Brown v. Bronx Cross County Medical Group

• Decision Date: 14 October 1993
• Docket Number: No. 91 Civ. 8260 (DNE).,91 Civ. 8260 (DNE).
• Citation: 834 F. Supp. 105
• Parties: Sandra M. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. BRONX CROSS COUNTY MEDICAL GROUP, Laura Gazlay, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

834 F. Supp. 105

Sandra M. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. BRONX CROSS COUNTY MEDICAL GROUP, Laura Gazlay, Defendants.

No. 91 Civ. 8260 (DNE).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

October 14, 1993.

Colin A. Moore, Brooklyn, NY (Colin A. Moore, Arleen T. Ralph, of counsel) for plaintiff.

Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, New York City (Alan M. Klinger, Steven M. Weiner, of counsel), for defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

EDELSTEIN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Sandra M. Brown brings this action against defendants Bronx Cross County Medical Group and Laura Gazlay for discriminatory employment practices that she alleges ultimately led to termination of her employment. Plaintiff asserts that defendants' employment practices violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 2000e, as well as New York state law.

Defendants move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6) to dismiss plaintiff's § 1981 and § 1983 claims, and to strike from the complaint plaintiff's demands for compensatory and punitive damages and for a jury trial under § 2000e. In addition, Defendants argue that the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims, or in the alternative, should dismiss the state law claims.

BACKGROUND

In evaluating whether a complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, the court must assume the truth of plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 283, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 2943, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986); LaBounty v. Adler, 933 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir.1991). Accordingly, the following summary of facts is adopted from plaintiff's complaint.

Plaintiff Sandra M. Brown is a Jamaican national and a permanent resident of the United States. Plaintiff was employed by defendant Bronx Cross County Medical Group ("BCCMG"), a private professional corporation, as a medical records clerk from August 1985 until July 3, 1990. The events giving rise to the instant controversy began when defendant Laura Gazlay became Ms. Brown's supervisor at BCCMG. Ms. Brown avers that Ms. Gazlay refused to accommodate her domestic schedule even though Ms. Gazlay routinely accommodated other similarly situated non-Black employees' schedules. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Gazlay repeatedly harassed her, belittling Ms. Brown's Jamaican heritage and subjecting her to taunts and insults on a number of occasions.

Moreover, Ms. Brown claims that, when one of her co-workers "abused her in front of clients and other co-workers," Ms. Gazlay refused to discipline the offending co-worker despite being asked to do so by her superior. On another occasion, Ms. Gazlay attempted to fire Ms. Brown for arriving late to work, but reinstated her when she later discovered that Ms. Brown had in fact arrived on time. When Ms. Brown submitted a written complaint concerning Ms. Gazlay's treatment of her to BCCMG's Regional Administrator, "defendant Gazlay's hostility towards plaintiff intensified and on July 3, 1990, plaintiff was terminated." Complaint, at 4.

Ms. Brown filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging discrimination based on race and national origin. On September 27, 1991, the EEOC issued a finding that there was no probable cause for further action, and plaintiff filed this action on December 6, 1991.¹

DISCUSSION

Defendants move, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), to dismiss plaintiff's claims. In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court treats the facts alleged as true for the purposes of evaluating the legal merits of the complaint, and must determine whether the complaint or certain claims therein must be dismissed as devoid of merit under relevant substantive law even if the facts alleged are ultimately proven. See Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holdings L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1561, 118 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992); Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 773 (2d Cir.1991); Ryder Energy Dist. Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir.1984). "The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). Each of plaintiff's claims will be evaluated with reference to this standard.

I. Plaintiff's Federal Statutory Claims

A. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

Plaintiff filed her complaint on December 6, 1991. On November 21, 1991, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("the Act"), which amends Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), to allow the plaintiff in an employment discrimination action to sue for compensatory and punitive damages and to have her case heard by a jury. See Pub.S. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). Prior to these amendments, jury trials and compensatory and punitive damages had been held to be unavailable in cases brought under Title VII. See, e.g., Wade v. Orange County Sheriff's Office, 844 F.2d 951, 953 (2d Cir.1988). Plaintiff concedes that all conduct and events involved in this action occurred prior to passage of the Act, but argues that the Act should be applied retroactively. Defendants argue against retroactive application, and move to strike plaintiff's demands for compensatory and punitive damages and for a jury trial.

In Butts v. City of New York Department of Housing Preservation, and Development, 990 F.2d 1397, 1411 (2d Cir.1993), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Act does not apply retroactively to cases involving conduct that occurred prior to passage of the Act. Thus, a cause of action brought under Title VII, as the statute applies to conduct occurring prior to enactment of the Act, is limited to a claim for reinstatement and back pay, and the Title VII plaintiff has no right to a jury trial. Therefore, defendants' motion to strike from the complaint plaintiff's demand for compensatory and punitive damages and for a jury trial under Title VII is granted.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1981

Plaintiff cites the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as a further basis for her complaint. Section 1981 states, in relevant part, "all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens...." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988). In recent years, the scope of § 1981 has been in flux. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 177, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 2373, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989), the Supreme Court limited the scope of § 1981, holding that the right to make contracts "does not extend ... to conduct by the employer after the contract relation has been established, including breach of the terms of the contract or imposition of discriminatory working conditions." The Civil Rights Act of 1991 then superseded the Patterson decision and expanded the scope of § 1981 by providing that the term "make and enforce contracts" in § 1981 "includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b).

Facially, then, § 1981 as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 might appear to provide an additional ground for plaintiff's complaint. However, as the Second Circuit concluded with reference to the plaintiff in Butts, "Since the 1991 Act does not apply to Plaintiff's case, we must apply the law as it existed prior to the Act." Butts, 990 F.2d at 1411. Thus, the Court is bound to apply § 1981 to Ms. Brown's case as the law existed at the time defendants' alleged conduct occurred. Because Ms. Brown concedes that this conduct occurred prior to passage of the Act, § 1981 must be applied as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Patterson. See id.

Under Patterson, neither discriminatory treatment of Ms. Brown during her employment at BCCMG nor racially-based termination would give rise to a § 1981 action. The Patterson Court clearly excluded racial harassment during employment from the scope of § 1981, stating "racial harassment relating to the conditions of employment is not actionable under § 1981 because that provision does not apply to conduct which occurs after the formation of a contract and which does not interfere with the right to enforce established contract obligations." Patterson, 491 U.S. at 171, 109 S.Ct. at 2369. Furthermore, the Second Circuit has clarified Patterson, explicitly excluding claims for discriminatory termination of employment from the scope of § 1981: "Discharge from employment involves neither the making nor the enforcement of a contract, but rather conduct subsequent to the formation of the contract. Accordingly, as this Court has previously concluded, an allegedly discriminatory termination of a contract is not actionable under section 1981." Patterson v. Intercoast Management of Hartford, Inc., 918 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir.1990) (citing Gonzalez v. The Home Ins. Co., 909 F.2d 716, 722 (2d Cir. 1990)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1686, 114 L.Ed.2d 81 (1991).

In light of these decisions, § 1981 can have no bearing on this case and plaintiff's § 1981 cause of action is therefore dismissed.

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff cites 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as providing an additional basis for her complaint. Section 1983 limits state sovereign immunity by enabling a private citizen to bring a claim against a state official, or an individual acting under color of state law, for violation of that private citizen's constitutional rights. A § 1983 plaintiff must prove two elements. First, plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 1732, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978). Second, plaintiff must prove that the defendant depriving plaint...