is asserted was exchanged in part for the property in dispute, the balance being paid by Brown in other ways, was conveyed to Brown by his former wife herself, by an ordinary deed, and without any condition or declaration of trust; the deed declaring the uses to be for his benefit. We are aware of no rule by which a resulting trust could arise out of such a deed to the grantor or her heirs. If any trust arose at all it is shown to have been an express one by parol agreement, which was in contravention of the deed, and which we cannot presume to have been valid. And in the purchase of the property in controversy, the transaction was with the consent of the defendants, who knew how the title was taken, and trusted entirely to a similar parol understanding, which could not avail them under our statutes for any purpose.

In bringing about the marriage, Brown had, and was evidently intended to have, credit for owning the premises in controversy. The deed was not made public, and was unquestionably intended to prevent the dower interest of complainant from attaching,--if the deed itself was really made operative. This was a legal fraud, and could not lose that character by reason of any desire to carry out a previous purpose, concealed from complainant and the public, and continuing concealed during the remainder of Brown's life.

But, if we were required to consider the facts critically, we are not prepared to believe that the deed was intended to operate until subsequently delivered, and there is no evidence which satisfies us of any such delivery. We think the preponderance of evidence shows that Brown retained his control over the property and its rents during his life, and that this was expected and understood. It is possible he intended the deed to take effect at his death. As defendants are his heirs-at-law, no one can prevent them from asserting title in either capacity, so long as he made no devise, and so long as complainant's rights are protected. But as to her, we agree with the court below, that Brown is to be regarded as having died seized of the land.

We have referred to these facts as having some bearing on the last decree as well as the first. But the first decree was undoubtedly a final decree, and was so regarded below. It settled the title of complainant, and the further proceedings were in furtherance and partly in execution of the original decree. It was held in Damouth v. Klock, 28 Mich 163, that a decree in a partition suit settling the title is a final decree, notwithstanding the further inquiries and determination concerning the feasibility of an actual partition, the necessity of a sale, the taking of accounts, and other necessary action to complete the proceedings. A partition...